Copley v. Stone

• Decision Date: 30 December 1947
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 776.
• Citation: 75 F. Supp. 203
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: COPLEY v. STONE et al.

75 F. Supp. 203

COPLEY v. STONE et al.

Civ. A. No. 776.

District Court, W. D. South Carolina, Spartanburg Division.

December 30, 1947.

E. P. Riley, of Greenville, S. C., and H. H. Edens, of Columbia, S. C., for plaintiff.

Perrin, Tinsley & Perrin, of Spartanburg, S. C., for defendants Alvin C. Stone and J. H. Williams.

Young & Long, of Union, S. C., for Mrs. Smith Lancaster and Smith Lancaster.

WYCHE, District Judge.

In this action plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries which he alleges were caused by the collision of a motorcycle driven by one Leo L. Powers, upon which he was riding as a passenger, when the motorcycle collided with the rear of a taxicab driven by the defendant Alvin C. Stone; that the collision of the motorcycle with the taxicab was caused by a collision of the taxicab with an automobile driven by the defendant Smith Lancaster; that the taxicab was driven by the defendant Alvin C. Stone as agent of the owner, the defendant J. H. Williams; that the automobile was driven by the defendant Smith Lancaster as agent of the owner, the defendant Mrs. Smith Lancaster; that his injuries were caused by the separate, independent acts of negligence of the defendants Stone and Williams on the one hand, and of the defendants Mrs. Smith Lancaster and Smith Lancaster on the other hand.

The defendants Stone and Williams deny the material allegations of the complaint, and allege that the injuries to the plaintiff were the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendants Mrs. Smith Lancaster and Smith Lancaster "to which these defendants contributed in no particular whatsoever"; that the injuries to the plaintiff were the direct and proximate result of the negligence on the part of the operator of the motorcycle on which plaintiff was riding, concurring and combining with the alleged negligence of these defendants (which negligence is specifically denied) without which said negligence on the part of the operator of the motorcycle said injuries to the plaintiff would not have occurred; that the plaintiff and the operator of the motorcycle on which plaintiff was riding were engaged in a joint enterprise and the acts of negligence committed by the operator of the motorcycle were attributable to the plaintiff, and that plaintiff was thereby guilty of contributory negligence. However, the defenses of joint enterprise and contributory negligence were abandoned during the trial.

The defendants Mrs. Smith Lancaster and Smith Lancaster deny the material allegations of the complaint and deny that Smith Lancaster was the agent of the defendant Mrs. Smith Lancaster.

At the conclusion of the testimony for the plaintiff, the defendants moved for a dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove any actionable negligence on their part, and made a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of all the testimony upon the same ground. Under Rule 50(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, I reserved my decision on both motions, and submitted the cause to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $8,000 actual damages against the defendant Stone, Williams and Smith Lancaster.

The matter is now before me upon the motion of the defendants Stone and Williams for judgment non obstante veredicto and failing in that for a new trial.

The accident happened near the center of Union Street slightly beyond the intersection of Advent and Union Streets in the City of Spartanburg, South Carolina. The jury, upon consent of the parties, viewed the scene of the accident, and by suggestion of counsel, I have inspected it for information in the consideration of this motion.

The scene of the accident, together with the photograph introduced at the trial (Exhibit 1), and the testimony in this case, disclose that Union Street, from curb to curb, is approximately 35 feet wide, and runs in a northerly direction from the city limits of the City of Spartanburg to a traffic light where it crosses Kennedy Street; that Advent Street runs across Kennedy Street in a southwesterly direction into Union Street, forming an angle of about thirty-six degrees between Union and Advent Streets; Advent Street is, from curb to curb, about 36 feet wide; however, it is approximately 100 feet wide where it enters Union Street; that Kennedy Street runs in a westerly direction across Advent Street and crosses Union Street at a traffic light. A Shell filling station is located on the triangular island formed by Advent, Kennedy and Union Streets. Upon approaching the Advent Street intersection from the south on Union Street the entire section of Advent Street between Kennedy and Union Streets is visible for a distance of approximately 150 feet. There is a "Stop" sign on the right-hand side of Advent Street where it enters Union Street.

The following traffic ordinances and State statutes were introduced in evidence: "Those streets and parts of streets described in Schedule IV attached hereto and made a part hereof are hereby declared to be through streets for the purpose of this section. (Union Street is designated as a through street.)

"When stop signs are erected or marked on streets intersecting a through street at the entrances thereto or at the entrance to any intersection, every driver of a vehicle shall stop at every such sign or at a clearly marked stop line before entering the intersection except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic control signal.

"It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subdivision (b) of this section for any person who is an habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive any vehicle within this city.

"Any person who drives any vehicle in such a manner as to indicate either a wilful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.

"No person shall drive a vehicle on a street at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.

"The fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the foregoing prima facie limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when travelling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions, and speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the street in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.

"When two vehicles enter an intersection from different streets at the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right.

"The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this ordinance at the entrance to a through street and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said through street, or which are approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver, having so yielded, may proceed, and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through street shall yield the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through street."

"No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing."

"Where no special hazard exists the following speeds for passenger vehicles shall be lawful and any speed to excess of said limits shall be unlawful:

"1. Twenty-five miles per hour in any business district;

"2. Thirty-five miles per hour in any residence district;

"3. Fifty-five miles per hour under other conditions."

"The fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the foregoing limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions, and speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care."

"Whenever the department shall determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that any speed hereinbefore set forth is greater than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any part of a highway, the department shall determine and declare a reasonable and safe speed limit thereat which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection or other place or part of the highway."

"The foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the burden of proving negligence upon the part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an accident."

"No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after giving a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement or after giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any other vehicle may be affected by such movement."

"No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal."

"The signals herein required shall be given...