Cortés-Rivera v. Dep't of Corr. and Rehab. of Com. of P.R.

• Decision Date: 16 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-1858,09-1858
• Citation: 626 F.3d 21
• Parties: Enrique CORTÉS-RIVERA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION OF the COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; Miguel Pereira-Castillo, in his individual and official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation of Puerto Rico; Correctional Health Services Corporation, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

626 F.3d 21

Enrique CORTÉS-RIVERA, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION OF the COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; Miguel Pereira-Castillo, in his individual and official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation of Puerto Rico; Correctional Health Services Corporation, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 09-1858.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

Heard Sept. 9, 2010.

Decided Nov. 16, 2010.

Wilma E. Reverón-Collazo, with whom Nora Vargas Acosta was on brief, for appellant.

Néstor J. Navas-D'acosta, with whom Carmen Lucía Rodríguez Vélez was on brief, for appellee Correctional Health services Corporation.

Michelle Camacho-Nieves, with whom Irene S. Soroeta-Kodesh, Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, and Zaira Z. Girón-Anadón were on brief, for appellees Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Miguel Pereira-Castillo.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, HOWARD and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Chief Judge.

Enrique Cortés-Rivera, a doctor, appeals from a grant of summary judgment entered by the district court on his claim that his contract to provide medical services was illegally terminated. Cortés-Rivera worked as an independent contractor in Puerto Rico's Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOCR) between 2002 and 2007. He alleges that DOCR and its managing corporation, the Correctional Health Services Corporation (CHSC), discriminated and retaliated against him on the basis of disability in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (§ 504), and Puerto Rico state law.

The district court treated Cortés-Rivera's pleading, styled as a motion to oppose CHSC's summary judgment motion, as untimely. The main thrust of Cortés-Rivera's case was that he was an employee of CHSC and DOCR for purposes of his Title I and § 504 claims, not an independent contractor. In granting summary judgment for CHSC and DOCR, the district court made three holdings: (1) Cortés-Rivera was not an employee of CHSC or DOCR for purposes of the ADA, (2) Cortés-Rivera neither objected to a magistrate judge's conclusion that his non-employee status precluded his reasonable accommodation claims under § 504 nor adequately presented this issue to the district court, and (3) Cortés-Rivera had failed to raise a federal retaliation claim. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Cortés-Rivera's state-law claims. We affirm.

I.

A general practitioner, Cortés-Rivera began working for DOCR in 2002. In a pair of service contracts entered that year, he agreed to provide emergency room and ambulatory services to the prison population at Guayama Correctional Facility. Cortés-Rivera entered a superseding service contract on July 1, 2006. In this contract, set to expire on June 30, 2007, Cortés-Rivera agreed to provide ambulatory services for DOCR. In a letter dated November 15, 2006, DOCR terminated this contract early, effective January 8, 2007. Cortés-Rivera entered a final service contract with DOCR on February 20, 2007, which expired about four months later on June 30, 2007.

During the course of these contracts, between January and March 2006, Cortés-Rivera was diagnosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome. Guillain-Barre syndrome is a rare autoimmune disorder in which thebody's immune system attacks part of the peripheral nervous system. It leads to varying degrees of physical weakness and, in some cases, paralysis. There is no known cure for the disorder, though therapies may lessen its severity and accelerate recovery. Cortés-Rivera's Guillain-Barre syndrome led to complete paralysis of his left leg and foot. The parties do not contest that Cortés-Rivera qualifies as an individual with a disability within the meaning of federal disability laws.

Also during the course of Cortés-Rivera's contracts, DOCR entered into an agreement with another entity, CHSC, providing that CHSC would manage DOCR's Correctional Health Program. Under the agreement, CHSC assumed full supervisory authority over employees and contractors of DOCR. The contract provided that employees and contractors of DOCR would remain such until their relationship with DOCR was either terminated or modified. This contract entered force in 2005 and remained in force through the expiration of Cortés-Rivera's last service contract.

