Corder v. Corder

• Decision Date: 05 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. S138666.,S138666.
• Citation: 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 660,41 Cal.4th 644,161 P.3d 172
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Shaoping CORDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lisa R. CORDER, Defendant and Respondent. Lisa R. Corder, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shaoping Corder, Defendant and Appellant.

61 Cal.Rptr.3d 660

41 Cal.4th 644

161 P.3d 172

Shaoping CORDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lisa R. CORDER, Defendant and Respondent.

Lisa R. Corder, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shaoping Corder, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S138666.

Supreme Court of California.

July 5, 2007.

Davis & Heubeck, Law Offices of John C. Heubeck and John C. Heubeck, El Segundo, for Plaintiff and Appellant and for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of Ronald E. Harrington, G. David Tenenbaum and Ronald E. Harrington, Newport Beach, for Plaintiff and Respondent and for Defendant and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

In a consolidated wrongful death action, one defendant settled with the decedent's wife and his adult daughter for an unapportioned lump sum of $1.1 million, and the two nonsettling defendants ultimately prevailed at trial. At a subsequent court proceeding, the wife and the daughter offered evidence pertaining to the allocation of the settlement proceeds. Based on testimony from third party witnesses claiming the decedent was unhappy in his marriage and intended to get a divorce, the trial court found the marriage was "on the verge of ending," even though there was no evidence the decedent had actually separated from his wife or filed for a legal separation or a marital dissolution. The court then allocated 90 percent of the settlement proceeds to the decedent's daughter and 10 percent to the wife. We granted the wife's petition for review, which challenged the trial court's judgment and the Court of Appeal's affirmance of that judgment.

We conclude, contrary to the wife's assertions, that the trial court did not violate statutory law or act in excess of jurisdiction in undertaking to apportion the settlement proceeds. We also find the court was not required to allocate the proceeds based solely on the evidence admitted at the trial against the nonsettling defendants or on the perceived contribution that each heir's damages claim supposedly made to the settlement amount. However, we further conclude the record fails to support the court's finding that the marriage between the decedent and his wife was about to end. Because that finding cannot be sustained, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Raymond Corder (Corder) married Shaoping (Sherry) Corder (Wife) in September 2000. Lisa R. Corder (Daughter) is Corder's adult daughter from a previous marriage. In May 2001, eight months after the marriage to Wife, Corder was killed in a construction accident.

Wife and Daughter separately filed wrongful death actions in Orange County against defendant Morrow Equipment Company (Morrow) and others. After the two actions were consolidated, Morrow settled with both plaintiffs for an unapportioned lump sum of $1.1 million. Wife and Daughter then entered into the following stipulation: "Following the verdict or settlement of the [wrongful death] case, should the Plaintiffs fail to agree on an allocation or apportionment of damages between the heirs, that either Plaintiff shall have the right to a further trial regarding the allocation or apportionment of damages among or between the Plaintiffs. Furthermore, either party may supplement their witness list by identifying witnesses not previously disclosed and that those witnesses may be called as witnesses at the further trial proceeding."

Wife and Daughter went to trial against the two remaining defendants. The jury found neither defendant was negligent, and judgment was entered in their favor. Shortly thereafter, Wife and Daughter began preparing for a further trial on apportionment of the $1.1 million settlement proceeds from Morrow. Meanwhile, Wife filed a separate action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, seeking to quiet title to the proceeds. Daughter responded by moving to set a trial date in the Orange County case.

