Copeland v. Beville, 35973
| Decision Date | 20 January 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 35973,35973,1 |
| Citation | 93 Ga.App. 442,92 S.E.2d 54 |
| Parties | M. R. COPELAND v. J. R. BEVILLE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion for new trial as amended for any reason assigned.
J. R. Beville brought an action against M. R. Copeland to recover an amount paid by him in response to a fi. fa. issued in a dispossessory case between Charles B. Aycock and the Copeland Motor Company, a corporation. The petition alleged that the defendant, M. R. Copeland, requested the plaintiff to sign a bond as surety in the dispossessory proceedings, that the defendant, who was an officer of the corporation at that time, knew that Copeland Motor Company was insolvent, that the defendant, in order to persuade the plaintiff to sign the bond, stated to the plaintiff that the signing of said bond would be a mere formality and that if he would sign it as a personal favor to him, he, the defendant, would personally guarantee that he, the plaintiff, would not lose anything by signing the bond, that the plaintiff, relying on the promise and personal guarantee of the defendant to hold the plaintiff harmless, signed the bond. The promise and guarantee of the defendant was an original undertaking by the defendant, an was the sole consideration upon which the plaintiff signed the bond. It was further contended that the Copeland Motor Company is insolvent and that the sole recourse of the signing the bond as an officer of the corporation, whose promise he signed the bond.
In his answer the defendant admitted aigning the bond as an officer of the corporation, but denied that the plaintiff had signed it at his request and for further plea alleged that the plaintiff signed the bond in order to protect certain property owned by the plaintiff land located on the property from which the Copeland Motor Company was being dispossessed.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant filed a motion for new trial on the usual general grounds, which he later amended to include seven special grounds. The motion for new trial as amended was overruled, and it is to this judgment that the defendant excepts.
Benjamin B. Garland, W. M. Redman, W. E. Watkins, Jackson, for plaintiff in error.
Beck, Goodrich, Goddard & Smalley, Griffin, for defendant in error.
The defendant contends that the 'alleged contract' was a contract to answer for the debt of another and that therefore it fell within the statute of frauds an must have been made in writing to be enforceable, while the plaintiff contends that the 'alleged contract' was one of indemnity, and need not be in writing. 'Indemnity' has been defined as 'the obligation resting on one person to make good any loss or damage another has incurred or may incur by action at his request or for his benefit.' See 42 C.J.S., § 1, p. 564. The allegations in the present case definitely fall within the category of the above definition of a contract of indemnity. The mere fact that the allegations were that the defendant stated to the plaintiff that he would personally guarantee that the plaintiff would not lose anything by signing the bond, rather than that he, the defendant, would indemnify the plaintiff against any loss if he would sign the bond makes no difference. In Jones v. Shorter, 1 Ga. 294, the word 'indemnify' was used, whereas in Clark v. Toney, 17 Ga.App. 803, 88 S.E. 690, an examination of the original record reveals that the word 'guarantee' was used, but in both of these cases it was held that a cause of action was set forth and in effect that the contract was not one that fell within the statute of frauds so as to require it to...
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Progressive Elec. Servs., Inc. v. Task Force Constr., Inc.
...113 Ga.App. at 207(1), 147 S.E.2d 649. Contracts of indemnity generally fall outside the Statute of Frauds. Copeland v. Beville, 93 Ga.App. 442, 443(1), 92 S.E.2d 54 (1956). Therefore, we hold that the Signature Provision is enforceable against Bush. 2. Progressive and Bush next assert that......
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Zambetti v. Cheeley Invs., L.P., A17A1052
...Progressive Elec. Svcs. v. Task Force Constr., 327 Ga. App. 608, 613 (1), 760 S.E.2d 621 (2014), citing Copeland v. Beville, 93 Ga. App. 442, 443 (1), 92 S.E.2d 54 (1956).Finally, we find no substantial error that was harmful as a matter of law. See Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 714 (4......
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Parse v. Brunswick Cellulose, Inc.
...at his request or for his benefit." Cash v. St. & Trail, Inc., 221 S.E.2d 640, 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (quoting Copeland v. Beville, 92 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956)). Parties to a contract may validly agree that one party (the indemnitor) will indemnify or "save harmless" the other party (......
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Cash v. Street & Trail, Inc., 50946
...person to make good any loss or damage another has incurred or may incur by acting at his request or for his benefit.' Copeland v. Beville, 93 Ga.App. 442, 92 S.E.2d 54. This is traditionally a covenant by the indemnitor to indemnify or 'save harmless' the indemnitee from claims of third pa......