Corr. U.S.A. v. McNany

• Decision Date: 31 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:CV–10–1497.
• Citation: 892 F.Supp.2d 626
• Parties: CORRECTIONS U.S.A., Plaintiff v. Donald McNANY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

892 F.Supp.2d 626

CORRECTIONS U.S.A., Plaintiff

v.Donald McNANY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:CV–10–1497.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Aug. 31, 2012.

Richardson Todd Eagen, Sean T. Welby, Lightman Welby Stoltenberg & Caputo, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

Judith Ann Sznyter, Stephen J. Holroyd, Jennings Sigmond PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THOMAS M. BLEWITT, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. BACKGROUND.

Plaintiff, Corrections U.S.A. (“CUSA”), filed this action on July 20, 2010, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, against the following Defendants: Donald McNany, individually and as President of Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association (“PSCOA”); Sam Brezler, individually and as Secretary/Treasurer of PSCOA; and John Miller, individually and as Business Agent of PSCOA. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Plaintiff filed its Complaint pursuant to this Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in that the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Plaintiff Corrections U.S.A. is a corporation formed under the laws of the State of California with a principal address in Auburn, California; Defendants are adult individuals and officials of PSCOA with a principal address in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, pp. 2–3).

In its Preliminary Statement on page 1 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that this action is for “interference with an existing contract and/or relationship and interference with prospective relations to redress the actions of the Defendants.” (Doc. 1, p. 1).

As mentioned above, this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Venue in the Middle District of Pennsylvania is proper pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This case is governed by Pennsylvania contract and tort law. See Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Services, Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 212 (3d Cir.2009).

On October 8, 2010, Defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint. (Doc. 10). In their Answer, Defendants admitted to Plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction and venue. (Doc. 10, p. 1). The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and on December 6, 2010, U.S. District Judge Caldwell transferred this case to the undersigned for all future proceedings. (Doc. 15).

On April 11, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion for Extension of Time to extend the discovery deadline thirty (30) days, and on April 13, 2011, the Court granted Defendants' Motion, extending the discovery deadline to May 11, 2011. (Docs. 16 & 17).

During discovery, Plaintiff did not serve Defendants with any interrogatories or requests for production or admissions and did not attempt to depose Defendants or any other individual. (Doc. 22, ¶ 46; Doc. 24, ¶ 46). On April 22, 2011, Defendants served Plaintiff with a Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories, but Plaintiff never responded to the discovery requests. (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 47, 48; Doc. 24, ¶¶ 47, 48; Defs.' Ex. 16).

On May 31, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Extend the Case Management Deadlines to which Defendants did not object. On June 1, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion, extending the discovery deadline to July 31, 2011, and the dispositive motions deadline to September 30, 2011. (Docs. 18, 19).

On September 30, 2011, Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims and filed both a Brief in Support of their Motion and a Statement of Facts. (Docs. 20, 21, 22). Defendants also submitted sixteen exhibits in support of their Motion. (Doc. 20, Exs. 1–16). On October 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement, an Answer to Defendants' Statement of Facts, and an Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 23, 24, 25).

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for disposition.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD.

A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party may demonstrate that no genuine dispute as to any material fact exists by citing to pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court may consider any materials in the record in determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). An issue of fact is “ ‘genuine’ only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the nonmoving party.” Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693–694 (3d Cir.1988) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

The burden of proving lack of genuine issue of material fact initially falls upon the moving party. Childers, 842 at 694 ( citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The burden of proof shifts to the nonmoving party, however, when the moving party demonstrates no such genuine issue of fact. Forms, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 546 F.Supp. 314, 321 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff'd mem.,725 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.1983). The nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits or by “depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In determining the existence of an issue of material fact, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir.1988). As such, the court must accept the nonmoving party's allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. Id. ( citing Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied,474 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 537, 88 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied,429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977)).

