Corgain v. Board of Parole
Decision Date | 20 June 2007 |
Docket Number | A118627 (Control).,A119635. |
Citation | 213 Or. App. 407,162 P.3d 990 |
Parties | Richard W. CORGAIN, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POSTPRISON SUPERVISION, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Daniel M. Carroll, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, for petitioner.
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and ARMSTRONG and ROSENBLUM, Judges.
These consolidated cases — one of which is on remand from the Oregon Supreme Court, see Corgain v. Board of Parole, 196 Or.App. 323, 100 P.3d 1144 (2004), rem'd, 341 Or. 548, 145 P.3d 1109 (2006) (Corgain I) — both present the same issue: When should petitioner begin serving a sentence for first-degree robbery that was ordered to be served consecutively to his life sentence for aggravated murder? For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that (1) the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (board) correctly determined that petitioner did not begin to serve his consecutive sentence at the time that the board determined that petitioner was likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable length of time; and (2) the board subsequently properly applied ORS 144.125 (1981) in deferring petitioner's projected date of release from the service of his aggravated murder sentence. Consequently, we affirm the board's orders.
The material facts and procedural circumstances are uncontroverted. In August 1981, petitioner committed a first-degree robbery in Lane County. Several weeks later, he committed an aggravated murder in Klamath County. Petitioner was subsequently convicted of both crimes. On the murder conviction, he received a life sentence with a 20-year minimum; on the robbery conviction entered shortly thereafter, he received a 20-year indeterminate sentence, to be served consecutively to the aggravated murder sentence. Petitioner began serving his sentences in 1982.
In 1992, the board set a matrix term of 40 months for the robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the term for the aggravated murder. In early 2002, the board held a rehabilitation hearing pursuant to ORS 163.105 (1981) and entered the order that is at issue in Corgain I. In that order, the board determined that petitioner was likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time, and further provided that petitioner's consecutive prison term for the first-degree robbery would begin to run on his to-be-established firm parole release date on the aggravated murder sentence. That order did not, however, establish a firm parole release date. Rather, it established a "projected release date" of July 2002,1 before which the board would hold an exit interview and consider the results of a current psychological evaluation.
Petitioner unsuccessfully sought administrative review, and subsequently judicial review, of the board's order. As pertinent here, petitioner argued that, when the board made the finding at the rehabilitation hearing that he was likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time, it was required to set a firm parole release date at that point — and, under Norris v. Board of Parole, 331 Or. 194, 13 P.3d 104 (2000), cert. den., 534 U.S. 1028, 122 S.Ct. 562, 151 L.Ed.2d 437 (2001), the consecutive sentence on the robbery conviction should have commenced as of that date. We agreed and reversed in a per curiam opinion, citing Roy v. Palmateer, 194 Or.App. 330, 95 P.3d 1124 (2004). See Corgain I.
Meanwhile, as petitioner sought review of the board's first order, the board held another hearing pursuant to ORS 144.125 (1981), in which it considered a recent psychological evaluation of petitioner and found that petitioner suffered from a present severe emotional disturbance that constituted a danger to the health and safety of the community. See generally ORS 144.125 (1981). Based on that determination, the board deferred petitioner's projected parole release date on the aggravated murder sentence until 2004, and again noted that the consecutive 40-month term on the robbery would not begin to run until after the firm parole release date on the aggravated murder sentence.
Petitioner sought judicial review of that second order, and this court entered a stipulated order of abatement in that case (Corgain II) at the parties' request while the state sought review of this court's decisions in Roy and in Corgain I. Ultimately, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, in Roy v. Palmateer, 339 Or. 533, 124 P.3d 603 (2005), and remanded Corgain I to us in light of its decision in Roy. We consolidated Corgain I (A118627) and Corgain II (A119635), as both involve the same core issue concerning when petitioner's consecutive sentence should begin to run.
On judicial review in both Corgain I and Corgain II, petitioner assigns error to the board's determination that the consecutive sentence would not begin to run until after the firm release date on the aggravated murder term, and, in Corgain II, to the board's application of ORS 144.125 (1981) in these circumstances. We write only to address those assignments of error, and reject without discussion petitioner's other assignments of error.
Because the statutes in effect at the time petitioner committed his crimes are materially the same as were at issue in Norris, and because the facts in this case resemble the facts in Norris, we begin with a discussion of that case. At that time, ORS 163.105 provided, in pertinent part:
ORS 163.105 (1977).
In Norris, the petitioner received two consecutive life sentences pursuant to ORS 163.095(2) (1977), each without the possibility of parole for 20 years. After serving 15 years, the petitioner petitioned for a hearing pursuant to ORS 163.105 (1977), and the board made a determination that the petitioner was likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time. Norris, 331 Or. at 196-98, 13 P.3d 104. The board, however, nonetheless decided to sustain the judicially imposed minimum sentences of 20 years as to each crime. Id. at 199, 13 P.3d 104.
On judicial review, the petitioner contended that "in light of the Board's finding that he is capable of rehabilitation, the Board must convert the terms of his confinement to a parolable life sentence and set terms according to the matrix." Id. at 202, 13 P.3d 104. The board, on the other hand, argued that ORS 163.105(4) implicated a two-step process: first the board would determine if the petitioner was likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time, and if so, the board might then choose whether to override the minimum terms and set a release date according to the matrix. Id. at 202-03, 13 P.3d 104. The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately agreed in part with the petitioner, in light of the language in ORS 163.105(3) (1977) indicating that "the sole issue" at the hearing concerned rehabilitation, and ORS 163.105(5), which referred to the petitions for such hearings as petitions for "a change in the terms of [his] confinement." Id. at 203-04, 13 P.3d 104.
The analysis in Norris was straightforward to that point. However, the court then went on to state:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Fleming v. Board of Parole
...its administrative rules have not provided a mechanism for doing so. We faced a somewhat similar conundrum in Corgain v. Board of Parole, 213 Or.App. 407, 162 P.3d 990 (2007). That case, like Norris, concerned an inmate who had a sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence for aggra......
-
State v. Allen
...warn you that I'm totally booked up until August, and then in August I'm on vacation for the month." 7. Cf. Corgain v. Board of Parole, 213 Or.App. 407, 417, 162 P.3d 990 (2007) ("`Reading' appellate remands can be as reliable as reading 8. The trial court's letter opinion was initially red......
-
Atkinson v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
...sentences imposed in conjunction with consecutive terms shall be considered a single unified minimum.”); Corgain v. Board of Parole , 213 Or.App. 407, 420 n. 5, 162 P.3d 990 (2007) (“In general, ‘summing’ refers to the practice of adding the consecutive terms together, and ‘unsumming’ refer......
-
Washington v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
...that consecutive sentences are not appropriate, thus allowing those terms to run concurrently.” Corgain v. Board of Parole, 213 Or.App. 407, 420 n. 5, 162 P.3d 990 (2007) ; see OAR 255–35–022 (5/31/85) (further explaining “summing” and “unsumming”).1 Even while the parole-matrix system desc......