Corso v. Miser
| Decision Date | 28 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19 JE 0018,Case No. 19 JE 0019 |
| Citation | 2020 Ohio 5293 |
| Parties | REBECCA MODRANSKY CORSO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. GEORGE W. MISER, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Atty. Anthony Glase, Atty. Anthony Richardson II, P.O. Box 2641 Toledo, Ohio 43606, for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants and Atty. Gregory Watts, Atty. Matthew W. Onest, Atty. Wayne A. Boyer, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty, 4775 Munson Street, N.W., P.O. Box 36963 Canton, Ohio for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee George W. Miser appeals the decision of Jefferson County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment and quieting title to the oil and gas for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants Rebecca M. Corso and Paula D. Modransky. Appellees/Cross-Appellants appeal the trial court's decision denying their request for attorney fees. Three issues are raised in this appeal. First, does the language of the 1949 deed reserve the oil and gas to George T. Miser and Isabelle Miser, Appellant/Cross-Appellee's predecessor in interest. Second, if the language is ambiguous, does the parol evidence indicate that the language was meant to reserve the oil and gas interest. Third, did the trial court abuse its discretion when it implicitly denied the Appellees/Cross-Appellants' request for attorneys fees that was made for the first time in the proposed judgment entry for quieting title that was drafted by Appellees/Cross-Appellants' attorney.
{¶2} For the reasons explained below, the language of the 1949 deed is ambiguous and susceptible to different interpretations. However, there is no parol evidence indicating whether or not there was an intent by George T. Miser and Isabelle Miser, Appellant's predecessor in interest, to reserve the oil and gas. Thus, the language is construed against the grantor. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellees is affirmed. As to attorney fees, the argument raised is meritless; counsel did not properly move for attorney fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant attorney fees.
{¶3} This case involves the ownership of oil and gas underlying approximately 140 acres of real estate in Springfield Township, Jefferson County, Ohio. George M. and Mary Miser were the owners of the real estate and subsurface. In 1906 they conveyed the coal, except the number 8 seam, to Henry Wick. In 1943 George M. and Mary conveyed a portion of their estate to George T. and Isabelle Miser. George T. and Isabelle Miser are Appellant/Cross-Appellee's parents. One exception in this deed stated:
EXCEPTING that part of the coal underlying said premises heretofore sold and conveyed to Henry Wick, a reference to this deed of conveyance heretofore on record in the Recorder's Office of Jefferson County, Ohio, will more fully show, and being the same premises as is described in Mortgage Record 79, Page 22 of said county.
{¶4} George T. and Isabelle Miser in 1949 conveyed a portion of the estate they received in 1943 to John, Mary, and Dola Wylie. John, Mary, and Dola Wylie are Appellees/Cross-Appellants' grandparents and mother. That deed contains the following exception:
Excepting and reserving from the above described Real Estate, all coal and mineral underlying the same with the right to mine and remove the same as shown in deed to Henry Wick, where in said coal was conveyed, reference to which is hereby made for a more complete statement thereof.
1949 Deed in Volume 257, Page 152.
{¶5} In 1953, George T. and Isabelle Miser executed another deed indicating that 0.7 acres was erroneously omitted from the 1949 deed from George T. and Isabelle Miser to the Wylies. The only exception in that deed is for all legal highways.
{¶6} In 1949, a Coal Lease was executed. This document states:
1949 Coal Deed.
{¶7} In 1964, George T. and Isabelle Miser leased the oil and gas rights to Humble Oil & Refining Company. The oil and gas estate leased was identified as, "That certain mineral reservation by lessor appearing in deed dated September 30, 1949, recorded in Book 257, Page 152." This lease is dated March 26, 1964. This lease was signed by the Misers, notarized, and recorded.
{¶8} The record also contains a lease between Dola (Wylie) and Myroslow Modransky and Humble Oil & Refining Company for the oil and gas underlying the same property described in the Miser-Humble Oil and Gas Lease. That lease is dated April 28, 1964. The version of the lease that is in the record is not signed, notarized, or recorded.