In a letter dated September 19, 2006, Cortés-Rivera requested accommodations to address difficulties he had in accessing punch clocks used to measure attendance and timeliness at the correctional facility. This request was denied in a September 27, 2006, letter from the Clinical Services Director of the Correctional Health Program. The letter stated that Cortés-Rivera was not a regular employee and thus did not have the privileges of such employees. The letter nonetheless recommended that Cortés-Rivera's supervisor consult with him about placing him in one of two particular areas of the facility that would be more accessible. Cortés-Rivera was subsequently placed in one of those areas.

In a letter dated October 23, 2006, the chief executive officer of CHSC notified the secretary of DOCR, Miguel Pereira-Castillo, that layoffs would be necessary to address a projected budget deficit for DOCR. He requested that DOCR cancel six of its professional service contracts, including Cortés-Rivera's. The officer wrote that one of the professionals rendered services that were no longer necessary. He wrote that the remaining five professionals, including Cortés-Rivera, were selected because they had the least seniority in the institution where they rendered services. On November 15, 2006, Pereira-Castillo notified Cortés-Rivera that his contract would be terminated effective January 8, 2007. DOCR nonetheless entered a subsequent contract with Cortés-Rivera on February 20, 2007, effective until June 30, 2007.

On November 20, 2007, Cortés-Rivera filed a complaint alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. As to discrimination, Cortés-Rivera claimed that the defendants denied his request for reasonable accommodation and terminated his contract in violation of Title I of the ADA and § 504. As to retaliation, he made two claims, asserting that they were made under Puerto Rico state law. First, he asserted that the early termination of his July 1, 2006, contract was in retaliation for his accommodation request. Second, he asserted that the defendants refused to alter his February 20, 2007, contract because he filed claims concerning the prior termination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Cortés-Rivera also alleged discrimination and various common law claims in tort and contract under Puerto Rico state law.

Adopting the recommendations of a magistrate judge, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. As a preliminary matter, the district court held that Cortés-Rivera did not timely oppose CHSC's motion for summary judgment.On the merits of the motions for summary judgment, the district court made three holdings: (1) Cortés-Rivera was not an employee of DOCR or CHSC under Title I of the ADA, (2) Cortés-Rivera failed to object to the magistrate's conclusion that his non-employee status barred his reasonable accommodation claim under § 504 and failed to adequately contest the issue in the district court, and (3) Cortés-Rivera did not raise a federal retaliation claim. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Cortés-Rivera's state claims in the absence of a valid federal claim.

II.

On appeal, Cortés-Rivera challenges both the district court's finding that he did not timely oppose CHSC's summary judgment motion and the district court's three holdings on the merits. As to the timeliness of his opposition to summary judgment, he argues that the district court abused its discretion given the purported seriousness of its holding and the reasonableness of his reading of the deadline. As to the three claims on the merits, Cortés-Rivera argues that (1) he is an employee of DOCR and CHSC for purposes of Title I of the ADA, (2) he may bring an employment discrimination claim under § 504 even if he does not qualify as an employee under Title I of the ADA, and (3) he raised federal retaliation claims for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.

We first address Cortés-Rivera's claim concerning the timing of his opposition to CHSC's summary judgment motion. We then turn to his three claims on the merits of CHSC's and DOCR's motions for summary judgment.

A. Timeliness of Opposition to Summary Judgment

We review a district court's finding that a party failed to timely oppose summary judgment for abuse of discretion. United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir.1995). We will only find an abuse of discretion if there is "an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justified request for delay." Id. (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Only in "rare cases" have we found that a district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant an extension of time. Perez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, 440 F.3d 531, 534 (1st Cir.2006). We have granted relief, however, when a litigant was "reasonably surprised" by a court's deadline or "the events leading to the contested decision were unfair." Id. (collecting cases). Cortés-Rivera claims that he was "gravely surprised" by the relevant deadline and recites this court's observation in Perez-Cordero that "[i]n most cases, a party's failure to oppose summary judgment is fatal to its case," id.

Cortés-Rivera's claim of surprise by this deadline makes little sense. He argues that the district court should have given him an extension, though he did not seek one, because it previously extended a deadline for DOCR. He also implies that he should have been awarded an extension so that he could oppose both CHSC's...