Cornell University v. Bagnardi

• Citation: 68 N.Y.2d 583,510 N.Y.S.2d 861,503 N.E.2d 509
• Parties: , 503 N.E.2d 509, 37 Ed. Law Rep. 292 CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Appellant-Respondent, v. Elizabeth S. BAGNARDI et al., Respondents-Appellants, and Charles Hindman et al., Intervenors-Respondents. In the Matter of SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE, Appellant, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF YONKERS, Respondent, and Lawrence Park West and Neighborhood Homeowners Association, Inc., Intervenor-Respondent.
• Decision Date: 19 December 1986
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 861

510 N.Y.S.2d 861

68 N.Y.2d 583, 503 N.E.2d 509, 37 Ed.

Law Rep. 292

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Appellant-Respondent, v. Elizabeth S. BAGNARDI et al., Respondents-Appellants, and Charles Hindman et al., Intervenors-Respondents.

In the Matter of SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE, Appellant, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF YONKERS, Respondent, and Lawrence Park West and Neighborhood Homeowners Association, Inc., Intervenor-Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 19, 1986.

Thomas Mead Santoro and Walter J. Relihan, Jr., Albany, for appellant-respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Ralph W. Nash, City Atty., for respondents-appellants in the first above-entitled action.

Nathaniel F. Knappen and Richard B. Thaler, Ithaca, for intervenors-respondents in the first above-entitled action.

Carl Stahl, White Plains, for appellant in the second above-entitled proceeding.

Jay B. Hashmall, Corp. Counsel, White Plains, (Dennis M. McMahon, Yonkers, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled proceeding.

Michael R. Edelman, White Plains, for intervenor-respondent in the second above-entitled proceeding.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

In these cases involving local zoning regulations, we are called upon to determine the proper method of balancing the needs and rights of educational institutions that desire to expand or construct into purely residential neighborhoods against the concerns of the surrounding residents about the potential inconveniences. We hold that the presumption that educational uses are always in furtherance of the public health, safety and morals may be rebutted by a showing that the proposed use would actually have a net negative impact, and that a reasonably drawn special permit requirement may be used to balance the competing interests in this area. In all instances, the governing standard should be the protection of the public's health, safety, welfare and morals. Since in these cases the schools involved were prevented from implementing their expansion plans for reasons not related to these considerations, the denial of their applications was improper.

I.

Plaintiff Cornell University sought to relocate its Modern Indonesia Project, an interdisciplinary academic program involving approximately 15 people on a full-time basis, to a large house it owned in the Cornell Heights area abutting the Cornell campus. Uses permitted in that area, zoned R-2a, included one- and two-family dwellings, churches, public parks or playgrounds, libraries, public or parochial schools and fire stations. Private schools were allowed by special permit of the Board. A "school" was defined as a "public, private or church-affiliated establishment academically below the college level, for the education of children and for adults in subjects or skills" (City of Ithaca Zoning Ordinance § 30.3[78] ).

Having assumed that its proposed use did not accord with uses allowed as of right or by special permit in the area, plaintiff applied for a variance, which the local Board of Zoning Appeals is empowered to issue where zoning restrictions impose "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship" (City of Ithaca Zoning Ordinance § 30.58[B][3] ). After a hearing, plaintiff's variance application was denied. The Board found that Cornell would suffer no hardship if the variance were denied and concluded that there would be potential unspecified damage to the character of the neighborhood. The Board further stressed that Cornell had shown no need to move its program to the particular site it had chosen.

Plaintiff then commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the ordinance was "unconstitutional, illegal and invalid and/or unconstitutionally, illegally, and invalidly applied to plaintiff". Supreme Court, after trial, adjudged that the proposed use was an educational use that would not endanger the public's health, safety or welfare, that the provisions of the zoning ordinance as applied to prevent plaintiff from using its property for the Modern Indonesia Project were void and ineffective and that defendants should be restrained from interfering with the proposed use of plaintiff's property.

