Copeland v. Wheelwright
| Decision Date | 24 May 1918 |
| Citation | 119 N.E. 667,230 Mass. 131 |
| Parties | COPELAND v. WHEELWRIGHT et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Case Reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.
Petitions by William A. Copeland against Arthur W. Wheelwright and others, for review of decree approving compromise, and for vacating decree allowing a will. The petitions were dismissed, and petitioner appealed to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. On reservation for the full court. Decrees dismissing petitions affirmed.
Fred T. Field, of Boston, for petitioner.
Robert G. Dodge and Harold S. Davis, both of Boston, for Herbert W. Windeler and others.
Henry Wheeler, of Boston, for Arthur W. Wheelwright and others.
These petitions were brought to vacate two decrees of the probate court, one authorizing and approving an agreement for compromise of a controversy over the allowance of the will of John W. Wheelwright, and the other allowing his will but directing it to be executed and his estate administered in accordance with the agreement. These petitions were filed after the expiration of the time limited for appeals from the decrees.
The grounds alleged in each petition are that the probate court had ‘no legal power or authority to enter the same’ and that therefore they are ‘without validity and effect.’
The pertinent facts are that John W. Wheelwright died in April, 1916, leaving an instrument purporting to be his last will. He had been an insane person under conservatorship for many years. When his will was presented for allowance, doubts existed as to his testamentary capacity. He left no widow, and his next of kin were an unmarried son aged about fifty-two and a married daughter with three minor children. It is contended that the instrument as drawn was ‘difficult to construe.’ Apparently, however, it established a trust for the benefit of the son and daughter, with remainder as to the share of the son in certain contingencies to his heirs at law. His heirs presumptive at that time were his sister and, in the event of her decease, her children. The remainder of the share, of which the sister was entitled to the income during her life, was for the benefit of her issue. The son was appointed one of the executors and was one of the petitioners for the allowance of the will. The daughter appeared to contest the will. It was under these circumstances that the agreement for compromise of contest as to the allowance of the will was made.
It was executed and approved in accordance with the procedure marked out in R. L. c. 148, §§ 15-18, St. 1903, c. 222. The formal requirements of the statute were strictly observed. A guardian ad litem and next friend was appointed to represent ascertained interested minors (being children of the daughter), and all other persons unascertained and not in being, who might be or become interested. This guardian signed the agreement for compromise in each capacity. It was signed also by all the other parties in interest. The terms of the agreement need not be set forth in detail. It is enough to say that under it the provisions in the will for the benefit of the heirs at law of the son are not to be executed, and an absolute interest is to be enjoyed by the son and the terms of the trust for the benefit of the daughter and her issue are to be executed in a manner different from that set forth in the will.
[1] Such an agreement is within the scope of the statute. Manifestly there was ground for a genuine contest respecting the testamentary capacity of the deceased. It was not a vexatious or frivolous contest. Nor is there anything to indicate that the controversy was feigned or simulated or a mere form without real substance contrived as a mask whereby disappointed legatees might induce a court to approve a distribution of the estate more satisfactory to themselves than was designed by the testator. Blount v. Wheeler, 199 Mass. 330, 85 N. E. 477,17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036.
The general purpose and effect of this statute has been stated in numerous cases. Most of them are collected in Ellis v. Hunt, 228 Mass. 39, 116 N. E. 956, where the subject is discussed. Its design was, in cases of real controversy between persons claiming as beneficiaries under a will and the heirs at law of the deceased, to establish a means for settling that controversy and binding future contingent interests, however complicated they may be under the will. The conditions imposed by the statute for such a settlement are that (1) all persons in interest capable of acting for themselves and guardians of those persons in interest ascertained and in being not competent to act for themselves, shall sign the agreement, (2) a guardian shall be appointed with official responsibility and duty to investigate fully and protect all unascertained and future contingent interests, and (3) the agreement must be found by the court to be just and reasonable in relation to the parties in being and in its effect upon any future contingent interests and bequests to charities, and a decree expressive of that finding must be entered. These are the only limitations upon the scope of such an agreement for compromise in writing specified expressly in the statute. It is a necessary consequence of these broad provisions that the terms of such an agreement for compromise may affect seriously future contingent interests. Persons not under any legal disability have apart from the statute full power to enter into contracts respecting the disposition of property to which they are entitled under wills, and such agreements will be enforced in equity. The statute enables future contingent interests to be affected by agreements in addition to vested interests. Doubtless that was one of its main purposes. It affords the sanction of judicial approval to the form and substance of the agreement. It vests the enforcement of the terms of the agreement in the executor or administrator with will annexed.
The agreement in the case at bar was entered into by all the heirs at law and by the legatees and devisees. It was between adversary parties. It is not necessary to determine whether in such a case the future contingent interest must be represented not only by a guardian but also by the holder of an interest. In passing it may be observed that there may be cases where the present holder would be practically sure not to be the taker. Elder v. Adams, 180 Mass. 303, 62 N. E. 373. In the case at bar the daughter of the deceased and her children were the heirs presumptive of the son. They were all parties to the agreement. It was for the interest of these children to support to claims of the heirs of the son, their uncle.
The agreement contains concession by the legatees under the will sufficient to support its character as a compromise....
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...Mass. 39, 43, 116 N.E. 956. See, also, Brandeis v. Atkins, 204 Mass. 471, 474, 90 N.E. 861, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 230; Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 136, 119 N.E. 667. Thus, when a contest was withdrawn under a compromise and the residuary estate was divided equally between the legatee ......
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