Corley v. State

• Decision Date: 05 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. A89A0671,A89A0671
• Citation: 383 S.E.2d 586,192 Ga.App. 35
• Parties: CORLEY v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 586

383 S.E.2d 586

192 Ga.App. 35

CORLEY v. The STATE.

No. A89A0671.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 5, 1989.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1989.

Certiorari Denied July 13, 1989.

Virgil L. Brown & Associates, Virgil L. Brown, Concord, for appellant.

John T. Newton, Jr., Sol., for appellee.

CARLEY, Chief Judge.

Appellant was charged with two traffic offenses: driving under the influence in violation of former OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(4); and, disregarding a stop sign in violation of OCGA § 40-6-72(b). After a jury trial, he was found guilty of both charges. He brings this appeal from the judgments of conviction and sentences that were entered by the trial court on the jury's guilty verdicts.

1. The trial court's denial of appellant's motion for a directed verdict is enumerated as error.

The State's expert witness could not testify with complete certainty that, at the time that appellant wrecked his car, his blood alcohol level was 0.12 percent or more. However, the evidence did show that, more than an hour after appellant had last driven, his blood alcohol level was 0.20 percent. In addition, two witnesses for the State gave graphic descriptions of appellant's drunken state. The testimony of these two witnesses was entirely consistent with the description given by the State's expert witness of the behavior of one having a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.12 percent. After a review of the record, we find that a rational trior of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof of appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. The trial court's admission of evidence regarding the results of appellant's blood test is enumerated as error.

Appellant's initial contention is that "the trial court erred in admitting the results of a blood alcohol test where no proper foundation as to the qualifications of the technician who took the blood had been laid by the State. [Appellant] first raised this issue after the close of the State's evidence by motion to strike the evidence. No objection was made by [appellant] contemporaneously with the challenged testimony. [Cit.] [Appellant] would excuse the lack of a timely objection because the trial court allowed the State [C]rime [L]aboratory witness to testify out of the normal chain of custody order. However, as the grounds of [appellant's] motion to strike [are] unrelated to the chain of custody issue we cannot agree. The trial court's exercise of its discretion on the order of witnesses as to the chain of custody in no way extended the appropriate time for objections by [appellant] as to other issues." McNabb v. State, 180 Ga.App. 723, 724-25(3), 350 S.E.2d 314 (1986).

Appellant also contends that the chain of custody for his blood sample was not established. The State offered the testimony of the officer who watched as the blood was taken and who eventually mailed the sample. The State also offered the testimony of the State Crime Laboratory chemist who had received the sample and had analyzed it. The testimony of these two witnesses was sufficient to establish the chain of custody, there being no evidence, but only a bare speculation, of tampering. See Anderson v. State, 247 Ga. 397, 399(2), 276 S.E.2d 603 (1981).

3. The failure of the trial court to grant a mistrial is enumerated as error.

Appellant's contention is that the trial court, in responding to an...