Corrigan v. Haaland

• Citation: 12 F.4th 901
• Decision Date: 02 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-35393,20-35393
• Parties: K. John CORRIGAN; M. Martha Corrigan; Hanley Ranch Partnership; Michael F. Hanley IV; Linda Lee Hanley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Deb HAALAND, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior ; William Perry Pendleton, Director of the BLM; John Ruhs, Idaho State Director of the BLM; Lara Douglas, Boise District Manager in her capacity as manager for the Boise District of the BLM; Donn Christiansen, Owyhee Field Office Manager in his official capacity as manager for the Owyhee FO of the Boise District of the BLM, Defendants-Appellees, and Western Watersheds Project, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

12 F.4th 901

K. John CORRIGAN; M. Martha Corrigan; Hanley Ranch Partnership; Michael F. Hanley IV; Linda Lee Hanley, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. Deb HAALAND,^* Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior ; William Perry Pendleton, Director of the BLM; John Ruhs, Idaho State Director of the BLM; Lara Douglas, Boise District Manager in her capacity as manager for the Boise District of the BLM; Donn Christiansen, Owyhee Field Office Manager in his official capacity as manager for the Owyhee FO of the Boise District of the BLM, Defendants-Appellees,andWestern Watersheds Project, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-35393

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 3, 2021 Seattle, Washington

Filed September 2, 2021

W. Alan Schroeder (argued), Schroeder Law, Boise, Idaho; Laura A. Schroeder, Schroeder Law Offices P.C., Portland, Oregon; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Christine G. England (argued) and Robert B. Firpo, Assistant United States Attorneys; Bart M. Davis, United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, Boise, Idaho; for Defendants-Appellees.

Talasi B. Brooks (argued), Western Watersheds Project, Boise, Idaho; Paul D. Ruprecht, Western Watersheds Project, Reno, Nevada; for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Morgan Christen and Mark J. Bennett, Circuit Judges, and Paul L. Friedman,^** District Judge.

FRIEDMAN, District Judge:

Appellants Michael F. Hanley, IV, Linda Lee Hanley, and Hanley Ranch Partnership sought to transfer to Appellants K. John Corrigan and M. Martha Corrigan a "preference" to receive a permit to graze on certain federal land allotments. The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") denied the preference transfer application, concluding that Hanley Ranch Partnership did not hold any preference that it could transfer. The Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA"), an appellate tribunal within the Department of the Interior, upheld the BLM's denial, concluding that after Hanley Ranch Partnership's grazing permit expired, and the BLM declined to issue a new permit due to unsatisfactory performance, Hanley Ranch Partnership did not hold any residual preference. The district court agreed.

Appellants now ask us to reverse the district court's decision, arguing that a grazing preference survives the expiration of a corresponding permit and continues to exist until the BLM cancels it. Because the BLM never canceled their grazing preference through any formal process, Appellants ask us to conclude that they retained a preference even after their grazing permit expired.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee the Department of the Interior and Intervenor-Appellee Western Watersheds Project ("WWP").

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Beginning in 1934, Congress has passed laws that govern grazing privileges on the public rangelands. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 ("TGA"), 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. , seeks to "promote the highest use of the public lands" and "stop injury" from "overgrazing and soil deterioration." 43 U.S.C. § 315 ; see generally Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt , 529 U.S. 728, 731–33, 120 S.Ct. 1815, 146 L.Ed.2d 753 (2000). Under the system established by the TGA, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to divide public rangelands into grazing districts and to issue permits to private parties to graze livestock on the land. The TGA and its companion statute, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. , provide that individuals who control land within or near a grazing district may receive a "preference" or "priority" to stand first in line in applying for a grazing permit. See Pub. Lands Council , 529 U.S. at 733–38, 120 S.Ct. 1815.