As stated, Pennsylvania contract and tort law is applicable to the claims raised in this case. See Acumed, 561 F.3d at 212.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

Plaintiff CUSA was incorporated under the laws of California in 1998, and its principal address is in Auburn, California. (Doc. 1, ¶ 4; Doc. 22, ¶ 1; Doc. 24, ¶ 1). CUSA was formed by correctional officers to “provide national representation to correctional officers employed by federal, state and local governments” and receives monetary dues from its members on a monthly basis, collected through payroll deductions which are then forwarded to CUSA. (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 10–11; Doc. 24, ¶¶ 10–11). CUSA members receive benefits and services including, but not limited to: death benefits; comprehensive information about the correctional officer profession; assistance in fighting prison privatization; and lobbying on their behalf for various federal and state legislative issues. (Doc. 25, ¶ 3). Some of the members of CUSA are also members of other associations (hereinafter referred to as “Dual Members”), including Defendant PSCOA. (Doc. 22, ¶ 12; Doc. 24, ¶ 12). Each month, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania deducts CUSA's monthly dues from the paychecks of Dual Members who have provided written authorization for the Commonwealth to do so. (Doc. 22, ¶ 13; Doc. 24, ¶ 13; Doc. 25, ¶ 6). PSCOA then forwards those dues to CUSA, a procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between PSCOA and the Commonwealth at Article 38, Section 2(b): “Effective April 1, 2006, the Employer will provide a payroll slot to the PSCOA to be used for a voluntary deduction program for membership in Corrections USA.” ( Id.; Doc. 25, H7; Defs.' Ex. 4, p. 72). As of February 2009, 479 PSCOA members had authorized monthly dues for CUSA membership to be deducted from their paychecks. (Doc. 22, ¶ 17; Doc. 24, ¶ 17).

PSCOA is an unincorporated association with a principal address in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 5–7; Doc. 22, ¶ 2; Doc. 24, ¶ 2). Since 2001, the PSCOA has been the exclusive collective bargaining representative for all employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the Department of Corrections and Department of Public Welfare (“Commonwealth”) in the H–1 bargaining unit (“H–1”). (Doc. 22, ¶ 3; Doc. 24, ¶ 3; Defs.' Ex. 2, ¶ 3). Pursuant to the PSCOA's Constitution that internally governs the association, PSCOA is administered by a 13–member executive board (“Board” or “Executive Board”). (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 4–5; Doc. 24, ¶¶ 4–5; Defs.' Ex. 3, pp. 9–12). Since 2001, the PSCOA has been a party to a number of collective bargaining agreements with the Commonwealth regulating the terms and conditions of employment for approximately 11,000 employees in the H–1 bargaining unit, most recently one with a term of July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2011. (Doc. 22, ¶ 6; Doc. 24, ¶ 6).

Defendant McNany was President of the PSCOA from August 2002 until July 2010. (Doc. 22, ¶ 7; Doc. 24, ¶ 7; Defs.' Ex. 2, ¶ 2). Defendant Brezler was the Secretary/Treasurer of the PSCOA from 2001 until July 2010. (Doc. 22, ¶ 8; Doc. 24, ¶ 8; Defs.' Ex. 7, ¶ 1). Defendant Miller was a Business Agent with the PSCOA from 2003 until July 2010. (Doc. 22, ¶ 9; Doc. 24, ¶ 9). Roy Pinto (“Pinto”) was both a Regional Vice President with PSCOA from 2001 until July 2010 and Vice Chairman of CUSA from 2006 until the present, with CUSA compensating him in the amount of $1,000 per month. (Doc. 22, ¶ 16; Doc. 24, ¶ 16; Doc. 25, ¶¶ 15–16).

On February 5 and February 24, 2009, CUSA representative Robert Storm (“Storm”), who was also a PSCOA Executive Board member at the time, electronically transmitted via e-mail unencrypted files containing social security information of CUSA members to CUSA. (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 18–19; Doc. 24, ¶¶ 18–19). In a letter dated March 2, 2009, Defendant...