Corbett v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 22 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1:15-cv-09214-GHW |
| Parties | JONATHAN CORBETT, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
The City of New York (the "City") moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss pro se plaintiff Jonathan Corbett's claims for federal municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). For the reasons that follow, the City's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Monell claims are dismissed.1 The City's motion to bifurcate Monell discovery is DENIED as moot.
At 4:02 a.m. on February 7, 2015, Mr. Corbett was on the phone with his girlfriend when she took her own life. ECF No. 65, Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ¶ 16. Unsure of exactly what he had heard on the phone, Mr. Corbett traveled to his girlfriend's apartment on West 33rd Street in Manhattan, where he found her unresponsive and called 911. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Within fifteen minutes, at least eight officers of the New York City Police Department (the "NYPD") had arrived on the scene. Id. ¶ 19. When officers first arrived, Mr. Corbett told them where to locate his girlfriend'sbody. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. He voluntarily spoke with several officers about the incident, and at approximately 4:50 a.m., Sergeant Roberto More directed another officer to "take [Corbett] back to the precinct." Id. ¶ 21-22. Either More or another nearby officer then told Mr. Corbett "something to the effect of, 'Hold tight, this is going to be a long night for you.'" Id. ¶ 23. It was at this point, Mr. Corbett alleges, that it became clear he was "no longer free to go." Id. ¶ 24. He was then directed into a squad car and transported to the Midtown South Precinct without his consent. Id. ¶¶ 25, 30.
Upon arrival at the precinct, the transporting officer directed Mr. Corbett into a room, where he waited "under armed guard" by that officer for approximately two hours before Sergeant Bryan Gillis and Detective Michael Aherne arrived. Id. ¶ 32, 36, 38, 40. Sergeant Gillis and Detective Aherne proceeded to question him for approximately thirty minutes before informing him that he was "free to go" at approximately 7:20 a.m. Id. ¶ 43-44. In total, Mr. Corbett was detained for approximately two and one-half hours without his consent. Id. ¶ 46. He alleges that none of the officers had probable cause or even reasonable suspicion that he had committed any wrongdoing at any time during this encounter. Id. ¶¶ 50-51. According to Mr. Corbett, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner subsequently ruled his girlfriend's death a suicide, and the NYPD closed the case without bringing any charges. Id. ¶ 53.
On November 23, 2015, Mr. Corbett filed this lawsuit pro se against four "John Doe" officers and the City. ECF No. 1. On November 30, 2015, the Court issued a Valentin Order directing the City to ascertain the identities of the four "John Doe" officers named in the complaint. ECF No. 3. Although the City was able to identify three of the named officers as Sergeant More, Sergeant Gillis, and Detective Aherne, the City was unable to identify the officer who allegedly transported Mr. Corbett to the precinct and guarded him while he waited to be questioned. ECF No. 19. Mr. Corbett amended his complaint on March 29, 2016 to name the three identified officers. ECF No.22. In his first amended complaint, Mr. Corbett brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and for municipal liability against the City pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), as well as various state law claims. Id. On April 19, 2016, the City moved to dismiss Mr. Corbett's Monell claims and to bifurcate, or in the alternative stay, discovery on those claims. ECF Nos. 26-29. On July 12, 2016, the Court granted a stay of Monell discovery pending decision on the City's motion. ECF No. 50. Discovery proceeded on the remaining claims.
On October 7, 2016, before a decision was issued on the City's fully briefed motion to dismiss, Mr. Corbett moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. ECF No. 62. In his motion, Mr. Corbett explained that, in light of depositions he had taken of the individual defendants, he wished to "simplify his municipal law claim '[p]redicated on "Pattern or Practice" of Failing to Train, Supervise, Screen, or Discipline' to a claim simply alleging failure to train its officers regarding how to avoid unlawfully detaining someone." Id. at 2 (alterations in original). The Court granted Mr. Corbett leave to do so on October 19, 2016, ECF No. 64, and he filed his second amended complaint on the same day. ECF No. 65.
In his second amended complaint, Corbett again brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well as various state law claims. Id. He also brings his amended Monell claims. On November 2, 2016, the City again moved to dismiss Corbett's Monell claims and to bifurcate, or in the alternative stay, discovery on those claims. ECF Nos. 69-72.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege facts that are consistent with liability; the complaint must "nudge" claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DeJesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). A complaint that offers "labels and conclusions" or "naked assertion[s]" without "further factual enhancement" will not survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Because he is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe Mr. Corbett's allegations and "interpret[ ] [them] to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g.., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (). Nevertheless, dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements. Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F. Supp. 3d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997)).
A municipality is not vicariously liable for its employees' actions under § 1983. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Municipalities are, however, liable for "their own illegal acts." Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). Plaintiffs seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must plead "(1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right." Rodriguez v. Winski, 973 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)).
A plaintiff may satisfy the "policy or custom" prong in one of four ways: by alleging the existence of (1) a formal policy, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; (2) actions taken or decisions made by final municipal policymakers that caused the violation of plaintiff's rights, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986); (3) a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a "custom or usage" and implies the constructive knowledge of policymakers, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; or (4) a failure to properly train or supervise municipal employees that amounts to "deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into contact." See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Moray v. City of Yonkers, 924 F. Supp. 8, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Count 1 of Mr. Corbett's Second Amended Complaint falls into the final category. He alleges that the NYPD "fail[ed] to train its officers as to what constitutes a detention, and/or to train its officers to advise individuals that they are free to go when failing to do so would lead a reasonable person to believe that they have been detained." SAC ¶ 71. In Count 2, Mr. Corbett seeks to proceed on a theory he describes as "[m]unicipal [l]iability [p]redicated on [n]egligent [o]bstruction of [j]ustice" arising from the...
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