Corbett v. New York, C. & H.R.r. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 September 1913
• Parties: CORBETT v. NEW YORK C. & H. R. R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

215 Mass. 435

102 N.E. 648

CORBETT v. NEW YORK C. & H. R. R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

September 11, 1913

COUNSEL

G. L. Mayberry, of Boston, for defendant.

John J Mansfield, of Boston, for plaintiff.

OPINION

MORTON J.

This is an action of tort to recover for injuries caused by the falling of a car door upon the plaintiff as he was attempting to open it. The case is here on the defendant's exceptions.

The car was a Chicago & Great Western Railroad Company car, and was loaded with wool which the plaintiff was sent by his employers, a firm of teamsters to unload and deliver 'where it was going.' It was in the defendant's yard at East Boston known as the Porter street yard, and stood upon a delivery track so called. There was evidence tending to show that a clerk in the defendant's employ acting, as could be found, within the scope of his authority, and for the purpose of aiding the plaintiff in the unloading of the car, pointed out its location to the plaintiff. On one side of the car there was a space for teams and the delivery of freight, but none on the other. The car had two doors on opposite sides, both sealed. There was nothing to show that any directions were given or were expected to be given to the plaintiff by the defendant in regard to unloading the car, and, so far as appears, he was left to break the seals and open and unload the car in his own way. The plaintiff drew up alongside the car with his team and tried to open the door, as he testified, but was unable to do so on account of the wool that pressed against it. Thereupon he went round to the other door, broke the seal, lifted the latch or hasp, and was in the act of shoving back the door when it fell upon him. This was in substance the plaintiff's account of the accident. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the door on the delivery side was open, and that the plaintiff attempted to open the other door for more ventilation; that the door was in good condition; and that in opening it the plaintiff used an iron bar and pried it up out of the groove in which it ran, and thereby caused it to fall on him. This was denied by the plaintiff.

The question whether the accident happened as the plaintiff testified that it did, or in the manner described by the defendant, or in some other manner, was plainly one of fact for the jury. It could not be ruled as matter of law that the plaintiff had no right to open the door for ventilation or for the purpose for which he testified that he opened it. The placing of the car upon a delivery track and the pointing out of its location by the clerk to the plaintiff constituted, or could be found to constitute, a representation by ...