Corbett v. Fayetteville-Manlius Central School Dist.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1970
• Docket Number: FAYETTEVILLE-MANLIUS
• Citation: 34 A.D.2d 379,311 N.Y.S.2d 540
• Parties: James Kevin CORBETT, by his father, Cornelius P. Corbett, and Cornelius P. Corbett, individually, Respondents, v.CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 540

311 N.Y.S.2d 540

34 A.D.2d 379

James Kevin CORBETT, by his father, Cornelius P. Corbett, and Cornelius P. Corbett, individually, Respondents, v. FAYETTEVILLE-MANLIUS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

June 25, 1970.

Oot, Greene, Setright & Moore, Syracuse, for appellant (Victor J. Hershdorfer, Syracuse, of counsel).

Kiley, Feldmann, Whalen, Fuller & Devine, Cazenovia, for respondents (William D. Kiley, Cazenovia, of counsel).

Before GOLDMAN, P.J., and DEL VECCHIO, WITMER, GABRIELLI and BASTOW, JJ.

OPINION

DEL VECCHIO, Justice.

Defendant Central School District appeals from so much of an order as denied its motion to dismiss the infant plaintiff's action on the ground that it was barred by the one year and ninety day statute of limitations contained in General Municipal Law § 50--i(1).

The complaint alleges that plaintiff was injured on August 30, 1964, when he fell into an excavation which existed on property owned by defendant during the course of repair and renovation of school premises and that timely notice of claim was served on the school district on November 17, 1964, within ninety days after the claim arose. Actions by the infant and his father were not commenced until September 24, 1968, four years and twenty-five days after the accident. Upon motion by defendant, the father's action was dismissed as barred by General Municipal Law § 50--i(1) and no appeal has been taken from that determination. Appellant asserts that the same disposition should have been made of the infant's action.

The Appellate Divisions for the Second and Third Departments have held that the infancy tolling provisions of CPLR 208 are available to a plaintiff maintaining an action against a municipality, and that the provision of General Municipal Law § 50--i(2) that 'This section shall be applicable notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of law, general, special or local, or any limitation contained in the provisions of any city charter', does not vary this result. (Abbatemarco v. Town of Brookhaven, 26 A.D.2d 664, 272 N.Y.S.2d 450; LaFave v. Town of Franklin, 20 A.D.2d 738, 247 N.Y.S.2d 72.) We concur in these conclusions.

In Russo v. City of New York, 258 N.Y. 344, 179 N.E. 762, the Court of Appeals held that there is a distinction between the statutory requirement for the timely service of notice of claim against a municipality and the limitation period for commencing an action against the municipality. The first, which is intended to give the municipality prompt notice of the accident and to extend to it an opportunity to make timely investigation, is not suspended during infancy; the latter is not a statute of limitation which runs during infancy, for the time of disability by reason of infancy is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

Nothing contained in General Municipal Law § 50--i(2), compels a conclusion that this distinction has been obliterated. The statute reflects 'only a legislative intent to supersede the numerous specific statutes that preceded section 50--i and not to eliminate the applicability of section 60 (now CPLR 208). The legislative history and the phraseology utilized reveals no other purport' (LaFave v. Town of Franklin, 20 A.D.2d 738, 247 N.Y.S.2d 72). CPLR 208 is not 'inconsistent' with the one year and ninety day period fixed for commencing tort actions against municipalities; it is simply an ameliorative provision which...