Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Owen Steel Co.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-659.
• Citation: 348 F. Supp. 1363
• Parties: SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. OWEN STEEL COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

348 F. Supp. 1363

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. OWEN STEEL COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 71-659.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

October 10, 1972.

N. Welch Morrisette, Jr., Columbia, S. C., for plaintiff.

Donald V. Richardson, Columbia, S. C., for defendant.

ORDER

HEMPHILL, District Judge.

This suit was instituted by the plaintiff Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, hereafter referred to as Seaboard, to recover property damages resulting from a collision which occurred on December 7, 1970, between plaintiff's trains and defendant's tractor-trailer trucks, at the intersection of the plaintiff's railroad with South Beltline Boulevard near but outside the city limits of Columbia, South Carolina. Defendant, hereafter referred to as Owen, filed a general denial and a counterclaim seeking recovery for property damages to its tractor-trailer and steel. The amount of damage sustained by each party was stipulated. The parties agreed to strike punitive damages from their claims. The defense of contributory negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, wilfulness and wantonness was raised by each party.

The trial of the case started on Tuesday, March 21, 1972. After all the evidence was submitted, the parties moved for directed verdicts in support of their respective claims and for the dismissal of the respective claims against them. All the motions were denied, and the case was submitted to the jury, with instructions on the issue of liability, on Thursday, March 23, 1972. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was thereupon declared by the court.

Seaboard now renews its motions (under Rule 50(b)¹ of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) for a directed verdict and for judgment for plaintiff on its complaint and for a directed verdict of dismissal of Owen's counterclaim. Where the jury fails to return a verdict and is discharged, under subdivision (b) of this rule, the court could direct entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or could order a new trial. Daniels v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 120 F.Supp. 96 (D.C.N.Y.1954).

The Seaboard track runs in a fairly straight line East to West for several miles prior to this grade crossing. South Beltline Boulevard, as it approaches the crossing, approximates a rude shallow S. The first view of the tracks is head on at right angles. Coming from the plant site of Owen Steel Company on South Beltline Boulevard, one passes under a Southern Railroad trestle and views the elevated embankment of the Seaboard tracks. After a moderately winding curve to the left the roadway nearly parallels the tracks in a straight course for a distance of some 700 feet, thereafter makes a slight curve to the right prior to the crossing. The highway crosses the track in a straight line at an angle of approximately 30 degrees. From the first curve to the left to the second curve to the right, the roadway has a gradual incline to crossing grade.

The curves are marked by South Carolina Highway Department curve warning signs and posted speed limit signs of 25 m. p. h. About 300 feet prior to the crossing there is a round South Carolina Highway Department Railroad crossing sign mounted on a post. Further warning of the crossing consisted of an X crossing symbol and a RR railroad symbol painted in white letters on the pavement. The crossing itself is marked by the standard post-mounted railway crossbuck sign.

Plaintiff's train was approaching the City of Columbia at approximately 7:35 a. m. on December 7, 1970, at a speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour. The day was clear and, according to the testimony, the sun had just risen and was slightly to the north of the east-west track.

Defendant's driver was driving a 1969 White cab-over type tractor with a Dorsey flatbed trailer in tow with a load of steel beams aboard. The prospective route was from Owen Steel Company to Fort Jackson, S. C. via South Beltline Boulevard northbound. The driver, Mr. Readie Davis, admittedly experienced, was driving up the incline toward the crossing in ninth gear at a speed of about 20 miles per hour. He did not stop at the crossing and although the tractor successfully cleared the tracks, the locomotive struck the trailer. The momentum of the train carried the tractor trailer off the road and down the right of way. A party in a Rambler automobile was also involved in the collision, as the truck and train carried across his lane, sweeping his vehicle down the right of way.

The testimony was in conflict as to whether the statutory signals² were given. This issue would also determine the applicability of 58-1004 of the S.C.Code Anno., 1962.³ The locomotive crew, consisting of the engineer and the brakeman, testified that the signals were given. Defendant offered testimony of those who did not hear the signals, and plaintiff offered testimony to explain the reason for their failure to hear the signals.

A brakeman was stationed on the left of the engine. The defendant's truck and another which preceded it were observed by the brakeman for some distance prior to the collision. According to the brakeman's testimony, he saw the truck was not going to stop and he shouted to the engineer who immediately put the train into emergency braking. Defendant argues that there is a reasonable inference of negligence on the part of the brakeman because he observed the truck approaching and failed to apply the emergency brakes which was the only control he had to operate, and that the brake was immediately in front of him.

Without attempting to reproduce here other conflicting evidence and inferences present at the trial, this court concludes that plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict on the complaint and on the counterclaim must be denied because the issues are those of fact which are properly for the jury and not the court. It is elementary that in ruling upon such motions the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the party against whom such motion has been made, namely Owen Steel Company, the defendant; and a verdict should not be directed unless the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is in favor of Seaboard. Therefore if there are reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in favor of Owen, then it would be erroneous to direct a verdict against Owen. This court will take questions of fact away from the jury only where the necessity for such action is clear and imperative. M. J. Carroll, Inc. v. Gilmore, 103 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1939); Copley v. Stone, 75 F. Supp. 203 (D.S.C.1948).⁴

Since there is conflict in the testimony as to whether the statutory signals were given, the court must assume for the purpose of these motions that they were not given. Failure to give the signals is negligence per se. Ford v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 169 S.C. 41, 168 S.E. 143 (1932). Limehouse v. Southern Ry. Co., 216 S.C. 424, 58 S.E.2d 685 (1950). Owen's counterclaim is based on Section 58-1004 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1962) which requires a finding of contributory gross negligence⁵ or recklessness on the part of Owen before recovery by it may be defeated in such crossing cases as this one where there is evidence that the statutory warning signals, required by Section 58-743 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1962), were not given by the train crew. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Glenn, 198 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 935, 73 S.Ct. 505, 97 L.Ed. 719.

Seaboard contends that Readie Davis, Owen's driver, neither attempted to look nor listen for an approaching train before he crossed the track. If this were the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, then a verdict against Owen would be proper. Wingate v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 244 S.C. 332, 137 S.E.2d 258 (1964). However, Readie Davis testified⁶ that he looked both ways, had his window partially down and listened, and neither heard a train nor saw a train. He testified that when he tried to look down the track to the east, his vision was blinded by the bright, rising sun but that he could see for about a hundred feet. Larry Richardson, a witness who had stopped his car on the other side of the track and who was heading south on South Beltline, testified that he could hardly see the train due to the glare of the sun; and he was situated in an optimum location for observing the approaching train. Readie Davis had driven for over 700 feet parallel to Seaboard's track and never heard a whistle blow or bell ring. In determining the negligence of a motorist in a railroad crossing collision, the test is always the conduct of an average, reasonably prudent person under existing conditions, and when railroad whistles or other warnings are not being sounded, a resulting assumption of safety to cross the railroad arises. Vernon v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 221 S.C. 376, 70 S. E.2d 862 (1952). A jury could reasonably conclude that, under the conditions existing at the time of the accident, Readie Davis took reasonable precautions to ascertain whether a train was approaching. The duty of a motorist is to look and see what reasonably could be seen; to listen and hear what reasonably could be heard. There is no absolute duty to see what reasonably cannot be seen or to hear what reasonably cannot be heard. Certainly there is no absolute duty to stop at a railroad...