Corsaut v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States
| Decision Date | 14 December 1926 |
| Docket Number | 37524 |
| Citation | 211 N.W. 222,203 Iowa 741 |
| Parties | JULIA CORSAUT, Appellee, v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED APRIL 7, 1927.
Appeal from Black Hawk District Court.--GEORGE W. WOOD, Judge.
Action upon an insurance policy. The cause was submitted to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Pike Sias, Zimmerman & Frank, for appellant.
George W. Dawson and Sager & Sweet, for appellee.
On January 30, 1922, the appellant issued its policy of insurance upon the life of Dr. James Calvin Corsaut. The insured died on the 31st day of December, 1923. The appellee is the wife of said decedent, and is the beneficiary named in said policy of insurance. The premium on said insurance policy was due on the 19th day of January of each year. The policy contained the following provision:
"If the insured becomes wholly and permanently disabled before age 60, the society will waive subsequent premiums payable upon this policy, subject to the terms and conditions contained on the third page hereof."
The petition alleges that, at the time the premium became due, to wit, on January 19, 1923, and for some time prior thereto, and thereafter until the date of the death of the insured, he was totally and permanently disabled by disease, and was totally insane and incompetent to transact any business or cause same to be transacted by anyone in his behalf. It is undisputed in the evidence that the premium due on January 19, 1923, was never paid. The burden rested upon the appellee, in order to entitle her to recover, to establish that the insured became "wholly and permanently disabled" prior to January 19, 1923. We quite recently had occasion to examine a policy of insurance containing a similar provision, in Hurley v. Bankers' Life Co., 198 Iowa 1129, 199 N.W. 343. In the policy under consideration in said case it was provided that:
" * * * if the insured, before attaining the age of sixty years, becomes totally, permanently and incurably disabled as a result of accident or disease (not due to any cause or condition existing at the time of application for this agreement) and is thereby prevented permanently, continuously, and wholly from performing any work or following any occupation for compensation or profit, the company will waive payment of premiums thereafter becoming due under said policy," etc.
In said cause we were called upon to construe the effect of the words "totally, permanently, and incurably disabled * * * and is thereby prevented permanently, continuously, and wholly from performing any work or following any occupation for compensation or profit." We reviewed the authorities at length upon the question of the construction of policies of this character, and adhered to the pronouncement heretofore made by us in Lyon v. Railway Passenger Assur. Co., 46 Iowa 631. We held that, under the terms and conditions of a policy such as the one in the case at bar, where the condition that avoided the payment of the premium was that the insured be "prevented permanently, continuously and wholly from performing any work or following any occupation for compensation or profit," the evidence must show that such a situation in fact existed, in order to entitle the beneficiary to recover under the policy.
It may be conceded that the question of whether or not an insured had become "wholly and permanently disabled" might, under many circumstances, very properly be one for the determination of the jury. In the instant case, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury on this question. It is impossible for us to review every incident and item detailed in the record, which, however, we have read and examined with great care. It appears that the insured was educated at the State University of Iowa, and was married to the appellee in January, 1902. He practiced for some time at the town of Dike, and later engaged in the practice of his profession at Cedar Falls. He evidently had a considerable practice. His wife testified that, in November, 1922, she noticed that he had despondent spells; that he would cry, and had spells of laughing, and could not remember people; that he did not recognize his best friends; that he would walk the floor, and hold his head, and wonder what was the matter with him; and that, in making calls in town, he would sometimes return home and say that he could not find the place where he would want to go. He complained of pressure in his head, and that he could not remember. She testified that he spent his money recklessly, and had bills which he claimed had been paid, and it was found afterward that they had not been. She testified that the insured paid his taxes by writing checks, and wrote checks several times when he had no funds in the bank, and when she spoke to him about it, he said he thought he had plenty of money in the bank. On January 10, 1923, the appellee took the insured to Iowa City for examination. She selected the route and purchased the tickets. The insured was restless on the train; walked from one end of the car to the other, smoking and walking. He was examined by a doctor at the Psychopathic Hospital in Iowa City, but the appellee was not present at the examination. The insured informed his wife that the doctor had told him that he guessed there was nothing the matter with him, and the insured seemed happy to think there was nothing wrong with him, and wanted to go home, and was in a very happy state of mind on the way home. This was approximately at the time the premium was due. The appellee and the insured returned to Iowa City sometime in February following. The insured was worse at that time. The appellee left the insured at Iowa City on this trip, and he returned home unattended. The appellee testified that, in the fall of 1922, she had known the insured to come home when he had been on a case when he thought he had made a mistake, or feared his judgment was wrong, and cry about it. He became irritable toward his family, which consisted of his wife and two children, 19 and 20 years of age. The insured went with the appellee to the bank, to talk over his financial affairs. The appellee testified that she went to the insured's office very seldom during these times, and did not know whether he treated patients during the months from January to June, 1923.
A doctor testified that he had been acquainted with the insured for some 11 or 12 years; that he occupied a suite of rooms with the insured, and they had the same reception room and office girl, and that this arrangement continued until about four or five months before the insured's death; that he saw the insured probably every day, and they did some work together; that, during the fall and winter of 1922-23, he noticed that the insured acted differently; that he had despondent spells, talked about not feeling well, and would lie in his office for several hours at a time, and on other occasions he would be too enthusiastic,--wanted to buy things; that he duplicated orders; that he assisted in performing an operation with the witness and another physician, by administering the anaesthetic, and gave more than was necessary, and th...
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