Cornelius v. State
Decision Date | 27 June 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 5D17–1138 |
Citation | 223 So.3d 398 |
Parties | Clifton CORNELIUS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Petitioner.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
This Petition for Writ of Prohibition is a sequel to a series of pleadings filed by Clifton Cornelius invoking his right to a speedy trial and seeking discharge from the criminal charges pending against him.1 Although Cornelius, like other criminal defendants, has the right to a speedy trial, the manner of his invocation of that right is problematic for him. Specifically, the issue in this case concerns the validity of a pro se demand for speedy trial Cornelius filed in the trial court. In addition to the demand, Cornelius also filed a pro se notice of expiration and a pro se motion for discharge, which will collectively be referred to as the "pleadings." (The relevance of these pleadings will appear later in the discussion.) The pro se designation is significant because Cornelius was represented by counsel at the time he filed the demand for speedy trial and sent it on the procedural path in the trial court. Although the traverse ended in the trial court when an order was entered striking the demand, it continues in this court with the filing of Cornelius's pro se petition for writ of prohibition. In that petition, Cornelius requests that this court enter an order "prevent[ing] the State of Florida, and alternatively, the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court from prosecuting the above styled case."
We will explain why we decline that request by discussing: 1) the procedural history of Cornelius's invocation of his speedy trial rights in the trial court; 2) whether the trial court correctly struck the demand; 3) if the trial court's reasoning was incorrect, whether the trial court arrived at the correct conclusion; 4) whether his counsel properly adopted the pro se demand and other pleadings in this court; and 5) whether adoption of the pleadings should relate back to the date of initial filing.
Dates are pertinent to the procedural history, so we will mention them. In August 2011, Cornelius was charged by information with fleeing or attempting to elude and driving without a license. The Office of the Public Defender was appointed to represent him in 2011 and has continuously represented Cornelius since that initial appointment.2 Before these charges were resolved, Cornelius was sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Department of Corrections in an unrelated case. The charges remained pending while Cornelius served his sentence.
On January 23, 2017, Cornelius filed his pro se demand for speedy trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b). Cornelius requested that the trial court grant a speedy trial or enter an order dismissing the charges and the detainer. According to the certificate of service, Cornelius did not send a copy of the demand to his counsel. He also did not send copies of the other pleadings to his counsel.
The State moved to strike Cornelius's demand, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had not attached because he had not been formally arrested in this case. The trial court granted the State's motion without explanation. Cornelius filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied.
Cornelius subsequently filed the instant petition for writ of prohibition on April 18, 2017, contending that his speedy trial rights have been violated and requesting that this court order his discharge. On May 22, 2017, Cornelius's counsel filed a response arguing that the trial court erred in applying the wrong section of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. The response also stated that counsel was adopting the pro se pleadings and that we should refrain from applying the date-of-adoption rule applied by the court in State v. Craven , 955 So.2d 1182, 1183–84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ( ).
We agree with Cornelius that the trial court proceeded under the wrong section of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 when it struck his demand for speedy trial. Rule 3.191(a), which deals with speedy trial without demand, is triggered when a defendant is taken into custody. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a) ().
In this case, however, Cornelius filed a demand for speedy trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b). Seeid. (providing that rule 3.191(a)"shall cease to apply whenever a person files a valid demand for speedy trial under subdivision (b)"). Rule 3.191(b) provides that "every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall have the right to demand a trial within 60 days." The sixty-day limit begins to run from the date of demand regardless of a defendant's custody status. Carter v. State , 509 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Accordingly, whether Cornelius had been arrested in this case was irrelevant to the trial court's analysis of his speedy trial demand.
Although the trial court's reasoning was wrong, our analysis does not end here, because the demand was filed by Cornelius while he was represented by counsel. Courts have adopted the general rule, with limited exceptions not applicable here,3 that a pro se pleading is a nullity and must be stricken if it is filed while the defendant is represented by counsel. See Logan v. State , 846 So.2d 472, 476 (Fla. 2003) ; Craven , 955 So.2d at 1183 ; Sams v. State , 849 So.2d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) ; Booker v. State , 807 So.2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ; Lewis , 766 So.2d at 289. Courts sometimes consider "nullity rule" to be an appropriate moniker. See Sheppard , 17 So.3d at 280. A motion by the State to strike a pro se pleading is not a prerequisite to application of the nullity rule. See Prevatt v. State , 776 So.2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) () (internal citations omitted); Craven , 955 So.2d at 1183 ().
The nullity rule emanates from judicial recognition that criminal defendants are generally not entitled to hybrid representation by counsel and themselves. See Sheppard , 17 So.3d at 279 (). This rule applies to demands for speedy trial and attendant notices of expiration and motions for discharge. See Smith v. State , 758 So.2d 741, 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ; Salser v. State , 582 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) ; State v. Templar–O'Brien , 173 So.3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (); Harden v. State , 152 So.3d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (); Craven , 955 So.2d at 1183 ; Sams , 849 So.2d at 1174 ( ); Thompson v. State , 615 So.2d 737, 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (); Beverly v. State , 516 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Pursuant to the nullity rule, the trial court should have stricken Cornelius's pro se demand for speedy trial as a nullity and never considered it further. Thus, the trial court properly struck the demand for speedy trial filed by Cornelius, albeit for the wrong reason. See Marquardt v. State , 156 So.3d 464, 482 (Fla. 2015) ( ).
Implicitly recognizing that the nullity rule portends an impediment to the relief Cornelius requests, his counsel attempts to adopt the demand and other pro se pleadings for the first time in this court. She argues that we should look away from the date-of-adoption rule in Craven and hold that the pertinent date relates back to the initial filing of the pro se pleadings. Cornelius would then be able to argue that he is entitled to discharge because he was not brought to trial within the time limitations of the speedy trial rule.
We recognize that counsel may breathe life into unauthorized pro se pleadings by adopting them. Logan , 846 So.2d at 475 ; Harden , 152 So.3d at 627 ; Sams , 849 So.2d at 1174. However, adoption of the pro se demand and the other pleadings should be a matter that is presented to the trial court. Golden v. State , 84 So.3d 396, 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ; Craven , 955 So.2d at 1184. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 provides that the trial court must comply with certain time requirements, which necessarily requires that the trial court know that a demand has been made. For example, the trial court must hold a calendar call within five days...
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...no longer represented Cunningham when he filed the pro se motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at 1210 n.1.3 See Cornelius v. State, 223 So.3d 398, 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ("Courts have adopted the general rule, with limited exceptions not applicable here, that a pro se pleading is a nullity an......