Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court of Tehama County

• Decision Date: 04 April 1962
• Citation: 57 Cal.2d 488,20 Cal.Rptr. 621,370 P.2d 325
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 370 P.2d 325 CORNING HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF TEHAMA COUNTY, Respondent; Louisa C. Muskopf et al., Real Parties in Interest. Sac. 7370.

Page 621

20 Cal.Rptr. 621

57 Cal.2d 488, 370 P.2d 325

CORNING HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF TEHAMA COUNTY, Respondent;

Louisa C. Muskopf et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Sac. 7370.

Supreme Court of California.

April 4, 1962.

Newton, Braun & Goodrich, Glenn Newton and William J. Braun, Redding, for petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein, Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein and Reginald M. Watt, Chico, for real parties in interest.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

Petitioner, a hospital district in Tehama County, seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in an action for personal injuries brought against it by Louisa and Richard Muskopf. The right to this relief depends upon the validity and effect of chapter 1404 of the 1961 Statutes, which became effective September 15 of that year. The district asserts that by reason of this legislation it is entitled to rely on the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability as that doctrine existed prior to our decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457, and that the superior court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the case.

The complaint in Muskopf v. Corning, filed by plaintiffs in 1958, alleged that in May of that year, while Mrs. Muskopf was a paying patient of a hospital operated by the district, the hospital staff negligently attempted to move her, causing her to fall and suffer injuries. The trial court rendered judgment for defendant after sustaining a general demurred on the ground that the district was acting in a governmental capacity and was entitled to the benefit of governmental immunity. ¹ In Muskopf v. Corning we held that the doctrine of governmental immunity could no longer be used to shield an entity of government from liability for torts for which its agents were liable. We reversed the judgment for defendant and, in denying a petition for rehearing, rejected a suggestion that the decision be made to apply only prospectively.

It should be noted as a preliminary matter that no final judgment has been rendered in Muskopf v. Corning. Although the doctrine of the law of the case would ordinarily preclude Corning from again urging that it has immunity, that doctrine will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision (Vangel v. Vangel, 45 Cal.2d 804, 809-810, 291 P.2d 25, 55 A.L.R.2d 1385), and it would be unfair to apply the decision to Corning if, as a result of the 1961 legislation, it is not to be applied to the defendants in other cases involving the same problem.

Interpretation of Statute

Section 1 of the 1961 statute provides in part: 'The doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability is hereby reenacted as a rule of decision in the courts of this State, and shall be applicable to all matters and all governmental entities in the same manner and to the same extent that it was applied in this State on January 1, 1961. This section shall apply to matters arising prior to its effective date as well as to those arising on and after such date.' ² This language, without more, would eliminate the effect of our decision in Muskopf v. Corning as to all past, present, and future tort cases against governmental agencies until such time as the Legislature might again take action in this field. It is clear from the legislation as a whole, however, that section 1 cannot be interpreted in this manner but is qualified by sections 3 and 4.

Section 3 provides: 'Section 1 of this act shall remain in effect until the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Regular Session of the Legislature, and shall have no force or effect on and after that date.' It follows that the rule in Muskopf v. Corning is not rendered permanently inoperative but will be automatically reinstated on the specified date in 1963 in the absence of further legislation on the subject. (Cf. Analogous rules of construction applied where the operation of a statutory provision is temporarily suspended by another statute: Gov.Code, § 9611; ³ 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rd ed. 1943) §§ 2037-2038, pp. 516-518.) Section 3 makes no distinction in this respect between causes of action accruing before and after the 1963 date.

Section 4 provides, '(a) On or after the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Regular Session of the Legislature, an action may be brought and maintained in the manner prescribed by law on any cause of action which arose on or after February 27, 1961 and before the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Regular Session, and upon which an action was barred during that period by the provisions of this act, if and only if both of the following conditions are met: (1) a claim * * * has been field * * * and (2) the bringing of the action was barred solely by the provisions of this act and is not barred by any other provision of law enacted subsequent to the enactment of this act. (b) The statute of limitations otherwise applicable to the bringing of an action allowed pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall commence to run on or after the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Regular Session of the Legislature.' ⁴

February 27, 1961, referred to in section 4, is the date on which Muskopf v. Corning became final, and it is provided in section 4 that suits on causes of action accruing on or after that date may be brought and maintained on or after the specified date in 1963 'in the manner prescribed by law.' Since, as provided by section 3, section 1 will have no force or effect after the 1963 date, the words 'in the manner prescribed by law' must mean the law existing without regard to section 1 and are sufficiently broad to include the rule announced in Muskopf v. Corning. The words of section 4 referring to causes of action 'barred during that period by the provisions of this act' and 'barred solely by the provisions of this act,' clearly imply that such actions will no longer be barred after the end of the period referred to in section 4, when section 1 will automatically cease to be of force or effect.

As we have seen, the 1961 legislation will have no effect on causes of action accruing after the specified date in 1963. With respect to causes of action accruing between February 27, 1961 and the 1963 date, which are specifically dealt with in section 4, it is clear the statute establishes a temporary period of suspension, and without further legislation the rule of Muskopf v. Corning will be controlling in all such actions. There is no similar provision specifically covering causes of action which accrued prior to February 27, 1961, and it is therefore less clear whether the intent was to provide for the destruction or merely the temporary suspension of such causes of action. It is our view, however, that the intent to do nothing more than suspend such causes of action is shown by the provision of section 3 that section 1 'shall have no force or effect' after the specified 1963 date. The difference between such an action and one accruing after February 27, 1961, is that as to the latter the statute of limitations will not commence to run, under section 4, subdivision (b), until the 1963 date, whereas all causes of action arising prior to February 27, 1961, are barred unless suit is filed within the ordinary limitation periods provided for tort actions.

The above interpretation of the 1961 legislation is in accord, by analogy, with section 9611 of the Government Code, supra, which declares that a 'provision of law' (here, by comparison, the decision in Muskopf v. Corning) temporarily suspended by a provision declared effective for only a limited time is not deemed repealed but upon expiration of that time 'shall have the same force and effect as if the temporary provision had not been enacted.' Moreover, construing the legislation as merely suspending causes of action, rather than destroying them, is a less drastic retroactive application of section 1 insofar as it governs 'matters arising prior to its effective date.' A statute shall not be construed to be retroactive unless expressly so declared (Civ.Code, § 3), and in keeping with this rule a statute should be given the least retroactive effect that its language reasonably permits.

Although the intent to merely suspend causes of action is not consistent with all the language of the statute, no interpretation is consistent with all the language, and this may be explained by the fact that only sections 1 and 2 of the statute were contained in the original bill and that by separate, successive amendments section 3 and later section 4 were added without any change in the wording of the prior sections.

The 1961 statute, as we have interpreted it, will give the Legislature time to review the many statutory provisions enacted on the basis of the law existing prior to 1961, and determine what, if any, legislation may be necessary in this field. In addition public entities will be afforded time to prepare for bearing the burdens of defending actions and to provide for the satisfaction of possible judgments.

It follows from what we have said that the statute does not destroy plaintiffs' cause of action but merely suspends it.

Constitutionality

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