Corey v. State
Decision Date | 10 July 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 15613,15613 |
Citation | 703 P.2d 685,108 Idaho 921 |
Parties | Brian COREY and Jean Borley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Thomas A. Mitchell, Coeur d'Alene, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Brian K. Julian, Boise, for defendant-respondent.
The facts in this case are undisputed and can be simply stated as follows: On January 2, 1982, at approximately 4:30 p.m. appellant, Brian Corey, was injured while operating a snowmobile in Farragut State Park. The injury occurred when Corey struck a cable which was strung across a path in the park. The State of Idaho had installed the cable and was responsible for its maintenance. The area in which the accident occurred was open for snowmobiling and was not designated as a closed area. Appellant filed this action seeking compensation for his injuries from the State of Idaho. He alleged that the State was negligent in installing and maintaining the cable. The State moved for summary judgment. The trial judge granted the motion, holding that the State was immune from liability under I.C. § 36-1604. This appeal followed.
Appellants present three issues on appeal. They argue first, that I.C. § 36-1604 is inapplicable under the particular facts of this case. Second, they contend that the State's conduct in this case was "willful" and that the statute does not provide immunity for willful acts. Finally, they assert that if the statute is found applicable in this case, it must necessarily be struck down as an unconstitutional denial of appellants' right to due process of law. We will address each issue in turn.
Appellants first argue that the statute does not apply in this case. I.C. § 36-1604, as amended in 1980, provides in pertinent part:
The stated purpose of the statute is to encourage landowners to open their land to the public for recreational use. In the present case, appellants contend that the State--by erecting a steel cable across the trail, was attempting to exclude the public from its land. Thus, appellants assert that the statute does not apply.
Appellants' argument is unpersuasive. I.C. § 36-1604 specifically provides that an owner of land who permits recreational use of that land without charge does not owe a duty of care to keep the premises safe for such use. The State of Idaho is an "owner" as defined by the statute. Farragut State Park is "public land" open for recreational use. It is uncontroverted that at the time of the accident appellant Corey was in an area of the park open for snowmobiling. Additionally, Corey was engaged in snowmobiling, a recreational activity specifically mentioned in the statute. Thus, there can be no question that I.C. § 36-1604 is expressly applicable to the factual situation presented by this case. Appellants next argue that I.C. § 36-1604 should be interpreted to exclude intentional or willful conduct on the part of the landowner. However, the issue of whether the statute would absolve a landowner from liability for such conduct is not before us. The only allegation of fault contained in appellants' complaint is that, "The State of Idaho installed and maintained said cable negligently and failed to warn of its presence." Appellants neither alleged nor does the record contain any evidence of intentional or willful conduct by the State. Thus, we take no position on the issue of whether I.C. § 36-1604 would absolve a landowner of liability for willful or intentional conduct. See Johnson v. Sunshine Min. Co., Inc., 106 Idaho 866, 871, 684 P.2d 268, 273 (1984).
Finally, appellants assert that I.C. § 36-1604 is unconstitutional as violative of due process because it purports to immunize a landowner from liability for intentional conduct. As we stated above, the question of whether the statute exempts intentional acts by a landowner is not properly before us. Accordingly, the question of whether the statute would be unconstitutional without such an exemption is not before us either.
In Johnson, supra, appellants argued that I.C. § 36-1604 violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and analogous provisions in the Idaho Constitution because it created two classes of persons, non-paying recreational users of another's land and all other persons using the land of another. This Court upheld the statute under the rational basis test noting that, "The encouragement of recreation enhances the physical well-being of Idaho's people, has a positive effect on Idaho's economy, and is a legitimate legislative goal." Johnson, supra, at 870, 684 P.2d at 272. The applicable standard of analysis under a due process challenge is the same as under an equal protection challenge. See Heese v. A & T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 635 P.2d 962 (1981). Under the facts of this case, I.C. § 36-1604 advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion and is therefore constitutional. As was noted above, we take no position on the issue of whether the statute exempts intentional acts of a landowner, and whether the lack of such an exemption would be constitutional.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Costs to respondent.
No attorney fees on appeal.
I concur in the decision of the majority solely because this case was plead by the plaintiff as a "negligence" case and does not raise the issue of whether the statute is unconstitutional by not excluding from immunity intentional, willful or wanton conduct. I continue to adhere to the views set forth in my dissent in Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co. Inc., 106 Idaho 866, 684 P.2d 268 (1984).
The complaint alleges that a cable strung across a snowmobile pathway was a trap, and that the State of Idaho installed it, and that the State failed to warn of its presence. The majority opinion read in its entirety so recognizes. Although most would agree that the use of cables and ropes for traffic control in winter sports areas is not uncommon, and hence not per se tortious, a proposition with which I would not quarrel, the majority enters into no discussion of the failure to warn. Instead, the majority, immediately after mentioning the failure to warn, comes up with the non sequitur that the plaintiffs "neither alleged nor does the record contain any evidence of intentional or willful conduct by the State." To which I respectfully demur. The majority, although flirting around with language from Johnson v. Sunshine Mining Co., 106 Idaho 866, 684 P.2d 269, 276 (1984), avoids any mention of Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980). Huyck, of course, of the latter two cases, is the more applicable of the two. Therein a motorcyclist was picked off by the strung cable. Huyck was also the case most strongly here relied upon by the State of Idaho. The strung cable in Huyck was Huyck, 101 Idaho at 300, 612 P.2d at 143. The hypothesis of this Court's holding was, after citing from Bosiljevac v. Ready Mix Concrete Co., 182 Neb. 199, 153 N.W.2d 864 (1967), that "In the instant case, there is no showing but what the barrier was readily observable." Huyck, 101 Idaho at 301, 612 P.2d at 144. 1 Having by sheer hindsight omniscience determined that the fault there was the plaintiff's, the Court did use the occasion to observe that "the duty of the defendants, as owners or tenants, was to refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause injuries." Id.
The trial court likewise made no mention of Huyck in summarily ruling against the plaintiffs, but going directly to I.C. § 36-1604, declared that that statute eliminated any duty requiring a landowner to conform to a certain standard of conduct.
Both courts, the trial court and now this Court, have simply avoided ...
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