Coral Gates Properties v. Hodes

• Citation: 59 So.2d 630
• Parties: CORAL GATES PROPERTIES, Inc. et al. v. HODES.
• Decision Date: 13 June 1952
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

Page 630

59 So.2d 630

CORAL GATES PROPERTIES, Inc. et al. v. HODES.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division B.

June 13, 1952.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 1952.

Pepper, Lefevre, Orr & Faircloth, Tallahassee, Claude Pepper, Miami, and Earl Faircloth, Tallahassee, for appellants.

Cushman, Gay & Woodard and F. E. Gotthardt, Miami, for appellee.

MATHEWS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final decree in a suit brought under the provisions of Chapter 87 F.S.A. (Declaratory Judgment Statute), wherein a money judgment was entered against the appellants for real estate commissions for services rendered by a real estate broker under an alleged oral contract. Although the bill of complaint prayed for discovery and an accounting, this appears to be 'windowdressing', as the real purpose of the suit was to obtain a money judgment for the claimed real estate commissions under an alleged oral contract. A mere reading of the bill is sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff knew exactly what he claimed to be the terms of the alleged oral contract and what he had earned thereunder. The bill of complaint shows on its face that there were disputes between the parties as to the terms of the contract, as to a general release of all liabilities, as to breach of the alleged contract and the amount of damages. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the bill of complaint mainly on the ground that the bill of complaint showed on its face that the cause of action was for breach of an oral contract. In due course the Circuit Judge denied the motions and ordered answers filed. Answers were filed by all of the defendants in which they denied most of the material allegations of the bill of complaint and raised questions of fact as to the terms of the oral contract, the breach thereof, and pleaded a general release of all liability, duly executed by the appellee. Trial by jury was demanded.

After the answers were filed, the defendants filed, on March 22, 1950, a motion to transfer the cause to the law side of the Court on the ground that the same 'should have been brought as an action at law as will appear from the bill of complaint and the answers of these defendants.'

On the 25th of July, 1950, the Court made an order appointing a special master and referring the cause to the master to take testimony and report 'his findings, facts and conclusions to the Court.'

On July 31, 1950 the defendants filed objections to the motion for an order of reference on the grounds: (1) that there was pending a motion of the defendants to transfer the cause to the law side of the Court, and (2) that the bill of complaint and answers showed that the only issues involved were 'pure questions of fact which under the constitution and laws of this State should be tried by a Jury.'

On the 7th of August, 1950, the Court entered a further order denying the motion of the defendants to transfer the case to the law side of the court, revoked the order of reference theretofore made, and stated, 'after due notice the Court will consider the appointment of a Special Master together with the issues to be submitted to said Master, and those issues to be submitted to a jury under the provisions of Section 87.07 Florida Statutes [F.S.A.].'

On the 16th of August, 1950, the Court made a further order denying the motion to submit any questions of fact to a jury, appointed a special master 'for the purpose of taking testimony and he is hereby directed to file his report, including findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations to the Court.' Thereafter 330 pages of testimony were heard by the master.

While taking testimony, the master made the following statement for the record, 'I think we have developed this cause into a battle between the witnesses and their credibility.' In his report to the Chancellor, the master said:

'The testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses and the testimony of the defendants and their witnesses is in direct conflict concerning the material elements of the case. There was much testimony given in an attempt to discredit witnesses for each side. It would be impossible to give the Court a concise statement to thereby enable the Court to understand the bitterness existing between the plaintiff and defendants and would probably be necessary for the Court to read the transcript of testimony. * * *'

The transcript of the testimony in this case fully justifies the above quotations and conclusions of the special master.

Based upon this report of the special master and his recommendations and his determination of credibility of witnesses and conflicts of testimony, the Chancellor entered a final decree, which was a money judgment in this case for a real estate commission. Section 87.11 F.S.A., is as follows:

'This chapter is declared to be substantive and remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status and other equitable or legal relations; and is to be liberally administered and construed. Laws 1943, c. 21820, § 11.'

The purpose of this suit was not for the construction of a written contract and was not even for the construction of an oral contract where the terms of such contract were not in dispute. It was not for the purpose to settle and afford relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to the rights, status and other equitable or legal relations. It was for the purpose of obtaining a money judgment under an oral contract, the terms and performance of which were disputed by the appellants. In the case of James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 208, 176 N.E. 401, 404, the Court said:

'Under the facts of this case, the plaintiff had an action at law for commissions. He needed no declaratory judgment to establish his rights. * * *'

In the case of Bowden v. Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co., Fla., 47 So.2d 786, 787, the Court said...