Corder v. Gates

• Decision Date: 16 October 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 88-5555,88-5588,s. 88-5555
• Parties: Lillian CORDER, Roberta Lombardo, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Brad GATES, Sheriff, Defendant, and Roy Brown, et al., Defendants-Appellants. Lillian CORDER; Roberta Lombardo, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Brad GATES, Sheriff; Roy Brown, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 374

947 F.2d 374

21 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1284

Lillian CORDER, Roberta Lombardo, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Brad GATES, Sheriff, Defendant, and Roy Brown, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Lillian CORDER; Roberta Lombardo, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Brad GATES, Sheriff; Roy Brown, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 88-5555, 88-5588.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 4, 1991.

Decided Oct. 16, 1991.

Timothy T. Coates, Los Angeles, California, for defendants-appellants-appellees.

Stephen Yagman, Yagman & Yagman, Venice, California, for plaintiffs-appellees-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before PREGERSON, HALL and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.

CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Roy Brown appeals the district court's award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, arguing, inter alia, that the amount of attorney's fees awarded should be reduced further. Plaintiffs cross-appeal arguing that the district court improperly reduced the amount of attorney's fees owed to them.

I

Lillian Corder and Roberta Lombardo brought suit on the basis of the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants illegally detained them and conducted an illegal search of their residence in a misguided attempt to find an escaped prisoner. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that on January 18, 1985 they resided together at 4630 Live Oaks in Cudahy, California and at approximately 3:00 a.m. defendants stormed plaintiffs' residence, ordered them from their home, and detained them for approximately five hours without pressing legal charges. Plaintiffs further claimed that defendants "absent any warrant ... shot out the windows of the home, entered the home, shot chemical gas into the home, [and] shot out the ceiling of the home...."

Plaintiffs named as defendants the following individuals and entities: Orange County Sheriff Brad Gates, twenty-five Orange County deputy sheriffs, Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block, twenty-five Los Angeles deputy sheriffs, Bell/Cudahy police chief Frank Fording, ten Bell/Cudahy police officers, the County of Los Angeles, the County of Orange, the City of Bell, and the City of Cudahy. Roy Brown, the highest ranking Los Angeles County Sheriff's officer present during the operation, authorized the entry of plaintiffs' home.

On September 30, 1985, defendants made a $45,000 settlement offer, which plaintiffs rejected. ¹ This offer included the $39,000 worth of plaintiffs' attorney's fees that had then accrued, leaving the plaintiffs with $6,000.

After trial, the jury, by special verdict, awarded damages in favor of Lillian Corder as follows: $1.00 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages against Bell/Cudahy Police Sergeant Stanton Loder; $1.00 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages against Orange County Sheriff's officer Keith Brown; and $1.00 in compensatory damages and $1000 in punitive damages against appellant, Commander Roy Brown of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. The jury awarded damages in favor of Roberta Lombardo as follows: $1.00 in compensatory damages and $2,500 in punitive damages against Stanton Loder; $1.00 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in compensatory damages against Keith Brown; and $1.00 in compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages against appellant Roy Brown. The total compensatory and punitive damages amounted to $24,006. The district court subsequently awarded plaintiffs $90,333 in attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs cross-appeal arguing that the district court erred when it adjusted the fee award downward to reflect limited success. Defendant Roy Brown appeals. Brown makes three arguments: First, Brown argues that the attorney's fees awarded by the district court must be reduced further to account for plaintiffs' limited success; second, Brown argues that the district court must apportion liability for attorney's fees among defendants in accord with their relative culpability, claiming that each defendant's relative culpability is reflected in the proportion of the overall jury verdict that is directed against him; third, Brown argues that the district court must decrease his liability for attorney's fees to account for fees already paid by other defendants through settlement. ²

II

District court awards of attorney's fees under section 1988 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1087, 109 S.Ct. 2425, 104 L.Ed.2d 982 (1989), reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1838, 108 L.Ed.2d 966 (1990). As such, the district court's fee award will be overturned if it is based on an inaccurate view of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact. See Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir.1991); Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir.1989) (reviewing denial of preliminary injunction).

III

Section 1988 authorizes the district courts to award a reasonable attorney's fee to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation. "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 (quotation omitted). "Congress has elected to encourage meritorious civil rights claims because of the benefits of such litigation for the named plaintiff and for society at large...." Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96, 109 S.Ct. 939, 945-46, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989).

Blanchard highlights the principles that govern appellate review of district court fee awards. The Blanchard Court addressed the question whether a fee agreement between a plaintiff and her lawyer acted as a cap on the amount of attorney's fees that a district court could find "reasonable." The Court held that the discretion of the district courts to award "reasonable" fees is not circumscribed by fee agreements, though the district courts have liberty to consider such agreements when determining a "reasonable" fee. 489 U.S. at 94, 109 S.Ct. at 944-45. Defendant argued that failing to "cap" fees would result in a "windfall" to plaintiff's attorneys. The Court responded:

[T]he very nature of recovery under § 1988 is designed to prevent any such "windfall." Fee awards are to be reasonable, reasonable as to billing rates and reasonable as to the number of hours spent in advancing the successful claims. Accordingly, fee awards, properly calculated, by definition will represent the reasonable worth of the services rendered in vindication of a plaintiff's civil rights claim. It is central to the awarding of attorney's fees under § 1988 that the district court judge, in his or her good judgment, make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances of the case.

Id. at 96, 109 S.Ct. at 945-46.

Blanchard evidences three principles. First, discretionary judgments of the district courts, which watch civil rights cases unfold before them, must be respected. Second, the discretion of the district courts must not be unduly limited by mechanistic rules. Third, fee awards must ensure that civil rights lawyers receive reasonable compensation for their services. ³ This third principle limits the district court's discretion, for this third principle underlies the requirement that the district courts carefully calculate hours and rates and fully articulate their reasoning. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941.

A

We first consider whether the method used by the district court to calculate attorney's fees was both incorrect and harmful, so that its fee award must be invalidated. The district court first determined the reasonable rate of compensation, and the reasonable number of hours worked, then multiplied hours by rate to arrive at the presumptively reasonable fee that is known as the "lodestar" figure. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-41. The district court then adjusted this "lodestar" figure to account for the plaintiffs' limited success.

We have held that the procedure followed by the district court in calculating fees is disfavored. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487-88 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 773 (1990); Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1464. Since consideration of limited success is presumably "subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate," district courts should not ordinarily make a separate adjustment for limited success. Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1464 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1940 n. 9.).

However, the fact that the district court followed a disfavored procedure for calculating fees does not necessarily nullify the district court's fee award. In Cabrales the district court followed the same procedure for calculating fees as was followed in the instant case, yet we affirmed the fee award because the record showed that "the district court made only one reduction for lack of success." Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1465. We said:

Mathematically, it is inconsequential whether the lodestar figure itself is adjusted for lack of success or whether the reasonable hours component of the lodestar is adjusted for lack of success. What matters is that the district court did not "count" for lack of success twice. We therefore hold that the district court's reduction of the lodestar, if warranted, constitutes a "harmless error."

Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1465.

In the instant case, as in Cabrales, the district court partitioned its "lodestar" analysis from consideration of plaintiffs' degree of success, and accounted for plaintiffs limited success only once. Thus, any error was...