{¶9} In 1965, Appellant/Cross-Appellee inherited property from Isabelle Miser. In 2006, Appellees/Cross-Appellants became the sole owners of the interest conveyed in 1949 and 1953. Appellee/Cross-Appellant Rebecca M. Corso owns a 2/3 interest and Appellee/Cross-Appellant Paula D. Modransky owns a 1/3 interest.
{¶10} In 2011, Appellees/Cross-Appellants entered into a lease with Chesapeake Exploration LLC for the oil and gas rights underlying the land at issue in this case. In 2014, Chesapeake Exploration LLC entered into a lease with Appellant/Cross-Appellee for the oil and gas rights underlying the land at issue in this case. Chesapeake is withholding royalties from both Appellant/Cross-Appellee and Appellees/Cross-Appellants due to the parties competing claims to ownership over the oil and gas interest.
{¶11} In 2018, Appellees/Cross-Appellants filed an action to quiet title or in the alternative for declaratory judgment based on the Marketable Title Act against Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 7/23/18 Complaint; 8/8/18 Amended Complaint. Appellees/Cross-Appellants asked for an order granting them all rights, title, and interest to the oil and gas underlying the real estate and for an order that Appellant/Cross-Appellee was to pay a fair portion of the court costs.
{¶12} Appellant/Cross-Appellee answered and asked for the court to dismiss the claims with prejudice, award him attorney fees and courts costs, and any other equitable relief the court deemed appropriate. 8/22/18 Answer.
{¶13} The parties filed their competing summary judgment motions and argued that the plain language was in their respective favors. Appellant/Cross-Appellee asserted the plain language of the deed meant that the oil and gas interest was reserved. 9/14/18 Summary Judgment Motion; 10/12/18 Response to Summary Judgment Motion; Appellees/Cross-Appellees asserted the language on its face indicated the oil and gas interest was not reserved and accordingly was transferred to their predecessors in interest and therefore inherited by them. 9/14/18 Summary Judgment Motion; 10/15/18 Reply to Opposition.
{¶14} The trial court denied the motions explaining:
While the Court does have some extrinsic evidence such as the newly-entered oil and gas lease and the statements of both sides claiming that they always thought they owned the oil and gas rights the Court is not convinced that it has access to all of the extrinsic evidence that would be out there or would be available after discovery. For these reasons the Court cannot grant a Summary Judgment to either party.
11/30/18 J.E.
{¶15} Following discovery, the parties filed their second motions for summary judgment. 5/3/19 Appellant/Cross-Appellee Motion for Summary Judgment; 5/6/19 Appellees/Cross-Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant/Cross-Appellee argued the plain language of the deed indicated the oil and gas interest was reserved. 5/3/19 Motion for Summary Judgment. However, even if the plain language of the deed was ambiguous he contended the parol evidence indicated it was the intent of the Misers to reserve the interest. 5/3/19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellees/Cross-Appellants argued the plain language of the deed did not reserve the interest and even if the deed was ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence does not show an intent to reserve the interest. 5/6/19 Appellees/Cross-Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
{¶16} A hearing on the summary judgment motions was held on June 17, 2019. Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 7/16/19 J.E. It held that the word "minerals" standing alone and without qualifying words would have created an effective reservation. 7/16/19 J.E. However, the word "minerals" was followed by qualifying language and that qualifying language was ambiguous. 7/16/19 J.E. Therefore, the court looked to parol evidence and stated there was no parol evidence indicating the Misers intended to reserve the oil and gas. 7/16/19 J.E. Therefore, the limiting language was construed against the drafters, i.e., the grantors Misers, and it was found that the oil and gas interest passed to the Wylies and then to the Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 7/16/19 J.E.
{¶17} At the end of the judgment entry the trial court stated, "Plaintiff shall prepare an Order consistent with this Order quieting title...
To continue reading
Request your trial