Corocran v. Quick
| Decision Date | 16 July 1981 |
| Citation | 441 N.Y.S.2d 365,109 Misc.2d 996 |
| Parties | Joseph COROCRAN, Barry Rell, James Michael Truck and Dennis Day, Individually and as Officers and Members of the Kingston Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs, v. Donald E. QUICK, Alexander Yosman, Herbert N. Kessman, Thomas W. Henebery and N. George Habeeb, constituting the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Kingston, New York, William A. Slover, as Deputy Police Chief of the City of Kingston, New York, and the City of Kingston, New York, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
In this action, the individual plaintiffs are police officers employed by the City of Kingston, New York. They sue individually and as members of the plaintiff Kingston Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, an unincorporated association comprised entirely of members of the police department of the City of Kingston. The defendants are the City of Kingston, the Deputy Police Chief of the City of Kingston, and individuals constituting the Board of Police Commissioners. The action is brought to obtain a declaratory judgment determining a particular resolution enacted by the defendant Board on April 10, 1981, to be unconstitutional and therefore illegal and of no affect. The plaintiffs additionally seek incidental injunctive relief.
The subject resolution is entitled "Resolution of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Kingston, New York, and reads, in full as follows:
SECTION 1. That the rules and regulations of the Police Department of the City of Kingston, New York shall be amended to add the following:
The resolution, it is alleged, was enacted in direct response to an action taken on April 9, 1981, at a regularly scheduled monthly meeting of the plaintiff organization. At this meeting, by unanimous vote of those present, it was resolved to commence informational picketing in the City of Kingston, New York, and further resolved that press releases be issued and certain other actions of like nature be taken to express and publicize the Association's criticisms of the firing of one of its members. It is further alleged that following the enactment of the Board's resolution, all action agreed to be taken by the plaintiff Association and its members was withheld and deferred upon the plaintiffs being informed that they would be subject to disciplinary proceedings should they proceed with their intended actions.
The matter is before the court upon the motion of the plaintiffs for summary judgment. In opposition, the defendants argue that the controversy is inappropriate for class action, that the plaintiffs do not represent all members of the Association and that, in any event, the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Upon these arguments the defendants demand dismissal, or, alternatively, that the proceedings be stayed to permit class action notice and the opportunity to the recipients of such notice to intervene. As a further alternative, the defendants urge that a hearing should be directed to determine the nature and extent of an alleged voluntary waiver of the plaintiffs' right of free speech, made in connection with their employment contracts. It is argued that because of such voluntary waiver the plaintiffs may not complain of the restrictions placed upon them by the subject resolution.
It is first observed that it appears to this court that the action is appropriately maintained as a class action upon consideration of the prerequisites set forth in CPLR 901. The issue,...
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