Coover v. Moore
| Decision Date | 31 March 1862 |
| Parties | JULIA ANN COOVER, Respondent, v. MOORE & WALKER, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
1. Under the (R. C. 1855, p. 647,) where the person killed left minor children, if the husband or wife of the deceased fail to sue within six months after the death, the right of action of the wife or husband is barred. If there be no minor children, the suit may be brought by the husband or wife within one year.
2. It appears that the sum to be forfeited is not intended as a penalty, but as compensatory damages liquidated by the statute.
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.
This was an action brought upon the statute of damages. (R. C. 647, § 2.) The suit was commenced April 27, 1858, by petition in the circuit court of St. Louis county, the plaintiff alleging that her husband was killed by the negligence of the driver of defendant's stage, and that he died June 5, 1857. The suit was returnable to October term, 1858, and upon an allegation of non-residence, an order of publication was issued to appear at the October term, 1858. At the trial, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The deceased left minor children.
George P. Strong, for appellants.
I. The right of action of the plaintiff was barred at the time she commenced her suit, and the right to sue was vested in the minor children of George W. Coover.
II. The right the plaintiff is seeking to enforce is purely a statutory right. No action lies at common law for the negligent killing of another. Penal statutes must be strictly construed. There is no administering this law according to its intent and spirit; it must be administered according to its letter. No intendments will be made in favor or against either party. (Alsop v. Ross, 24 Mo. 283.) In Cushing v. Dill, 3 Ill. 460, where penalty was imposed for wrongly cutting timber, it was held that the penalty could not be recovered of one whose agent had cut the trees. (Wright v. Bennett, 4 Ill. 258; Jarrett v. Vaughan, 7 Ill. 132; Edwards v. Hill, 11 Ill. 22; Crosby v. Gipps, 16 Ill. 332 & 19 Ill. 309; Beadlestone v. Sprague, 6 J. R. 101; Commonwealth v. Churchill, 5 Mass. 174; ib. v. Chenay, 6 Mass. 347.) No action can lie upon such statutes in the name of any person unless named. .)
III. The right of the husband or wife to sue is conditioned that they sue within six months. The right of the child is conditioned that he be a minor; that there be no husband or wife, or that they do not sue within six months.
R. S. Hart, for respondent.
I. We contend that the proper construction of the statute is, that the right of action resides exclusively with parents during the first six months, and that after that it is common to them and the minor children until the year expires, which is fixed by section six as the limit upon the action as to any and all parties suing under either or any section of the law. (Palmer v. Lord, 6 John. Ch. 95; Farris v. Kirtly, 5 Dana, 440; 3 Ohio, 352.)
This was an action brought under the (R. C., p. 647.) The defendants were owners of a stage coach, and the husband of plaintiff, being a passenger in the coach, was killed through the negligence of the driver. The plaintiff brought this suit more than six months after the death of her husband, who left minor children. At the trial, in the St. Louis circuit court, instructions prayed by the defendants, that the lapse of time (six months) was a bar to the plaintiff's action, were refused. The second section of the act provides that a suit may be maintained--First, by the husband or wife of the deceased; or, second, if there be no husband or wife, or he or she fails to sue within six months after such...
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Rositzky v. Rositzky, 29985.
...it shows no cause of action." The doctrine so announced is bottomed on the reasoning in McNamara v. Slavens, 76 Mo. 329, and in Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574 — the latter case holding that: "There being thus no general right of recovery, open to all persons, representing the estate of the dec......
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Cummins v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co.
...this suit although they commenced it within the one year statutory period of limitations. One of the earliest cases, Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574, interpreting the rights of the beneficiaries named in the statute, held that where there were minor children the widow had no right to sue after ......
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State ex rel. Research Medical Center v. Peters
...suit (within six months of the death, or one year, respectively). The earliest consideration of that statute yielded the intent (Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574, l.c. 576 (1862) ): that "only such persons can recover in such time and in such manner as is set forth in the statute." The court fou......
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Casey v. St. Louis Transit Company
...seem to shake its authority. As was said by the learned judge in Marshall v. Wabash Ry. Co., 46 F. 269: "It is true that the court in Coover v. Moore said the damages are compensatory. So they may be in certain cases, and in some cases less than full compensation. But where the plaintiff is......