Since at least 1988, Hanley Ranch Partnership ("HRP") received a series of ten-year permits to graze on two allotments in southwestern Idaho: the Trout Springs Allotment and the Hanley Fenced Federal Range Allotment. HRP also held preferences based on its control of private land adjoining the two allotments. On March 12, 2002, the BLM issued HRP's last ten-year permit, which authorized HRP to graze on the allotments through February 28, 2012.

In 2009, the BLM informed HRP that it would not renew HRP's permit pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(b), explaining that it had "identified numerous and continuous instances of non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the existing federal grazing permit, as well as a number of violations (trespasses) in the Trout Springs Allotment." HRP appealed the BLM's decision to two appellate tribunals within the Department of the Interior, first to the Departmental Cases Hearings Division ("Hearings Division"), and next to the IBLA. Both tribunals affirmed, and HRP did not seek review in federal court.

On August 1, 2013, HRP leased several plots of "base property" attached to the Trout Springs and Hanley Fenced Federal Range Allotments to K. John and M. Martha Corrigan, for a period extending through February 28, 2024.¹ Relying on this lease, the Corrigans submitted an application to the BLM to transfer a grazing preference from HRP to the Corrigans. The BLM denied the application on November 22, 2013, explaining that HRP no longer possessed any grazing preference. The Hanleys and the Corrigans (collectively, "Ranchers") appealed the BLM's decision to the Hearings Division, which affirmed on January 25, 2016. Ranchers subsequently appealed to the IBLA.

On August 10, 2017, the IBLA issued the opinion that is the subject of this appeal, affirming the ruling of the Hearings Division and the underlying decision by the BLM to deny the preference transfer application. The IBLA analyzed the TGA, the FLPMA, and the Department of the Interior's grazing regulations, codified at 43 C.F.R. 4100 et seq. ("the Grazing Regulations").² The IBLA concluded that "there is no basis in law supporting appellants’ view that Hanley Ranch's grazing preference ... can exist in a vacuum, without a grazing permit." The IBLA determined that once a permit expires and the BLM declines to renew it, the BLM need not separately cancel the associated preference, which expires alongside the permit. As a result, the IBLA concluded that the BLM correctly rejected the Corrigans’ preference transfer application.

Ranchers sought judicial review of the IBLA's decision. On February 26, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Ranchers’ motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Interior and WWP. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

"We review de novo a challenge to a final agency action decided on summary judgment and pursuant to Section 706" of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Esper , 958 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020). "De novo review of a district court judgment concerning a decision of an administrative agency means the court views the case from the same position as the district court," Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. , 340 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2003), and "review[s] directly the agency's action under the Administrative Procedure Act's [ ] arbitrary and capricious standard," Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell , 788 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The Court "may affirm on any ground supported by the record." Lima v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. , 947 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2020).

Under the APA, we "will reverse the IBLA's decision only if that decision is arbitrary, capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law." Hjelvik v. Babbitt , 198 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999). An agency decision construing a statute is not in violation of the APA where the agency accurately applies an unambiguous statute, or permissibly construes an ambiguous statute, and its conclusion is "well supported by substantial evidence in the record." Akootchook v. United States , 271 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) ; see also W. Watersheds Project v. Interior Bd. of Land Appeals , 624 F.3d 983, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Chevron Framework

Ranchers’ argument calls into question the IBLA's interpretation of the TGA and the FLPMA. When a party challenges agency action as inconsistent with the terms of a statute, courts apply the familiar analytical framework set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

In step one, a court must determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," or, instead, whether the statute is ambiguous. Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In determining whether Congress has directly spoken, a court uses "traditional tools of statutory construction," including an examination of the statute's text, the structure of the statute, and (as appropriate) legislative history. Id. at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. "Whether statutory language is sufficiently plain or not is ‘determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’ " W. Watersheds Project , 624 F.3d at 987 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ). "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell , 767 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ).

If a court determines that the "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 – that is, if the disputed language is "reasonably susceptible of different interpretations," Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 84...