Corning v. Maynard

Decision Date12 May 1917
Docket NumberNo. 30870.,30870.
Citation179 Iowa 1065,162 N.W. 564
PartiesCORNING v. MAYNARD.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Salinger, J., dissenting.

Appeal from District Court, Grundy County; George W. Dunham, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained in a collision between plaintiff's motorcycle and the defendant's automobile. At the close of plaintiff's evidence there was a directed verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Martin & Turnipseed, of Cedar Falls, for appellant.

F. E. Northup, of Marshalltown, for appellee.

EVANS, J.

The plaintiff on his motorcycle was driving east toward Cedar Falls. The defendant was approaching the plaintiff from the east, and therefore was driving west. They were on opposite sides of the same hill, which was so steep that neither driver could see the other at a greater distance than 100 feet until one or both of them came to the crest thereof. They met at the crest, and the collision resulted. The plaintiff did not in fact see the defendant until he was within 60 feet of him, although he might have seen him at the distance of 100 feet if he had been looking at that very moment. Just before seeing the defendant Maynard's car, the plaintiff had seen the car of Stahl, who was also driving west and coming up the same hill. When he saw Maynard's car, it was almost abreast with that of Stahl and was passing Stahl. Stahl was driving within 2 feet of the north line of the traveled road. Maynard was passing him on his left leaving 4 feet of space between them. Plaintiff was traveling on a line one foot or less further south than the 4-foot space between the two automobiles. He swerved his motorcycle one foot further to the left and undertook to go between the two automobiles. Maynard turned to the right at the same instant, and the plaintiff collided with Maynard's right fender and wheel. It is claimed for the plaintiff that he was driving at 20 miles an hour. Evidence was introduced tending to show that Maynardwas traveling at 35 or 40 miles an hour. Maynard gave no signals of any kind while coming up the hill. Neither did the plaintiff. Indeed, the plaintiff had upon his motorcycle neither bell nor horn nor brake. He relied wholly upon the compression of his engine for stopping purposes and upon the noise of his cut-out for signals. Much of the argument is devoted to the proposition of defendant's negligence and that it was the proximate cause of the accident. The negligence of the defendant may well be taken for granted, and also that it was a proximate cause of the accident.

[1][2] The important question is whether the plaintiff himself was clearly guilty of contributory negligence. That he violated the statute section 1571m18 in failing to give appropriate signals while his view was obstructed beyond the crest of the hill is indisputable. It seems likewise indisputable that if either of these parties had given the statutory signal the accident would have been avoided. In that respect the duty of one was precisely the same as that of the other. If the failure to give a warning signal on the part of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury, the same failure on the part of the plaintiff was a contributing cause. It was a clear violation of the statute also for the plaintiff to operate his motorcycle upon the public highway without the equipment of brake or bell or horn. Section 1571m17. The violation of this statute sustained a close relation to the circumstances of the accident, in that it rendered it impossible for him to comply with the requirement to give a...

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