Copper Care, Inc. and Elizabeth Clark v. Ohio Department of Human Services and Jean Ruggieri, 98-LW-5672
| Decision Date | 28 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | C.A. 17167,98-LW-5672 |
| Parties | COPPER CARE, INC. AND ELIZABETH CLARK Plaintiffs-Appellants v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND JEAN RUGGIERI Defendants-Appellees C.A. Case No. 17167 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
STEPHEN R. FELSON, 36 E. Seventh Street, Suite 1650, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Atty. Reg. #0038432, And IRVIN J. ZIPPERSTEIN, 650 Talbott Tower, 118 W. First Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402, Atty Reg. #0002568, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
LEW A BECHTOL, II, Assistant Attorney General, Assistant Chief Atty. Reg. #0042435 and ANNETTE M. DURBEN, Certified Legal Intern, Juvenile Justice, 30 E. Broad Street, 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees.
In this case, Plaintiffs/Appellants, Elizabeth Clark and Copper Care, Inc. (Copper Care), appeal from a summary judgment awarded to Defendants/Appellees, Jean Ruggieri and the Ohio Department of Human Services (ODHS). This case has been before us previously, on the issue of whether Copper Care appealed in a timely fashion from an administrative decision of ODHS. Specifically, ODHS sent Copper Care an adjudication order on December 4, 1995, revoking Copper Care's certification with ODHS as a foster care network and adoption placement agency. Subsequently, Copper Care appealed ODHS's decision to the common pleas court, but the appeal was dismissed as untimely. We then affirmed that decision. See, Copper Care, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services (Nov. 1, 1996), Montgomery App. No. 15834, unreported. However, while we agreed with the trial court that the administrative appeal was untimely, we found error in the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for civil rights violation and for an injunction. Our reasoning was that these claims were distinct from the issues adjudicated at the administrative level. As a result, we sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
Copper Care is an African American-owned private child placement agency. The civil rights claim was based on allegations that ODHS and Ruggieri discriminated against Copper Care and deprived Copper Care of its right to contract in violation of Section 1981, Title 42, U.S. Code, by treating Copper Care differently from similarly situated white-owned agencies. Among the alleged differences were that ODHS conducted unannounced visits to Copper Care and spread false rumors with the intent of destroying Copper Care's business. After remand, the trial court granted judgment to the defendants on jurisdictional grounds and also awarded summary judgment on the issue of Ruggieri's qualified immunity.
On appeal, Clark and Copper Care present the following assignments of error:
After considering the assignments of error, we find that the second and third assignments of error have merit and that the first assignment of error is not well-taken, except insofar as claims for prospective injunctive relief against Ruggieri in her official capacity are concerned. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings.
In the first assignment of error, Copper Care and Clark contend that the trial court erred in dismissing claims against ODHS and against Ruggieri in her official capacity. In its decision the trial court made the following disposition of the claims. First, the court rejected Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code claims against ODHS and against Ruggieri in her official capacity because neither ODHS nor Ruggieri were "persons" under 1983. Next, the court found that claims against the State and against Ruggieri in her official capacity under Section 1981, Title 42, U.S. Code, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the State's failure to waive its sovereign immunity. Additionally, the court found that Ruggieri was entitled to qualified immunity for claims brought against her in her individual capacity. And finally, the court found that prospective injunctive relief against Ruggieri was not warranted since Copper Care's license had been revoked and no appeal had been taken from our decision that the administrative appeal was untimely. The court also said that injunctive relief regarding attempts to obtain future licenses was not ripe.
Copper Care and Clark have not challenged the finding that ODHS and Ruggieri are not "persons" under Section 1983. Instead, they contend that the State and State employees acting in an official capacity are not immune from suit under Section 1981. In particular, they distinguish Section 1981 from Section 1983, by noting that Section 1981 has no language from which one might infer its inapplicability when a defendant is the state or a state agency. ODHS has responded in a number of ways. First, ODHS claims that ODHS, as a state agency, is absolutely immune from damages actions in common pleas court, whether the basis for the action is Section 1983 or Section 1981. Next, ODHS claims that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State under Section 1981. Finally, ODHS contends that Section 1981 does not provide an independent cause of action. Instead, according to ODHS, Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violation of rights guaranteed by Section 1981. As a result, the finding that ODHS is not a "person" under Section 1983 precludes any action against ODHS in common pleas court. ODHS also makes the same arguments with regard to claims asserted against Ruggieri in her official capacity.
Because our analysis below will show that the Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims are interrelated, we need to first consider what claims Appellants were entitled to bring under Section 1983. For resolution of this point, we look to federal law. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989), 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, the United States Supreme Court held that neither states nor officials acting in their official capacity are "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983. Later, in Hafer v. Melo (1991), 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301, the Court explained that state officials sued personally for acts done in an official capacity are "persons" for purposes of Section 1983. Further, the court in Hafer said that state officials sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief are also "persons" under Section 1983 because actions for prospective relief are not considered actions against the state. Id. at 27, 112 S.Ct. 362-63, 116 L.Ed.2d 310-11. This is consistent with a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Schwarz v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 267, which held that common pleas courts have jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims seeking prospective injunctive relief against individual state officers in their official capacities.
Furthermore, in Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Court of Claims legislation and the immunity provided by R.C. 9.86 do not apply to Section 1983 actions. Conley involved a suit against a special agent of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification that was based on several grounds, including malicious prosecution, defamation, and violation of Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code. The common pleas court dismissed the action, and the court of appeals then affirmed, based on the fact that under R.C. 2743.02, a plaintiff with a potential claim against the State of Ohio must first file in the Court of Claims for a determination of whether the employee is entitled to immunity under R.C. 9.86. On appeal from that decision, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the state law claims, but reversed as to the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims. Id. at 285. The reversal was based on the court's conclusion that R.C. 2743.02 and R.C. 9.86 are inapplicable to claims brought under federal law.
In particular, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on United States Supreme Court authority indicating that states cannot immunize conduct made wrongful under federal law even though the action is being brought in state courts. Id. at 292-93, quoting from Howlett v Rose (1990), 496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332. The court also focused on the Schwarz case, which as we said, held that common pleas courts have jurisdiction to hear Section 1983 claims against the state and its officers and employees. 64 Ohio St.3d at 293.
Based on the above authority, we conclude that Copper Care and Clark were not entitled to bring a Section 1983 action in common pleas court against ODHS, nor were they entitled to bring a damages action in common pleas court against Ruggieri in her official capacity as an ODHS employee. However, a Section 1983 action could have been brought against Ruggieri in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief and against Ruggieri in her individual capacity for damages arising out of her conduct as a state employee. These findings are consistent with the trial court's decision with the exception that the court discussed the claims against Ruggieri for prospective injunctive relief as if they had been brought in an individual, not an official capacity. This particular point will be addressed later, during our discussion of the merits of...
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