Corcoran v. Higgins
| Citation | 194 Mass. 291,80 N.E. 231 |
| Parties | CORCORAN v. HIGGINS. |
| Decision Date | 26 February 1907 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Arthur Dehon Hill and Henry R. Brigham, for plaintiff.
Jos. F O'Connell and Wm. F. McNamara, for respondent.
This is a bastardy complaint. The case has been tried three times. At the first trial there was a verdict of 'not guilty.' On motion of the complaint this was set aside. No exception was taken by the respondent to the allowance of the motion or to the order granting a new trial. At the second trial there was a disagreement. Before the jury were impaneled the respondent moved that he be discharged on the ground that he had already been found 'not guilty.' The motion was denied and the respondent duly excepted. At the third trial there was a verdict of 'guilty.' Before the jury were impaneled the respondent made the same motion which he had made at the second trial. The motion was denied and the respondent duly excepted. The case is here on the exception thus taken.
It is plain that if the court had no jurisdiction to set aside the verdict and to try the respondent again after a verdict of 'not guilty' had once been rendered, then the fact that the respondent did not except to the allowance of the motion or to the order granting a new trial is immaterial. The question of the court's jurisdiction could be raised as it was in the subsequent proceedings. Cheshire v Adams Ec. Res. Co., 119 Mass. 356; Custy v. Lowell, 117 Mass. 78; Riley v. Lowell, 117 Mass. 76; Elder v. Dwight, etc., Co., 4 Gray, 201.
Whatever doubts may have once prevailed, it is now settled both by statute and judicial decision that proceedings under the bastardy act are in the nature of civil proceedings. Rev. Laws, c. 82, § 22; Coney v. Holland, 175 Mass. 469, 56 N.E. 701; Barnes v. Ryan, 174 Mass. 117, 54 N.E. 492, 75 Am. St. Rep. 288; Davis v. Carpenter, 172 Mass. 167, 175, 51 N.E. 530. The action of the court in setting aside the verdict cannot be objected to, therefore, on the ground that the proceedings are criminal proceedings.
The respondent contends, however, that the statute makes the verdict in his favor final. The provisions of the statute on which he relies are found in the concluding sentences of section 15, c. 82, Rev. Laws, and are as follows: The section begins by providing that on the trial of the complaint the issue shall be whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and then goes on to say what shall be done if the verdict is guilty or there is a default, concluding as above. The provision in question is first found in St. 1785 p. 559, c. 66, § 2. It has come down to the present time by successive re-enactments in substantially the same words. Rev. St. 1836, c. 49, § 4; Gen. St. 1860, c. 72, § 7; Pub. St. 1882, c. 85, § 15; Rev. Laws, c. 82, § 15. It is plain, it seems to us, that the object and effect of the provision as originally enacted was to take away from parties in bastardy proceedings the right of appeal and review which both parties in civil actions and the defendant in criminal cases had at the time when the provision was first enacted and which gave them a right to a second trial upon the facts in case they were dissatisfied with the verdict which had been rendered and to provide for obvious reasons that a verdict fairly rendered in accordance with correct rules of law should in such proceedings be final. 1 Acts & Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay (1701-02) p. 466 c. 6; 2 Prov. Laws (1720-21) p. 186, c. 11; 3 Prov. Laws (1751-52) p....
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