Cornette v. Department of Transportation

• Decision Date: 03 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. B125741.,B125741.
• Citation: 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 733,80 Cal.App.4th 1239
• Parties: Stacy CORNETTE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOTATION, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

95 Cal.Rptr.2d 733

80 Cal.App.4th 1239

Stacy CORNETTE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOTATION, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B125741.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3.

May 3, 2000.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 1, 2000.

Review Granted July 19, 2000.

Grassini & Wrinkle and Roland Wrinkle, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

William M. McMillan; David R. Simmes; Larry R. Danielson; and Jill Siciliano for Defendant and Respondent.

CROSKEY, Acting P.J.

In this case, we are presented with the question of whether a plaintiff in a personal injury action against a public entity who seeks to defeat the defense of design immunity (Gov.Code, § 830.6)¹ is entitled to a jury trial as to the existence of "changed conditions" which would lead to the loss of that immunity. Despite conceding that factual issues remained as to the question of changed conditions, the trial court denied plaintiffs a jury trial and resolved those issues itself.

Plaintiffs Stacy Cornette and Rodney Cornette appeal the judgment entered in favor of the defendant Department of Transportation ("Caltrans") following the conclusion of a trial limited to the bifurcated design immunity defense asserted by Caltrans. They argue they were improperly deprived of their constitutional right to a jury trial of the disputed issues pertaining to the existence of "changed conditions" which would have justified a denial of that defense. We agree with the plaintiffs and we will therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new trial.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

On May 23, 1992, the plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident while driving northbound on the Antelope Valley Freeway. When another northbound vehicle blew a tire and collided with them, the plaintiffs were forced across the open dirt median of the freeway and into the southbound lanes where they collided with a southbound vehicle. The accident occurred just north of the Mountain Springs Road overcrossing; it was at a point which was approximately 20 feet beyond the end of an existing median barrier which Caltrans had previously constructed from the south up to, but ending at, the Mountain Springs Road overcrossing.

On May 18, 1993, plaintiffs filed this action for damages arising from their very substantial personal injuries and claimed mutual loss of consortium. They named a number of defendants in addition to Caltrans; however, we are concerned only with their claim against Caltrans which was based on the alleged dangerous condition of the Antelope Valley Freeway created by the absence of a median barrier at the location of the accident. At the time they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs requested a jury trial. Caltrans filed its answer on July 21, 1995, and raised, inter alia, the defense of design immunity. The plaintiffs in filing their Status Conference Questionnaire on September 11, 1997, again requested a jury trial; and the trial court, in its minute order of May 7, 1998, set the case for a jury trial.

The matter was called for trial on May 14, 1998 and Caltrans requested that the court bifurcate the design immunity defense and try it first. (Code Civ. Proc., § 597.)³ The trial court granted this request but concluded that none of the issues relating either to the existence of design immunity or its loss should be submitted to the jury; rather, such issues should be tried solely by the court as the trier of fact. This was done over the objections of the plaintiffs who repeatedly argued that all issues, save one, relating to design immunity or its loss by reason of changed conditions, should be tried to the jury. The court rejected this contention and concluded that it would be the arbiter of all factual and legal issues.

The parties then presented evidence, including expert witness testimony. On May 26, 1998, the trial court issued its Intended Decision, finding in favor of Caltrans. Thereafter, a formal Statement of Decision was signed and filed on June 26, 1998. In that statement, the trial court recognized that plaintiffs claimed that Caltrans' failure to install a median barrier had created a dangerous condition and amounted to actionable negligence but that Caltrans' claim of design immunity would, if sustained, preclude liability. The court noted that plaintiffs had argued the design immunity defense was not available to Caltrans because of the existence of changed conditions. It was the trial courts' resolution of the factual issues raised by that contention which presents the critical issue in this case.⁴

There is no doubt whatever that the evidence presented by the parties during the bifurcated hearing on Caltrans' design immunity defense, including particularly the competing expert testimony, was in conflict. There was substantial evidence presented that since this freeway had been designed and constructed in 1964 there had been a significant increase in both traffic volume and the number of accidents. Beginning in 1989 (three years prior to plaintiffs' accident) correspondence was generated describing other accidents which had occurred in the vicinity of the freeway and Mountain Springs Road and expressing a sense of urgency to have installed a median barrier north of that intersection.

As the trial court expressly noted in its Statement of Decision, the substance of these communications and what action should have been taken in response to them was the subject of considerable testimony by the expert presented by Caltrans as well as by plaintiffs' expert. The conflict in this testimony involved not only the accuracy of the information which was being communicated, but also whether the interpretation of the information did or did not meet Caltrans' standard criteria to establish a cause for alarm. Further, even assuming there was a cause for alarm, there was additional conflict over whether there was an adequate or reasonable amount of time for Caltrans to complete installation of an appropriate median barrier prior to the May 23, 1992 date of plaintiffs' tragic accident.⁵

While there is no dispute that these are unresolved factual issues, and that they are properly raised and resolved through the presentation and evaluation of expert testimony, the trial court nonetheless accepted the argument of Caltrans that plaintiffs were not entitled to have these issues submitted to a jury and that they could properly be decided by the court.

The trial court proceeded to do just that and found in favor of Caltrans on its design immunity defense. It concluded that plaintiffs' expert was not credible and rejected his opinions relating to plaintiffs' "changed conditions" contention. Following issuance of the Statement of Decision on June 26, 1998, the trial court entered judgment on July 14, 1998. Plaintiffs thereafter prosecuted this timely appeal.

ISSUE PRESENTED

There is only one issue which we must resolve. It is whether plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on disputed factual issues pertaining to their claim that Caltrans' design immunity defense was lost by reason of changed conditions.

DISCUSSION

1. A Public Entity May Rely Upon Design Immunity As Defense To a Claim of Liability For a Dangerous Condition

Public entity can be liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property. (Gov.Code, § 835.)⁶ The state's failure to erect median barriers to prevent cross-median accidents may result in such liability. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 720, 159 Cal.Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755; Morris v. State of California (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 962, 965, 153 Cal.Rptr. 117.)

However, statutory law provides a "design immunity" defense to such liability. (§ 830.6.)⁷ Under section 830.6 there is no liability for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction of or improvement to public property where such plan or design has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the legislative or other authorized body of the public entity provided the trial or appellate court determines that there is any substantial evidence that a reasonable legislative (or other authorized) body or public employee could have adopted or approved the plan or the design or standards therefor. Thus, a public entity raising a design immunity defense must establish three elements: (1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident, (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction and (3) the existence of substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the adoption of the plan or design. (Higgins v. State of California (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 177, 185, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 459.)

The rationale for design immunity is to prevent a jury from second-guessing the decision of a public entity regarding a particular plan or design of a public construction or improvement. (Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 432, fn. 7, 434, 99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121; hereafter, Baldwin.) "`"[T]o permit reexamination in tort litigation of particular discretionary decisions where reasonable men may differ as to how the discretion should be exercised would create too great a danger of impolitic interference with the freedom of decision-making by those public officials in whom the function of making such decisions has been vested."' [Citations.]" (Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 326, 102 Cal.Rptr. 305, 497 P.2d 777.) Or to put it another way, "in enacting section 830.6, the Legislature was concerned lest juries be allowed to second-guess the discretionary determinations of public officials by reviewing the identical questions of risk that had previously been considered by the government officers who adopted or approved the plan." (Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 434, 99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121.)

2. A Public Entity's Design Immunity Defense May Be Lost By Proof of Changed Conditions

The Supreme Court in Baldwin, overruling its own prior...