Cormier v. Fisher, Civ. 05-75-B-W.
| Decision Date | 21 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 05-75-B-W.,Civ. 05-75-B-W. |
| Citation | 404 F.Supp.2d 357 |
| Parties | Charlene CORMIER and Robert Cormier, Plaintiffs, v. James Todd FISHER Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Theodore M. Smith, Smith Law Office LLC, Van Buren, ME, for Plaintiffs.
Frederick C. Moore, Law Office of Frederick C. Moore, Portland, ME, for Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE OR RETAIN VENUE
This case begins like a law school examination: if a Maine resident is injured in Virginia by a Georgia resident, which court has jurisdiction and where does venue lie? This Court's brief answer is that the federal court in Maine does not have jurisdiction and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), it transfers the matter to the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia for further proceedings.
Plaintiffs, Charlene and Robert Cormier, are Maine residents who while in the commonwealth of Virginia were involved in a car accident they alleged was caused by the negligence of Defendant, James Todd Fisher, a resident of Georgia. On May 17, 2005, Plaintiffs filed suit against Mr. Fisher in the District of Maine, claiming damages for personal injuries to Charlene Cormier allegedly arising out of Defendant's negligence. Compl. (Docket # 1). Subject matter jurisdiction is grounded in diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Compl. at ¶ 3. Defendant, however, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Maine has no personal jurisdiction over him as he has never even set foot in the Pine Tree State. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or in the alternative, Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 11)(Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss).
Plaintiffs respond by arguing that personal jurisdiction is proper under both the Maine long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Pls.' Opp'n. Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or in the alternative Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 13) . Wisely, however, they elected to hedge their bet and request that if this Court finds an absence of personal jurisdiction, transfer be made to the Western District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1406(a). Pls.' Alt. Mot. to Change Venue or Retain Venue (Docket # 14) . Defendant requests, however, that the Court exercise its discretion to dismiss the case outright or transfer it to a federal district court in Georgia. Def.'s Opp'n. to Pls.' Alt. Mot. to Change Venue or Retain Venue (Docket. # 18)(Def.'s Opp'n.).
This Court agrees with Defendant that as a federal trial court in Maine, it has no personal jurisdiction over him; however, it agrees with Plaintiffs that the proper course of action is transfer, not dismissal. Consequently, this case will be transferred to the federal district court nearest the accident site: the Western District of Virginia.1
Because this is a diversity case, the Court's authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is limited by the state of Maine's long-arm statute. See Am. Express Int'l., Inc. v. Mendez-Capellan, 889 F.2d 1175, 1178 (1st Cir.1989). As Maine's long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the "fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution, 14th amendment", 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A(1), the inquiry focuses on whether the assumption of jurisdiction would violate due process.
Due process requires that the defendant have "minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780-81, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Minimum contacts are determined by whether the defendant "purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)(citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)).
To establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant is subject either to "general jurisdiction" or "specific jurisdiction." "[A] defendant who has maintained a continuous and systematic linkage with the forum state brings himself within the general jurisdiction of that state's courts in respect to all matters, even those that are unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir.1999) (citations omitted). Absent general jurisdiction, this Court may still assume jurisdiction if the claim "relates sufficiently to, or arises from, a significant subset of contacts between the defendant and the forum." Id. See also Donatelli v. Nat'l. Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462-63 (1st Cir. 1990). This is dubbed "specific jurisdiction". See generally RF Techs. Corp. v. Applied Microwave Techs., Inc., 369 F.Supp.2d 24, 28-30 (D.Me.2005); Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 56-58 (1st Cir.2005).
The Maine Law Court has determined that "before exercising its jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the court must conclude that (1) Maine has a legitimate interest in the subject matter of this action; (2) the defendant, by its conduct, should reasonably have anticipated litigation in Maine; and, (3) exercise of jurisdiction by Maine's courts would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Frazier v. BankAmerica Int'l., 593 A.2d 661, 662 (Me. 1991). Once the Plaintiff demonstrates that Maine has a legitimate interest in the controversy and that the requisite minimum contacts exist such that the defendant should reasonably expect litigation in this state, the burden shifts to defendant to prove that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.
Plaintiffs claim all three prongs are met. Pls.' Opp'n. at 2-4. This Court cannot agree. Plaintiff's Complaint offers only that the accident occurred in Virginia and that Defendant is a resident of Georgia. Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 4-7. This provides no basis to subject the Defendant to suit in Maine. Even if the pleadings were adequate, Plaintiffs could not rest on bare allegations to meet their burden, particularly in light of Defendant's assertion that he has never owned or rented property in Maine, has never operated a business in Maine, never lived, worked, or so much as set foot in Maine. Def.'s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts at ¶ 3-4 (Docket # 12); Aff. of James Todd Fisher . See Frazier, 593 A.2d at 662 (); Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir.1992)("We recognize that some courts ... appear to hold that allegations in a complaint, unsupported by any evidence in the record before the court, are sufficient to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction so long as the defendant does not present evidence to contradict the allegations ... it has long been the rule of this circuit, however, that `plaintiffs may not rely on unsupported allegations in their pleadings to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction'").
Plaintiffs do not appear to contradict Defendant's lack of contacts with the state of Maine. Plaintiffs obliquely suggest that they are opposing Defendant's statement of undisputed material facts. Pls.' Opp'n. at 4. However, they have not alleged any contrary facts, and their Complaint and the affidavit of Charlene Cormier attached to the opposition statement do not provide a factual basis to deny Defendant's claim.2
Applying Frazier to the evidence at hand, Maine has a legitimate interest in providing its citizens with a means of redress against non-resident defendants — as Plaintiffs argue. Furthermore, the medical witnesses and creditors appear to be located here.3 But, Defendant did not reasonably anticipate litigation in Maine by traveling in Virginia, even though on an interstate highway. To hold that mere presence on an interstate highway is sufficient to subject one to personal jurisdiction in any state — even one through which the highway does not travel — would render the concept of personal jurisdiction, and its requirement of minimum contacts with the forum state, meaningless.4
Plaintiffs have, as their counterparts in Frazier, "failed to demonstrate that the requisite minimum contacts exist between the defendants and the State of Maine so that defendants should reasonably expect that they would be subject to suit here". They did not make a showing that the defendant directed "any activities to or ... [has] any continuing obligation with residents of Maine". That the consequences and costs are felt in Maine does not change the analysis. "The commission outside the forum state of an act that has consequences in the forum state is by itself an insufficient contact where all the events necessary to give rise to a tort claim occurred outside the forum state". Frazier, 593 A.2d at 663 (quoting Martin v. Deschenes, 468 A.2d 618, 619 (Me.1983)); Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 721 (1st Cir.1991).
There is simply no evidence the Defendant has maintained a "continuous and systematic linkage" with the state of Maine, so as to bring him within the reach of general jurisdiction. Phillips Exeter, 196 F.3d at 288. Nor does the claim at...
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