The Appellate Division modified the judgment, 107 A.D.2d 398, 486 N.Y.S.2d 964. That court first substituted for the trial court's declaration concerning the invalidity of the ordinance a narrower declaration of its own that the ordinance was invalid to the extent that it required a variance for the proposed use and conditioned the granting of a variance on a showing of hardship. Such requirements, the court held, do not bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare and are therefore improper. The court also held that the City of Ithaca Zoning Ordinance impermissibly distinguished between educational uses at the college level and those below. Having thus partially invalidated the ordinance, the court concluded that the proposed use fell within the category of uses available with a special permit. As a consequence, the court converted the remainder of the action into a proceeding under CPLR article 78 and remitted the matter to the Board to consider whether a special permit should be granted and whether any restrictions or conditions should be imposed.

After this decision and this court's subsequent decision to grant both sides leave to appeal under CPLR 5602(a)(2) (see, Matter of Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga County Water Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 855), the zoning ordinance was amended to eliminate the need for a variance for uses such as that proposed by Cornell and to remove any distinctions between levels of educational use. Under the amended ordinance, all educational uses are permitted subject to obtaining a special permit. The section governing the issuance of special permits was also amended to add a requirement that the property owner show the need to use the particular site chosen for the educational use.

II.

Sarah Lawrence College sought to house 13 students and 1 staff member in a private house across the street from its main campus. The building is located in an S-200 residential district where a college use is allowed, but only by special permit. The ordinance delineating the factors to be considered in determining whether a special permit should be issued states, in part:

"C. Such permit may be granted subject to such additional conditions and safeguards as may be deemed by the Board to be advisable and appropriate.

"D. Such use shall be found by the Board to be in harmony with the general purposes and intent of this Chapter.

"E. Such use shall not affect adversely the character of the district, nor the conservation of property values, nor the health and safety of residents or workers on adjacent properties and in the general neighborhood.

"F. Such use shall be of such appropriate size, and so located and laid-out in relation to its access streets, that vehicular and pedestrian traffic to and from such use will not create undue congestion or hazards prejudicial to the character of the general neighborhood.

"G. Such use shall not conflict with the direction of building development in accordance with any Master Plan or portion thereof which has been adopted by the Planning Board."

The Planning Board issued an unfavorable report finding, upon the college's application, that the proposed use might depreciate property values, would increase traffic, would damage the character of the neighborhood and would lead to other similar applications along the same street. Furthermore, the Board found that the house was not contiguous to other college-related facilities and that sufficient evidence of need for an additional dormitory facility had not been adduced. Sarah Lawrence then submitted its application to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a special permit on the ground that the percentage of its students seeking on-campus housing had increased immeasurably and that the facilities available on the actual campus could no longer house all of them.

Following a hearing, the Zoning Board of Appeals denied the application, basing its decision on the college's lack of need to expand and its conclusion that any hardship or practical difficulties borne by the college were self-included. The Board further deemed the college's traffic survey unrepresentative of local conditions and stated that the college's experts did not prove to its satisfaction that surrounding property values would not be adversely affected by the proposed student housing arrangements.

Sarah Lawrence thereafter commenced an article 78 proceeding, which resulted in the annulment of the Board's determination and a direction that it issue the permit. The court concluded that the evidence at the hearing could not support a determination that the proposed use would pose a health or safety hazard or have an adverse impact on the neighborhood. The Appellate Division, however, reversed, 119 A.D.2d 753, 501 N.Y.S.2d 162, finding that the Board's determination was not arbitrary and capricious and that it was supported by substantial evidence.

III.

Initially, the unusual circumstances in the Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi case present the question whether plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed on mootness grounds because of the recent amendments to the City of Ithaca's zoning ordinance. Notably, the zoning ordinance, whose constitutionality plaintiff attacked, has been repealed, and it is the amended ordinance which will unquestionably govern plaintiff's new application for a special permit. Therefore, that portion of plaintiff's declaratory judgment action which seeks a declaration that the former City of Ithaca zoning ordinance was unconstitutional, or unconstitutional as applied, is clearly moot (see, Matter of Sibarco Stas. v. Town Bd., 24 N.Y.2d 900, 301 N.Y.S.2d 637, 249 N.E.2d 478). Remaining in controversy, however, is the university's attempt to...