Copland v. Pirie

• Decision Date: 06 December 1901
• Citation: 26 Wash. 481,67 P. 227
• Parties: COPLAND v. PIRIE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

67 P. 227

26 Wash. 481

COPLAND v. PIRIE et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 6, 1901

Appeal from superior court, King county; O. Jacobs, Judge.

Action by George H. Copland against James Pirie, defendant, and Ralph D. Nichols, garnishee. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

S.D. King, for appellant.

H. H Herren, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

The sole question presented by this appeal is the constitutionality of the first section of the act of March 11, 1897, entitled 'An act relating to exemptions of personal property.' Sess. Laws, 1897, p. 93. The section is as follows: 'Section 1. There shall be exempt from execution and attachment to every householder in the state of Washington personal property to the amount and value of one thousand dollars ($1,000) in addition to the property exempt under section 486 of volume 2 of Hill's Statutes and Codes of the State of Washington: provided, that no property shall be exempt from execution for clerks' laborers', or mechanics' wages, earned within this state, nor shall any property be exempt from execution issued upon a judgment against an attorney on account of any liability incurred by such attorney to his client on account of any moneys, or other property coming into his hands, from or belonging to his client.' It is contended that the act violates, among others, section 37, art. 2, of the state constitution, which provides that 'no act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length.' In construing similar constitutional provisions the courts seem generally to have held that this requirement does not apply to supplemental acts not in any way modifying or altering the original act nor to those merely adding new sections to an existing act nor to acts complete in themselves, not purporting to be amendatory, but which by implication amends other legislation on the same subject. On the other hand, the courts are equally emphatic that if the act is not complete in itself, and is clearly amendatory of a former statute, it falls within the constitutional inhibition, whether or not it purports on its face to be amendatory or an independent act. See cases collected in 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 282, 283. The section in question, it seems to us, is not complete in itself. It does not purport to add an additional section to the statute relating to exemptions of personal property, but...