Coronel v. Victory

• Decision Date: 28 February 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. C13–2304JLR.
• Citation: 1 F.Supp.3d 1175
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: Orlando CORONEL, Plaintiff, v. AK VICTORY, et al., Defendants.

1 F.Supp.3d 1175

Orlando CORONEL, Plaintiff,

v.AK VICTORY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. C13–2304JLR.

United States District Court,

W.D. Washington,

at Seattle.

Signed Feb. 28, 2014.

James Milan Beard, Beard Stacey & Jacobsen LLP, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff.

Michael A. Barcott, Holmes Weddle & Barcott, Seattle, WA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REMAND

JAMES L. ROBART, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Plaintiff Orlando Coronel's amended motion to remand this action to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). ( See Mot. (Dkt. # 10).) Plaintiff originally filed this suit in the King County Superior Court in the State of Washington, alleging claims for maintenance, cure, and lost wages under general maritime law and for damages under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104. ( See Compl. (Dkt. # 1–2).) Defendants AK Victory, Inc. and The Fishing Company of Alaska removed the action to this court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1333 as the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. (Not. of Rem. (Dkt. # 1) at 2.) Having considered the submissions of the parties, the balance of the record, and the relevant law, and no party having requested oral argument, the court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for remand.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was employed as a seaman on the F/V Alaska Victory, a commercial fishing vessel owned and operated by Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1–2.3.) Plaintiff alleges that while serving on the Alaska Victory, he sustained injuries first to his left shoulder and later to his right ankle due to the unseaworthiness of the Alaska Victory and the negligence of Defendants. ( Id. ¶¶ 4.1–4.2.) After Plaintiff originally filed suit in Washington state court, Defendants removed the action to this court. ( See generally Not. of Rem.) Plaintiff now moves to remand. ( See Mot.)

III. ANALYSIS

It is a “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant.” Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006). It is to be “presumed that a cause lies outside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted). Courts in the Ninth Circuit “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir.1988)). Similarly, “statutes extending federal jurisdiction ... are narrowly construed so as not to reach beyond the limits intended by Congress.” Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir.1968)

In short, federal jurisdiction “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d 564 (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.1979)).

Here, Plaintiff brings two types of claims: claims under general maritime law and a claim under the Jones Act. ( See Compl. ¶ 5.1.) The court addresses the removability of each type of claim below. The court concludes that Defendants fail to meet their burden to establish that these either of claims lies within the limited jurisdiction of this federal court. See Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 684.

A. Claims Under General Maritime Law1. The Removal Statute

Both parties' arguments for or against the removal of Plaintiff's general maritime law claims focus on the language of the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The court concludes, however, that it is the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and more than 200 years of precedent interpreting this grant, that ultimately determine the removability of Plaintiff's claims.

The removal statute, as amended in 2011, provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).

The statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled....

28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).

Defendants reason that because district courts have original jurisdiction over “any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,” id., Plaintiff's claims under general maritime law can be removed according to the plain language of Section 1441(a), which permits removal of “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts ... have original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012). (Resp. (Dkt. # 12) at 8–10.) Precedent holds, however, that general maritime claims are not removeable absent an independent ground of federal subject matter jurisdiction, such as diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir.2001); In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir.1991). Defendants argue that this precedent is inapplicable because it relied on language in the removal statute that was later modified or removed by the 2011 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“2011 Amendments”). (Resp. at 4–6.) Specifically, although Section 1441(a) was unchanged by the 2011 Amendments, Section 1441(b) previously read:

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship of residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the prior version of Section 1441(b) constituted an “Act of Congress” that “expressly provided” that maritime claims were not removable under Section 1441(a). In re Dutile, 935 F.2d at 63. Maritime claims do not “arise under” federal law for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 367, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that maritime claims fell into the category of “any other such action[s],” as defined by the second sentence of then-Section 1441(b), that were removeable only if no defendant was a citizen of the state in which the action was brought. In re Dutile, 935 F.2d at 63. Although, read strictly, the second sentence of the previous version of § 1441(b) imposes only the forum defendant rule, the Fifth Circuit extrapolated from this sentence that maritime claims could not be removed absent diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. Other courts followed suit. See e.g., Morris, 236 F.3d at 1069.

The 2011 Amendments, however, clarified that the forum defendant rule in Section 1441(b) applies only to actions in which subject matter jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, stating:

(b) Removal Based on Diversity of Citizenship.—

...

(2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012). Defendants rely on a series of recent cases from lower courts in the Fifth Circuit holding that the removal of the language “any other such action” from Section 1441(b) eliminated the diversity requirement for maritime claims, such that maritime claims are now freely removable as claims over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F.Supp.2d 772 (S.D.Tex.2013); Wells v. Abe's Boat Rentals Inc., 2013 WL 3110322 (S.D.Tex.2013); Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., CIV.A. 13–477–JJB, 2013 WL 6092803 (M.D.La. Nov. 19, 2013). Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, CIV.A. H–13–03208, 2014 WL 358353 (S.D.Tex. Jan. 31, 2014). Defendants argue that the court must implement the plain language of the new version of the removal statute strictly, even if doing so contravenes traditional maritime practices. (Mot. at 17.)

Plaintiff, for his part, maintains that the 2011 Amendments should not be read to modify the removability of maritime claims. (Reply (Dkt. # 12) at 2–5.) Plaintiff cites to the legislative history of the 2011 Amendments to argue that Congress had no intention of reworking the removability of maritime claims.¹ (Reply at 4–6 (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (“[I]t will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.”))) Plaintiff also argues that the removal statute should be read in the context of the overarching history of admiralty jurisdiction, throughout which maritime claims have traditionally not been removable absent an independent ground for federal subject matter jurisdiction. (Reply. at 9–12 (citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 363, 79 S.Ct. 468)). Finally, Plaintiff offers an alternative interpretation of Section 1441(a), stating that the term “original jurisdiction” in fact means “federal question jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.² (Reply at 6.)

At first glance, Defendant's argument based on the plain language of the removal statute is compelling. This argument, however, elides the distinction between maritime claims brought in admiralty and maritime claims brought at law. Specifically, Defendant's plain language argument is predicated on two erroneous ideas: (1) that ...