Over Wife's objection, the Orange County court ruled it had jurisdiction to apportion the settlement proceeds and set a hearing for that purpose. The court then indicated that, as part of the apportionment proceeding, it would consider not only the evidence it had heard in the wrongful death trial, but also, as the parties stipulated, new evidence that had not been previously presented. At the apportionment proceeding, much of the new evidence concerned Daughter's contention that Corder, at the time of his death, was contemplating dissolving his marriage to Wife because he suspected she was engaging in prostitution. Specifically, Daughter and Wife presented various witnesses who gave conflicting testimony regarding statements Corder allegedly made about his marriage and Wife prior to his death. There was no evidence, however, that Corder actually separated from Wife or acted to initiate a legal separation or a marital dissolution. Daughter also presented evidence of her relationship with Corder.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court filed a "judgment" containing the following findings and conclusions. "Evidence at the allocation Trial demonstrated two conflicting views of the Decedent's relationship to his wife, Shaoping Corder. Lisa Corder, Decedent's daughter, presented witnesses who testified that the Decedent intended to divorce his wife. According to them the Decedent felt that his marriage was a mistake because his wife had continued to work as a prostitute despite her promises to stop.[¹] Witnesses also testified that Lisa Corder and her father had a very close relationship. Lisa Corder's argument was that since Decedent was on the verge of divorcing his wife, the wife's share of the proceeds should be reduced drastically from what it would otherwise have been.

"On the other hand, Shaoping Corder's witnesses indicated that the marriage was a good one and there was no intent manifested by the [Decedent] to divorce his wife. Shaoping Corder argued that because she would have been legally entitled to support from the Decedent during the marriage, the lion's share of the proceeds should go to her.

"Having considered the conflicting evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds most persuasive and credible the evidence that the marriage between Shaoping Corder and Decedent was on the verge of ending. While it is true that Decedent had not yet filed for divorce or contacted an attorney, the Court finds that had the Decedent lived the marriage would have lasted a relatively short period of time given Decedent's belief, expressed to several persons, that his wife was working as a prostitute against his wishes. Decedent may not have expressed his state of mind to all of those close to him, but such is life. For reasons that are usually unknown, people often keep secrets from some close friends or relatives and not from others. The Court finds unpersuasive the contention that Lisa Corder's witnesses came into Court to commit perjury regarding the prostitution allegations.

"Given the above findings, the Court makes the following allocation as to the 1.1 million dollar settlement proceeds: Lisa Corder 90%. Shaoping Corder 10%. [¶] In making these findings the Court has considered the total loss that each Plaintiff suffered from the Decedent's death...." (Capitalization of names omitted.) The trial court denied Wife's motions to vacate the judgment and to enter a different judgment or for a new trial. Judgment was entered accordingly.

Wife appealed the apportionment judgment and the denial of her posttrial motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed in a split decision. While all three justices agreed the trial court had jurisdiction to apportion the settlement proceeds, there was vigorous disagreement over the propriety of the apportionment. The majority concluded that: (1) Daughter had standing to challenge the amount of Wife's share and was not estopped from doing so; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Raymond Corder intended to divorce Wife; (3) the award was not excessive as to Daughter and inadequate as to Wife, given the decedent's intention to divorce, his close relationship with Daughter, and the fact that Wife's award was significantly more than she was likely to have received as spousal support following an eight-month marriage, had Corder not died; and (4) evidence of the settling defendant's motives was properly excluded. These conclusions prompted the dissenting justice to declare: "There is something profoundly wrong in allocating 90 percent of a wrongful death award to an adult child and only 10 percent to the widow or widower." Claiming the majority ignored California case law dealing with wrongful death damages, the dissenting justice contended that evidence of the decedent's mere intention to divorce Wife was irrelevant because the decedent had taken no concrete steps to effectuate or even initiate such action.

DISCUSSION

We granted Wife's petition for review to address essentially three issues. First, does the trial court in a wrongful death action have jurisdiction to apportion among the plaintiffs the proceeds of a settlement obtained in the action, or is the court's authority otherwise limited to apportioning an award of damages in such an action? Second, in a proceeding to apportion a settlement, is the trial court limited to consideration of the evidence introduced in the wrongful death action itself or the evidence that the defendant considered in arriving at the amount of the settlement? Third, did the evidence at the apportionment proceeding here, including the testimony of the witnesses who claimed the decedent intended to divorce Wife, support the trial court's allocation of 90 percent of the settlement proceeds to Daughter and only 10 percent to Wife?

A. "Jurisdiction" to Apportion Settlement Proceeds

Wrongful death actions are statutory in nature and governed by the Code of Civil Procedure.² Section 377.60 establishes a cause of action...