Cordova v. 21ST Century Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. B171304.,B171304. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Charlotte CORDOVA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 21ST CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. |
Fleishman, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.91 certain victims of the Northridge earthquake whose insurance claims would otherwise have been barred by the limitations period in Insurance Code section 2071 received an additional one-year period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2001 in which to file a claim or commence an action on the policy. The issue before us is whether, with the expiration of this additional one-year period, the filing window is now permanently closed to all victims of the Northridge quake or whether insurers may be equitably estopped from asserting the bar of the limitations period.
We hold the Legislature did not supplant application of the long-established doctrine of equitable estoppel when it enacted section 340.9.
The following facts are undisputed.
At the time of the Northridge earthquake, January 1994, Charlotte Cordova had a homeowners policy with 21st Century Insurance Company that included earthquake coverage. Shortly after the quake Cordova submitted a claim of loss based on damage to block walls, cracks throughout her house and damage to personal property. In March 1994, 21st Century determined Cordova's dwelling and personal property losses were less than the applicable deductibles but sent her a check for $5255.48 under her "other structures" coverage. In June 1994 Cordova asked the company to reevaluate her claim. In August 1994, following a reinspection of the property, 21st Century paid Cordova an additional $1950. In November 1994 Cordova wrote to 21st Century stating she understood she could have her home inspected by a structural engineer at the insurance company's expense. Later the same month 21st Century responded to Cordova's letter advising her if the contractor making the repairs on her property suggested an inspection by a structural engineer the company would employ such a person to conduct the inspection.
There were no further communications between Cordova and 21st Century regarding her earthquake claim until nearly eight years later when, in August 2002, an attorney representing Cordova wrote to the company and requested an adjuster contact him regarding her claim. A representative of 21st Century wrote back pointing out the period for filing a claim or initiating litigation arising out of the Northridge quake had long since expired. Cordova's attorney responded he was requesting her claim be reopened under authority of the California Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co.2 The record does not reflect any further communications between Cordova or her counsel and 21st Century.
Cordova filed suit against 21st Century in September 2002. She alleged 21st Century unreasonably and unjustifiably failed to conduct a thorough investigation of her earthquake loss; she was misinformed as to the extent of the damage to her property; and the special statutory one-year period for filing suit against 21st Century for losses sustained in the Northridge earthquake had expired before she realized the true extent of her damage.
21st Century moved for summary judgment on the ground "there is no merit to [this action] since plaintiff did not timely pursue [her] claims and is barred by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.9, subdivision (b)." In support of its motion 21st Century submitted a separate statement of undisputed facts setting forth the facts discussed above. The points and authorities accompanying the motion argued Cordova did not file this action until nine months after the expiration of the limitations period in section 340.9 and therefore "the instant complaint is barred by the limitations provisions of [section] 340.9, subdivision (b) and judgment should be entered in 21st Century's favor." Anticipating Cordova would attempt to make an equitable estoppel argument under Vu, 21st Century also argued section 340.9 cut off any such equitable relief.
In response, Cordova admitted she filed this lawsuit after the one-year period in section 340.9 had expired. She argued, however, the doctrine of equitable estoppel barred 21st Century from raising a statute of limitations defense based on section 340.9 and nothing in that statute extinguished her equitable remedy.
The trial court granted 21st Century's motion for summary judgment on two grounds. The court concluded section 340.9 was the exclusive means for pursuing a previously time-barred claim against an insurer arising from the Northridge earthquake and therefore Cordova could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to avoid the one-year limitations period in Insurance Code section 2071. The court further held even if theoretically the doctrine of equitable estoppel could apply to Northridge claims Cordova failed to submit any evidence showing the doctrine applied in her case.
The court granted judgment to 21st Century and Cordova filed a timely appeal.
Insurance Code section 2071 states in relevant part: "No suit or action on [a] policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity ... unless commenced within 12 months next after inception of the loss."
In Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Inc. Co. our Supreme Court held if an insured fails to bring a lawsuit against the insurer within the statutory one-year period because he reasonably relied on the insurer's incorrect factual representations regarding the loss the insurer would be equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense.3
While Vu was pending in the Supreme Court the Legislature enacted section 340.9.4
Section 340.9, subdivision (a) states:
Subdivision (c) of section 340.9 provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the applicable limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of the effective date of this section."
In determining the meaning of section 340.9 we begin with its language because if the language is clear there is no need to look further.5
Both parties find language in the statute which supports their positions.
Arguing section 340.9 does not supplant the doctrine of equitable estoppel Cordova points out there is nothing in the statute which specifically and expressly states the legal remedy it affords supersedes any equitable remedy. The absence of such a statement is significant, she argues, because the Legislature has shown if it wants to bar plaintiffs from asserting equitable relief from statutes of limitation it knows how to say so. For example, section 366.2, subdivision (a) provides a one-year limitation period for suing on causes of action which exist against a decedent at the time of death. Subdivision (b) of the statute states: "The limitations period provided in this section for commencement of an action shall not be tolled or extended for any reason except as provided [in the statute]." (Italics added.) In Battuello v. Battuello the court held that although the plain language of subdivision (b) precluded a plaintiff from relying on the doctrine of equitable tolling it did not prevent the court from applying the principles of equitable estoppel.6
The doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel are distinct, Battuello explained, each arising under different circumstances, and having different rationales and different predicates.7 Equitable estoppel does not "extend" the statute of limitations "`but rather comes into play only after the limitations period has run and addresses itself to the circumstances in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.'"8 Unlike the doctrine of equitable tolling, which takes its life from the statute of limitations itself, the doctrine of equitable estoppel "takes its life ... from the equitable principle that no man will be permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice."9 Thus, the court found, while the language of the statute clearly showed the Legislature intended the one-year limitation period "not be `tolled' or `extended,'" the statute said nothing about equitable estoppel. "In the absence of such language, or legislative history suggesting that was what the Legislature intended ... we conclude the doctrine still applies."10
Battuello was quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in ...
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