Corey v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 03 April 1902 |
| Citation | 63 N.E. 420,181 Mass. 229 |
| Parties | COREY et al. v. GRIFFIN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Whipple, Sears & Ogden, for plaintiff.
R. S Bartlett, for respondent.
Griffin the respondent, brought an action at law against the present complainants under St. 1890, c. 437, to recover back a certain amount of money paid to them upon contracts for the purchase and sale of certain stocks and securities; and this action is still pending. This bill is filed to enjoin the respondent from the prosecution of that action, upon the ground that, prior to every one of the contracts upon which recovery is sought therein, the respondent signed a certain paper, a copy of one of which is annexed to the bill. It is a sealed instrument, in the form of a letter to the complainants, in which the respondent, after saying that he desires to open an account with them for the purchase and sale of stocks, bonds, and other commodities, agrees that, in order to protect them 'from the annoyance of litigation involving the burden of proving the existence of [his] intention at the time of the respective transactions to perform [his] contract by actual receipt or delivery and payment of the price,' he will indemnify them and save them harmless 'from all claims and demands founded wholly or in part upon the fact' that he had no such intention, and from 'any loss or damage incurred or suffered by [them] on account of the nonexistence of such intention.' St. 1890, c. 437, § 2, is as follows: 'Whoever contracts to buy or sell upon credit or upon margin any securities or commodities, having at the time of contract no intention to perform the same by actual receipt or delivery of the securities or commodities, and payment of the price, or whoever employs another so to buy and sell on his behalf, may sue for and recover in an action of contract from the other party to the contract, or from the person so employed, any payment made or the value of anything delivered: provided, such other party or other person so employed had reasonable cause to believe that no intention to actually perform existed.'
It will be noted that in an action at law under this statute it is necessary for the plaintiff to show, among other things, that at the time of the contract he had no intention to perform the same by the actual receipt or delivery of the securities and payment of the price, and it is plain from the language of the agreement in question that it was drawn up in view of this statute, and for the purpose of preventing the respondent from setting up the nonexistence of such an intention in any action thereunder. Since proof of the nonexistence of such an intention is essential to the maintenance of such an action, it follows that, no matter how grave or frequent may be the violations of the statute in the transactions covered by the agreement, the complainants are not liable if the agreement is to stand.
The constitutionality of the statute is upheld upon the ground that it is intended to suppress a well-known species of gambling. Crandell v. White, 164 Mass. 54, 41 N.E 204; Wall. v. Stock Exchange, 168 Mass. 282, 284, 46 N.E. 1062. It is intended to suppress that gambling by putting such restraint upon those who are tempted to indulge in it, or to assist others in...
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