Copeland v. Carter

Decision Date29 April 1981
Docket NumberNos. 36978,36979,s. 36978
Citation277 S.E.2d 500,247 Ga. 542
PartiesCOPELAND v. CARTER. CARTER v. COPELAND.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

John D. Mattox, Albert E. Butler, Jesup, for Richard copeland.

W. Glover Housman, Jr., Hubert H. Howard, Jesup, for Martha Thomas Carter, b/n/f.

JORDAN, Chief Justice.

On June 26, 1979, Martha Thomas Carter, 79 years old, filed a complaint in the Wayne Superior Court against Richard Copeland in which she alleged that Copeland had recorded a deed conveying certain lands from herself to Copeland, and, that Copeland had conspired with an unknown imposter to forge her signature to said deed. Carter prayed that the deed be set aside and that attorney's fees and punitive damages be awarded.

Copeland did not file an answer. Instead, on November 30, 1979, Copeland filed a motion to open the default which the trial court subsequently granted on the grounds that Copeland's failure to timely file an answer had been the result of excusable neglect and that the other conditions of Code Ann. § 81A-155(b) had been fulfilled. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict setting the deed aside and awarding Carter $3,000 for attorney fees.

Carter appeals the trial court's grant of Copeland's motion to open the default, and Copeland appeals a series of allegedly erroneous rulings by the trial court during trial.

We affirm the trial court in all instances.

1. Carter enumerates three errors regarding the trial court's grant of Copeland's motion to open the default: Copeland's failure to pay the costs prior to the hearing on the motion (Carter concedes that Copeland paid the costs prior to the trial court's grant of the motion), and, the failure of the facts sworn to by Copeland in his verified motion to open the default to establish either a meritorious defense or excusable neglect.

Assuming a movant's compliance with the other conditions in Code Ann. § 81A155(b), a trial court is authorized to grant a motion to open a default so long as the movant has paid the costs prior to the grant of said motion. Cf. Sweat v. Mohr & Sons, 21 Ga.App. 93, 94 S.E. 79 (1917) (held: trial court is without discretion to grant a motion to open a default when the movant has only offered to pay the costs upon the motion being granted).

By verified answer, Copeland swore to the following facts: On or about June 11, 1979, Copeland and Carter went before Notary Public Paul Scott and executed, in the presence of one other person, a warranty deed conveying certain lands from Carter to Copeland. These facts constitute a meritorious defense to Carter's allegations that Copeland had conspired with an unknown imposter to forge her signature to the deed.

Regarding Carter's complaint that the facts sworn to by Copeland in his verified motion to open the default failed to establish excusable neglect, and, that the trial court therefore erred in opening the default on that ground, we note first that Code Ann. § 81A-155(b) states three grounds upon which a trial court may open a...

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21 cases
  • Strader v. Palladian Enters., LLC
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 16, 2011
    ...5, 402 S.E.2d 723 (1991); Muscogee Realty Dev. Corp. v. Jefferson Co., 252 Ga. 400, 402, 314 S.E.2d 199 (1984); Copeland v. Carter, 247 Ga. 542, 543(1), 277 S.E.2d 500 (1981); Axelroad v. Preston, 232 Ga. 836, 837(1), (2), 209 S.E.2d 178 (1974). Finally, Strader's reliance on In the Matter ......
  • Bowen v. Savoy
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 28, 2020
    ...or gross negligence. See Muscogee Realty Dev. Corp. v. Jefferson Co. , 252 Ga. 400, 402, 314 S.E.2d 199 (1984) ; Copeland v. Carter , 247 Ga. 542, 543 (1), 277 S.E.2d 500 (1981). Whether the plaintiff will be harmed or prejudiced by opening the default is likewise a universally pertinent co......
  • Principal Lien Servs., LLC v. Kimex Boat Rock 1183, LLC.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 14, 2019
    ...required to pay costs before the order granting the motion is entered." Id. at 491 (1), 384 S.E.2d 648. See also Copeland v. Carter , 247 Ga. 542, 542 (1), 277 S.E.2d 500 (1981) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in opening default where movant paid costs after filing a motion to ope......
  • Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 23, 1982
    ...as "a proper case has been made for the default to be opened". Code Ann. § 81A-155(b) (now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b)); Copeland v. Carter, 247 Ga. 542, 543, 277 S.E.2d 500 (1981); Broadaway v. Thompson, 127 Ga.App. 600, 194 S.E.2d 342 2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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