Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Local 7-116, Intern. Woodworkers of America (CIO)
| Decision Date | 26 January 1955 |
| Parties | , 35 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2480, 27 Lab.Cas. P 68,967 COOS BAY LUMBER COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LOCAL 7-116, INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA (CIO); Shirley Johnston and Howard Campbell, as President and Business Agent, respectively, of said Local, Defendants-Appellants, A. L. Couty, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
James P. Rogers, Portland, argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent. With him on the brief were Hart, Spencer, McColloch, Rockwood & Davies, Portland.
William A. Babcock, Jr., Portland, argued the cause for defendants-appellants. With him on the brief was Clarence J. Young, Portland.
A. L. County, Coos Bay, pro se.
Before LATOURETTE, C. J., * and WARNER, ** ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND and PERRY, JJ.
This is an appeal by three of the 92 defendants from a declaratory judgment and decree which was entered by the circuit court at the conclusion of its trial of this cause. The three appealing defendants are Shirley Johnston, Howard Campbell and Local 7-116, International Woodworkers of America (CIO).
The plaintiff-respondent, Coos Bay Lumber Company, is a Delaware corporation which has complied with the laws of this state governing foreign corporations and which operates manufacturing plants in this state. It is engaged in 'commerce' as that term is defined in the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(6). The defendant-appellant, Local 7-116, International Woodworkers of America (CIO), to which we will hereafter refer as the union, is a labor organization as that term is employed in the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(5). It is the bargaining representative of the employees of the plaintiff-respondent, Coos Bay Lumber Company, to which we will hereafter refer as the employer or the plaintiff. The defendants-appellants, Shirley Johnston and Howard Campbell, are, respectively, the president and the business agent of the union. The 89 other defendants are, or were, employees of the plaintiff. None of them, with the exception of A. L. Couty, has appeared in this court. Mr. Couty, in propria persona, filed a short brief with this court which favors the challenged decree.
The relief sought by the complaint was the interpretation of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement which was in effect between the employer and the union. The agreement bore the signatures of the employer and the union. It did not contemplate that the employees should sign it, and none of them had signed it. The complaint petitioned the court to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement required the employer to make deductions from the wages of its 89 employees above mentioned, against their protest, and pay the deducted amounts, as directed by the union and the agreement to finance an employees' insurance program, or whether the collective bargaining agreement permitted the employer to pay the disputed wage amounts to those of its workmen who had notified it that they did not want the employees' insurance, but wished to have the entire amount of their wages paid to them. The union, by cross complaint, asked for (1) an accounting of all sums of money which had not been paid by the employer to the insurance carrier, (2) specific performance of the collective bargaining agreement, and (3) 'such other relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable.'
The challenged judgment and decree sustained the position of the employer and of the 89 employees who had dissented from the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court ruled that neither federal nor state law authorized the union, through collective bargaining, to commit the wages of the employees whom it represented to the financing of an employee insurance program.
Prior to 1950 the employer and the union had signed collective bargaining agreements which governed the relationship between the employer and those of its workmen who worked in its plants. June 20, 1950, after a period of negotiation, the employer and the union amended their collective bargaining agreement by inserting in it these provisions:
'1. All employees covered by this agreement shall receive a wage increase of 7 1/2 cents per hour effective May 1, 1950 and the wage scale shall be revised accordingly.
'2. There shall be included in each working agreement where there is no existing employer benefit plan in effect between the Local Union and Employer, the following clause:
* * *
* * *
The provisions just quoted are the parts of the collective bargaining agreement with which this suit is concerned. The parties refer to them as a Health and Welfare Insurance Program. The complaint prayed the court to construe them.
Prior to June 29, 1950, the union had arranged with the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereafter referred to as the insurance company) to issue to the plaintiff's employees policies of (1) life, (2) health and accident, and (3) accidental death and dismemberment insurance. The effective date of the insurance was July 1, 1950. At that time there was in effect a policy written by the Coos Bay Hospital Association which provided the employees with medical and hospital service. June 29, 1950, the union, through written notice, directed the employer to make deductions in the amount of 7 1/2 cents per hour from each employee's wages and pay the total to the insurance company at its Portland office, less $3.50 per month per employee for remittance to the Coos Bay Hospital Association. The letter directed the employer to make the deductions as of May 1, 1950. It requested that no deductions be made from the wages of employees whose employment terminated prior to July 1, 1950, since, obviously, those employees could obtain no benefits from the insurance.
The employer made no deductions for payment to the insurance company from the wages of any of its workmen for the period of May 1, 1950, to July 1, 1950, but instead paid to them the sum of $11,706.97 which would otherwise have been deducted and paid to the insurance company. In short, in the period of May 1, 1950, to July 1, 1950, the employer paid nothing to the insurance company. However, for that period the employer made the required deduction of $3.50 per month per employee for payment to the Coos Bay Hospital Association for those of its employees who, prior to June 21, 1950, had individually authorized the deductions and payments.
The record does not indicate the exact amount which the employer refused to deduct from its workmen and pay to the hospital association for the period extending from May 1, 1950, to July 1, 1950, for those who had not individually authorized the deduction and remittance.
From July 1, 1950 to August 1, 1950, the employer followed the instructions that it previously had received from the union as to those of its employees who had made no objection to the deductions. However, in that period the employer, contrary to the union's instructions, complied with the demands of those of its employees who had notified it to make no deductions for remittance to the insurance company. In lieu of making the deductions from the wages of those dissenting employees, the company paid to the dissidents the amount which it otherwise would have included in the total which, month by month, it remitted to the insurance company. In the meantime, it paid to the Coos Bay Hospital Association the sums which its workmen individually authorized it to deduct from their wages for remittance to that association. The amount which the insurance company did not receive in the period of July 1, 1950, to August 1, 1951, on account of the omission of the company to make the deductions directed by the union was $6,020.51. The record does not indicate the amount, if any, which was diverted in that period from the hospital association for the medical and hospital insurance which it provided.
Since August 1, 1950, the employer has deducted from its workmen's wages and deposited in a special account the wage payments in issue pending the decision of this case, except for the amounts which it has continued to pay to the Coos Bay Hospital Association. Neither the amount, if any, which was diverted from the hospital association since August 1, 1951, nor the amount of the remittances to that association from August 15, 1951, appears in the record. The payments since August 15, 1951, were contrary to the instructions of the union, which on that day orally notified the employer to send all wage deductions permitted by the collective bargaining agreement to the insurance company.
As we have stated, the trial court upheld the employer's disposition of the disputed wage deductions and payments. It rendered a decree based on a belief that neither federal nor state law authorized the union, through collective bargaining, to commit the wages of the employees which it represented to the financing of employee group insurance program.
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