OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner filed this § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of his state court conviction based on violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On November 25, 2008, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree criminal sexual conduct (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520(b)(1)(B)). Petitioner was then sentenced, as a second habitual offender, to a prison term of twenty-five to fifty years. Petitioner remains in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections.
After his conviction, Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. ECF No. 14-3 at 21-52, 97-115. The Court of Appeals denied his application and affirmed his convictions on May 18, 2010. See People v. Correa, No. 290271, 2010 WL 1979297, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 18, 2010); see also ECF No. 14-13 at 1-16. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. ECF No. 14-14 at 3-50. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application on December 16, 2010. People v. Correa, 791 N.W.2d 285 (Mich. 2010); see also ECF No. 14-14 at 1. On December 15, 2011, Petitioner returned to the trial court and filed a motion for relief from judgment, which was denied on September 12, 2012. ECF No. 14-8 at 1-43; ECF No. 14-9 at 1- 5. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of appeals, which was also denied on October 2, 2013. ECF No. 14-15 at 3-61; ECF No. 14-15 at 1-2. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, and this application was denied on March 28, 2014. People v. Correa, 843 N.W.2d 767 (Mich. 2014); see also ECF No. 14-16 at 1-29.
Petitioner maintains that his convictions were based on violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Petitioner sets forth the following claims for relief.
I. E.C.'s Constitutional Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was encroached upon when the State of Michigan benefit[t]ed from:
A. [A] testimonial hearsay report generated by a non-testifying witness, i.e., the accusant's attendant doctor. The doctor generated the report that declared that he was "positive" that E.C. sexually assaulted his accuser. The doctor did not testify at trial and the State of Michigan entered the report into evidence as absolute proof of guilt.
B. [T]he accusant's testimonial hearsay statements allegedly briefed to her mother. The statements were entered into evidence although the declarer of those statements was not unavailable nor did E.C. have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarer concerning the statements.
C. [T]he accusant's testimonial hearsay statements allegedly briefed to her attendant nurse. Again the statements were not entered into evidence even though the declarer was not unavailable nor did E.C. have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarer concerning those statements.
D. [T]he accusant's testimonial hearsay statements allegedly briefed to her attendant police officer. Likewise, the statements were entered into evidence even though the declarer was not unavailable nor did E.C. have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarer concerning those statements.
II. E.C.'s Constitutional Sixth Amendment right to not be a witness against himself was encroached upon when the State of Michigan benefit[t]ed from:
A. [E]xtensive commenting on E.C.'s failure to testify. At closing arguments, the State of Michigan argued that unanswered "questions" and uncontradicted evidence proved E.C.'s guilt.
B. [C]omments on E.C.'s failure to explain his version of the facts to a police officer. At closing arguments, the State of Michigan argued that E.C. did not explain his side of the story to police and he is guilty because of it.
III. E.C.'s Constitutional Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was encroached upon when the State of Michigan benefit[t]ed from trial counsel's:
A. [F]ailure to adequately cross-examine the accusant's memory of the alleged events as the accusant's memory of the event was lacking in credibility and she made inconsistent statements in and out of court.
B. [F]ailure to investigate and consult an expert witness to offer an opinion regarding memory and its weight on a person's ability to accurately recall events. Counsel neglected to support his theory of the case.
C. [F]ailure to timely investigate and utilize a carehouse report. The report contained evidence that the accusant and her mother evaded several appointments for forensic interviewing, and the report contained untrue assertions by the accusant's mother.
D. [F]ailure to discover a 911 recording that contained statements by a key State witness. Because the State's case was based upon pure testimony and no other evidence existed to prove E.C.'s guilt, the recording potentially contained impeaching evidence against that key witness's credibility.1
IV. E.C.'s Constitutional Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right[s] to a fair trial was [sic] encroached upon when the State of Michigan benefit[t]ed from:
A. [A] nurse's vouching for the credibility of the accusant when she stated that the accusant's allegations were consistent with a performed medical examination.
B. [A] jury's coerced verdict by the judge's remarks about the horrendous predicament the jury would confront if a verdict was not immediately reached that same day.
C. [A] prosecutor's attack on the veracity of E.C.'s attorney by implying that he did not believe in his client. The prosecutor stated that E.C.'s attorney had to create reasonable doubt where non existed.
D. [A] prosecutor's personal expression of opinion, an argument about facts not in evidence, an argument to the jury to place themselves in the accusant's shoes, and an argument placing the weight of her office behind the accusant.
V. E.C's Constitutional Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right[s] to a fair trial was [sic] encroached upon when the State of Michigan benefit[t]ed from:
A. [A] failure to provide E.C. with an exculpatory 911 recording. On information and belief, the 911 recording would have discredited the testimony of a material witness, Tanille Lafay Clark (the caller).
VI. E.C's twenty-five minimum sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
ECF No. 1 at 5-8. After Petitioner filed his § 2254 claim in this Court, he filed a motion to amend his original habeas petition (ECF No. 9), which was granted on March 20, 2015 (ECF No. 12). Petitioner failed to file any briefs in support of his habeas application. Respondent filed an Answer in Opposition to Petitioner's habeas application on May 1, 2015. ECF No. 13. Petitioner did not reply to Respondent's Answer. The matter is now ready for a decision.
Petitioner filed this petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. PUB. L. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002) (noting that AEDPA prevents federal habeas "retrials" and ensures state convictions are made under state law). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that any habeas application by a person in state custody shall not be granted in regards to any claim that has previously been adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
This Court may only consider "clearly established holdings" of the Supreme Court, not lower federal courts, in analyzing a petitioner's claim under § 2254. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). A decision of the state court may only be overturned if: (1) it applies a rule contradicting Supreme Court governing law, (2) it contradicts a set of facts materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision, (3) it unreasonably applies correct Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case, (4) it unreasonably extends Supreme Court legal principles where it should not apply, or (5) it unreasonably refuses to extend Supreme Court legal principle where it should apply. Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655; see also Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003).
A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication to be "unreasonable" simply because that court decides, in its own judgment, that the relevant state decision applied federal law incorrectly. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11 (noting that it must instead determine if the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable"). This Court defers to state court decisions when the state court addressed the merits of petitioner's claim. Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (allowing review of habeas application de novo when state court clearly did not reach the question). When applying AEDPA to state factual findings, factual issues by state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster, 324 F.3d at 429.
After applying the standards under AEDPA to Petitioner's case, this Court concludes that Petitioner has not provided clear and convincing evidence that the state court improperly applied clearly established federal law to the facts of Petitioner's case.
Petitioner argues that this Court should grant him relief based on violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and ...
