Corley v. State
| Decision Date | 03 March 1888 |
| Citation | 7 S.W. 255 |
| Parties | CORLEY <I>v.</I> STATE. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Logan county; JAMES F. REID, Special Judge.
T. C. Humphry, for appellant. Dan. W. Jones, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The principal question in this case is as to admissibility of the confession upon which the prisoner was convicted. The rule is established in this state,—in accordance with the unvarying current of authority elsewhere,—that a confession of guilt, to be admissible, must be free from the taint of official inducement proceeding either "from the flattery of hope or the torture of fear." Austin v. State, 14 Ark. 555; Meyers v. State, 19 Ark. 156; Butler v. State, 34 Ark. 480; Ford v. State, Id. 649; Yates v. State, 47 Ark. 172, 1 S. W. Rep. 65. The question whether or not a confession is voluntary is determined by the court upon consideration of the circumstances under which it is made, taken in connection with the age, character, and situation of the defendant. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 119. If the judge is satisfied it is voluntary, the confession goes to the jury, and it becomes their province to determine its weight as evidence. The court determines the admissibility of the evidence; the jury estimates the degree of credit, due to it under all the circumstances of the case. Much is left to the discretion of the trial judge in determining the question of admissibility, but he has not that latitude of discretion in determining the fact as to whether the confession was voluntary or involuntary that a jury enjoys in deciding a question of fact. His views must be controlled by the established precedents. If the evidence shows that threats or promises by persons in authority over the prisoner have induced his confession, the trial judge is not at liberty to measure the extent of its effect upon the prisoner's mind, and thus determine for himself whether he will admit or exclude. 2 Starkie, Ev. 49; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116, 34 Amer. Dec. 672; Whart. Crim. Ev. § 652, note 6. If the confession is fairly traceable to the prohibited influence used to extract it, it must be excluded. Love v. State, 22 Ark. 336. The defendant objected to the introduction of the confession in this case; the jury was withdrawn, and the court heard the evidence, that led to the confession, to determine whether it was admissible in evidence. This was the approved practice. It was made to appear that the prisoner had been suspected of complicity in rifling the county treasurer's safe. He was himself deputy-treasurer, and knew the combination of the lock at the time the contents of the safe were stolen. The evidence tended to show that the safe had been unlocked, the money removed, and the locks broken afterwards as a blind to detection. The prisoner had been entreated, threatened, and finally arrested, to induce him to tell about the offense. He firmly protested his innocence and utter ignorance of the whole matter. He was released from arrest. Finally the grand jury met and summoned him before them to testify about the matter. He still asserted ignorance of the perpetrators of the crime. The grand jury persisted in the effort to extract some intimation from him that might serve as a clew to unravel the mystery. He was before them at different times on three successive days, and remained under guard subject to their order. The record does not purport to set the facts out in the order of their occurrence, and there is a slight mist of uncertainty as to the sequence of the representations made to the defendant by different members of the grand jury and others, while he was in the custody of the officer in whose presence the confession, which was received in evidence, was finally made. It seems that after a time the defendant gave evidence of breaking down. The grand jurors pressed the opportunity, and exhorted him to tell the truth. He expressed a fear of personal violence at the hands of those whom his testimony might implicate. Grand jurors promised him protection. Two of the three members of that body who testified insisted that the protection promised was protection only from personal violence, such as one citizen might give to another; and one of them said the defendant was informed that the jury regarded it as their duty to indict him, and expressed the opinion that the prisoner must have known he would be indicted; but the same witness testifies that when they promised him protection they did not explain what kind of protection was meant; and the third witness, who was the foreman, testified that, if he had been in the prisoner's place, he would have understood the promise and assurances of the grand jury to mean that he was not to be prosecuted. The defendant, at this juncture, made a statement implicating others in the offense, making an effort still to shield himself. He was then removed from the grand jury room, under a guard furnished at his request to protect him from violence, to await the further direction of the grand jury, the foreman instructing the guard to allow no one access to him. In this interval, as we understand it, the prosecuting attorney sought him, and assured him that if he would tell the whole truth the state would deal fairly with him. The next morning, while waiting to be called before the grand jury, Grady, Chitwood, and Taylor, the witnesses who testified to his confession, were admitted by his guard to his presence. They told him that they understood he had made a statement to the grand jury about the safe robbery which was not regarded as satisfactory; the spokesman informed him that it did not clear up some persons who were suspected, and that he ought to tell the whole truth, let the guilt rest where it might. The prisoner replied that that was just what he was going to do, and produced a statement, which he had written out on a pocket memorandum book, making the confession which was given in evidence, and read it to them. He stated that it was prepared for the grand jury, and that he had previously made up his mind not to tell...
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