Corcoran v. Village of Peekskill

• Decision Date: 17 January 1888
• Parties: CORCORAN v. VILLAGE OF PEEKSKILL.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

108 N.Y. 151

15 N.E. 309

CORCORAN

v.VILLAGE OF PEEKSKILL.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

January 17, 1888.

Appeal from general term, supreme court, Second department.

The action was brought by Robert Corcoran to recover damages against the village of Peekskill for personal injury sustained by his falling into an area in front of the house of B. Gilmartin, situate on the west side of South street, in the village of Peekskill. The complaint charges negligence upon defendant in leaving the area adjoining the sidewalk open and unfenced. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

J. D. McMahon, for appellant.

E. Countryman, for respondent.

EARL, J.

Whether the area was sufficiently guarded so as to protect travelers upon the street from falling into it was a question of fact for the determination of the jury. It was, however, a close question, and therefore the defendant had the right to have it submitted to the jury upon strictly competent evidence.

The plaintiff, against the objection of defendant, was permitted to prove that after the accident a fence was built around the area which substantially protected travelers against any danger from the same. This evidence, we think, was incompetent. Such evidence has sometimes been received by courts in cases where the party sued for an accident has soon thereafter made repairs or improvements for the purpose of making the machine or structure which caused the accident more secure, convenient, or safe, and its admissibility has been defended on the ground that the act of making the repairs or improvements was an admission that the machine or structure was therefore imperfect, out of repair, or unsafe. We think, however, that such evidence does not to prove that the party sued knew, or was bound to know, that the machine or structure was imperfect, unsafe, or out of repair. After an accident has happened it is ordinarily easy to see how it could have been avoided; and then for the first time it frequently happens that the owner receives his first intimation of the defective or dangerous condition of the machine or structure which caused or led to the accident. Such evidence has no tendency whatever, we think, to show that the machine or structure was not previously in a reasonably safe and perfect condition, or that the defendant ought, in the exercise or reasonable care and diligence, to have made it more perfect, safe, and secure. While such evidence has no legitimate bearing upon the defendant's negligence or knowledge, its natural tendency is undoubtedly to prejudice and influence the minds of the jury. Hence in this court, and generally in the supreme court, it has been held erroneous to receive such evidence. In Salters v. Canal Co., 3 Hun, 388, it was held erroneous to admit evidence to show that after the accident the railroad company changed the character of its switch. LANDON, J., writing the opinion, said: ‘The plaintiff was permitted to give evidence to the effect that after the accident the defendant substituted a target switch for the common one. Within the ruling in Dougan v. Transportation Co., 56 N. Y. 1, this seems to be error. Whether the defendants were negligent was a question to be decided upon the facts as they existed at the time of the injury. What the defendants did afterwards was immaterial, unless their acts could be construed as equivalent to their declaration that they were negligent at the time of the injury. But the question appears to be settled by authority, and not open for discussion in this court.’ In Payne v. Railroad Co., 19 Hun, 526, the action was to recover damages for an injury to plaintiff's horse, received while passing...