Cora v. Patterson
| Decision Date | 28 August 1974 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 19123,No. 1,1 |
| Parties | Dennis P. CORA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Betty PATTERSON, Defendant-Appellant, and Allstate Insurance Company, a foreign insurer, Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Leonard B. Schwartz, Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, Tyler & Gordon, Detroit, for Cora.
Joseph Crystal, Liberson, Fink, Feiler, Crystal & Burdick, Detroit, for Patterson.
David John Cooper, Garan, Lucow, Miller, Lehman, Seward & Cooper, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.
Before BRONSON, P.J., and BASHARA and VanVALKENBURG,* JJ.
This is an appeal taken by plaintiff-appellant Cora from a summary judgment entered for defendant-appellee Allstate Insurance Company in a declaratory judgment action begun by Cora after Allstate refused to defend a suit filed against Cora by defendant-appellant Patterson. Patterson had been injured in an accident with Cora on April 17, 1970 while Cora was operating a friend's motorcycle.
Circuit Judge Victor Baum held that Allstate was not obligated to defend Cora in the damage action filed by Patterson, on the ground that the Allstate automobile liability insurance policy issued to Cora's father did not comprehend coverage for a non-owned motorcycle operated by one who was not a named insured.
Judge Baum asserts in his well reasoned opinion, and the briefs filed here appear to assume, that Cora was not a named insured. The record does not affirmatively disclose whether Cora was a named insured; pertinent declarations concerning the identity of the named insured were not included in the record.
We are constrained, for purposes of this appeal, to treat Cora as other than a named insured. 1
The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether coverage under Allstate's policy, limited as it is to 'non-owned private passenger automobile(s)', extends to a motorcycle. We hold that it does not.
Initially, we direct attention to the many cases which counsel that the terms of an insurance policy must be construed in accordance with the ordinary and popular sense of the language used, so as to avoid strained interpretations. Edgar's Warehouse, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 375 Mich. 598, 134 N.W.2d 746 (1965); Economy Mills of Elwell, Inc. v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 8 Mich.App. 451, 154 N.W.2d 659 (1967); Huron Bowl, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 14 Mich.App. 62, 165 N.W.2d 265 (1968); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Duffin, 28 Mich.App. 142, 184 N.W.2d 229 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 384 Mich. 812, 184 N.W.2d 739 (1971); Weaver v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co., 32 Mich.App. 605, 189 N.W.2d 116 (1971).
Cora offers several dictionary definitions of 'automobile' which arguably include 'motorcycle'. But contrary definitions are also available. 2
Common usage is the touchstone. Cora argues that the word 'automobile' is ambiguous and cites Travelers, supra, in support of that proposition. In such a case, so goes the argument, a policy must be strictly construed against the insurer. If there is doubt about whether 'motorcycle' is included in the term 'automobile', that doubt must be resolved against the insurer.
The argument has but transparent appeal. Travelers was directed to the question whether a non-operable, non-licensed automobile, which the owner claimed he did not intend to repair, was a 'private passenger automobile' within the terms of the owner's insurance policy. As the Supreme Court later held, this was a question of Fact. Even accepting Cora's claim that Travelers stands for the proposition that the term 'automobile' is ambiguous, ambiguity is a relational term. The Court in Travelers was concerned with the apparent ambiguity of the term 'automobile' as it related to a motor car whose engine was not in operable condition, Not as it related to a motorcycle. Thus, the definition of 'automobile' applied in Travelers 3 and relied on by Cora must be read in light of the unique facts of that case. It is also limited by a case which followed Travelers--Weaver v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co., Supra.
In Weaver, we held that, for purposes of the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy, a motorcycle is not an automobile. Cora seeks to explain this result by labeling Weaver an 'exclusion' case; that in Weaver the clause being construed excluded coverage for any injury sustained while occupying an 'owned automobile'. Conversely, says Cora, the present case is one of inclusion, involving construction of one of the policy's main coverage clauses.
But the distinction, even if generally valid, does not make a difference in this context. Weaver was more than an exclusion case. It explored the scope of conversational language in comparing the meanings of 'motorcycle' and 'automobile': 'We conclude that in its every day usage the term 'automobile' does not include a motorcycle.' Weaver, supra, 32 Mich.App. at 607, 189 N.W.2d at 117:
It was further pointed out in Weaver that the insurance policy in that case did not disclose an intent to give an unusual meaning to the term 'automobile'. There 'owned automobile' was defined (in pertinent part) as a 'private passenger automobile', further defined as a 'four wheel private passenger, station wagon or jeep type automobile'. Here 'non-owned automobile' is defined (in pertinent part) as 'private passenger automobile', further defined as 'private passenger, station wagon or jeep type vehicle'.
Though Cora's affidavit indicates that the subject motorcycle had a passenger seat, the policy language unambiguously refers to four-wheeled passenger vehicles. Even though 'four wheel' does not appear in the present policy, the conjunction of 'private passenger' with 'station wagon' and 'jeep type' makes it clear that the phrase 'private passenger automobile' is referring solely to four-wheeled vehicles.
Thus, the insurance policy involved in the present case does not disclose an intent to define 'automobile' so as to alter its common meaning. 'Automobile' does not commonly include 'motorcycle', Weaver, supra, and in the present insurance policy, that result is, if anything, bolstered by use of the more descriptive and limited term 'private passenger automobile'.
Cases in other jurisdictions on this question are uniformly in accord. 4 The only case found involving construction of an insurance policy which disagrees is grounded in part on the presence of a representation by the insurer that the policy would cover motorcycles. 5
It should be noted, moreover, that this result is in accord with the purposes of the Financial Responsibility Act, M.C.L.A. § 257.501 et seq.; M.S.A. § 9.2201 et seq. That act mandates coverage for certain classes of persons and vehicles. For example, as was indicated above, coverage must be provided for named insureds for liability or damages arising out of the use of a non-owned motor vehicle. M.C.L.A. § 257.520(c); M.S.A. § 9.2220(c). Similar coverage for owned vehicles and other insured persons, M.C.L.A. § 257.520(b)(2); M.S.A. § 9.2220(b)(2), is also required. Public policy plainly requires that the statutorily mandated coverage be provided in every insurance policy. Allstate, supra. But public policy does not require that insurance companies provide coverage for persons or vehicles not included in the terms of the act. 6 Public policy is not offended when an insurance company does no more than comply with the terms of the statute. Allstate is not required by statute to provide coverage for non-owned vehicles driven by 'other insureds'. To do otherwise might well prevent insurance companies from efficiently assessing risks and spreading costs within the limits set by the act. Extending the scope of the act to require protection for persons not named in the insurance policy would fly in the face of the express language of the statute and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. 7
The order granting summary judgment for defendant-appellee Allstate is...
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