Cortez v. State
| Decision Date | 10 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-11-00306-CR,08-11-00306-CR |
| Parties | BOBBY CORTEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from
297th District Court
of Tarrant County, Texas
(TC # 1214569D)
OPINIONBobby Cortez appeals from his conviction for Indecency with a Child - Exposure. The jury found Appellant guilty and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court's decision allowing him to proceed pro se. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Stephanie Martinez was pregnant and expecting twins in the Spring of 2010. Her friends hosted a baby shower in the back party room at Billy Miners, a club and restaurant formerly located in downtown Fort Worth. Martinez's young children, as well as many other children belonging to her friends and family, attended the shower.
During the party, Martinez and her guests noticed a man, later identified as Appellant, seated at a table in a nearby courtyard. Appellant was watching his laptop in between glancing at Martinez and the other guests. Toward the end of the party, Appellant stood up and, while facingthe glass windows that separated the party room from the courtyard, began masturbating. Several of the children were within visual range. A restaurant employee called the police and the officers arrested Appellant, searched his computer, and discovered pornography. Appellant had several other prior offenses, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 2007 and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 1997.
Appellant filed several pro se motions. In May 2011, David Bays, Appellant's court-appointed attorney, filed motions for competency and sanity examinations which the trial court granted. Dr. Satyajeet Lahiri's conducted a competency evaluation, finding that Appellant (1) had the ability to discuss the various legal options available to him, (2) was capable of understanding legal strategies presented to him, and (3) could correctly identify his attorney along with his offense and relevant punishment.
The doctor categorized Appellant's mental illness as a form of paranoid psychoses, auditory hallucinations, and mood instability on Axis I and anti-social personality disorder on Axis II. He concluded that these disturbances did not affect Appellant's competency to stand trial. Dr. Lahiri further noted that Appellant had maintained a fair degree of clinical stability and had logical thought processes and exhibited goal directed behavior. Dr. Kelly Goodness also evaluated Appellant and declared him competent, making similar findings to those of Dr. Lahiri, including the ability to rationalize and understand the charges made against him together with an adequate capacity to discuss the pertinent proceedings at issue, despite his history of mental illness.
Dr. Lahiri also conducted a sanity evaluation. He concluded that Appellant did not meet the criteria for an insanity defense and was sane at the time of the alleged offense. Expressing his concern over the possibility that Appellant was malingering, Dr. Lahiri concluded that it waslikely Appellant fabricated or exaggerated his symptoms at the time of his offense. Due to his long association with the mental health system, Appellant was very familiar with the signs and symptoms of his specific illnesses. Although Appellant had a long history of mental illness, Dr. Lahiri determined that these illnesses were not of sufficient degree or severity, nor did he have the mental defect of the type and degree that rendered him unable to know the difference between right and wrong on or about the time of the alleged offense.
On June 1, 2011, the trial court heard proceedings regarding representation of Appellant, as requested by attorney Bays. These matters included Appellant's competency to stand trial. When the court inquired about Appellant's competency to stand trial, Appellant expressed the opinion that all of his attorneys in the past "never did nothing," and stated, The court initially concluded that Appellant was not able to waive his right to an attorney and kept Bays as Appellant's court-appointed lawyer.
On July 28, 2011, the trial court held another pretrial hearing regarding Appellant's request to proceed pro se. At the hearing, the trial court properly and thoroughly admonished Appellant, and inquired into the general nature of Appellant's offense along with its sentence; the advantages and disadvantages of self-representation; Appellant's age, background, education and experiences; the need to follow rules of evidence and criminal procedure; and the dangers and consequences of self-representation. The trial judge also discussed the habitual offender notice relevant to Appellant's sentence. Essentially, the trial judge explained that Appellant had prior convictions that categorized him as a habitual offender, and therefore, should the jury find that Appellant committed those prior offenses, Appellant's punishment range would be increased to a minimum of twenty-five years up to and including ninety-nine years, or life. The trial judgethen appointed attorney Bays as Appellant's standby counsel who would remain present while Appellant represented himself throughout trial.
Another hearing on self-representation was held a few days later on August 1, 2011. The purpose of this hearing was to clarify some of the pro se motions filed by Appellant. These motions addressed Appellant's intent to present evidence of insanity, to raise the matter of competency to stand trial, and to request a subpoena of Dr. Satyajeet Lahiri. Appellant changed his mind again and indicated to the court that he wanted to be represented by an attorney. He then expressed his desire for a lawyer to "go hybrid" with him. Attorney Bays advised the court that he had previously instructed Appellant that hybrid representation is not permitted in Texas courts. Following a recess, Bays told the court that since the State had not made a plea offer acceptable to Appellant, it was possible that Appellant was under the impression that complaining about his appointed counsel would get him a new lawyer who would then negotiate a more attractive plea bargain. The prosecutor confirmed that the plea offer was not dependent upon counsel, but upon Appellant's specific offense and his criminal history, all which established a legitimate basis for the offer at hand. After a discussion on these matters, the trial judge ruled that Appellant needed attorney Bays to remain as counsel. In addition, the trial court, the prosecution and the defense all agreed that Appellant should undergo another competency and sanity evaluation prior to proceeding to trial.
A few weeks later, on August 23, 2011, the trial court held yet another hearing regarding Appellant's desire to represent himself. Apparently Appellant changed his mind again and informed the court that he no longer wanted Bays to represent him. The court began to admonish Appellant again of the advantages and disadvantages of self-representation. Following the admonishment, Appellant wavered and then settled on allowing Bays continuing to represent.Bays remained as Appellant's counsel and the trial judge proceeded to arraignment and the presentation of an insanity defense.
That same afternoon, voir dire began. After the State concluded its voir dire, the court took a short break. Upon everyone's return, Appellant expressed his intent to represent himself. The court began to admonish Appellant for the third time of the dangers and consequences of self-representation and further indicated that if Appellant made any other attempts to disrupt or manipulate the proceedings, it would be considered unacceptable and viewed as an attempt at delay. Appellant then signed his second written waiver of counsel and the trial judge finished his admonishment. The trial judge ruled that attorney Bays would remain in the courtroom and continue to act as Appellant's standby counsel for the remainder of trial. Voir dire then continued.
When it was Appellant's turn to conduct his voir dire, he told the trial judge he wished to waive his voir dire and had no questions to present to the jury. The official jury panel was then sworn, seated, and given instructions regarding their duties as jurors. The indictment was read to the jury and, after some confusion as to what Appellant was pleading, the trial judge concluded Appellant had entered a plea of not guilty.
During Dr. Lahiri's testimony, the State questioned him about a mentally ill person knowing the difference between right and wrong and its effect on declaring a person legally insane. Dr. Lahiri's responded that although a person may be psychotic or mentally ill, he will be deemed legally sane if he knows the difference between right and wrong with regard to the crime committed. Dr. Lahiri also testified that during the sanity evaluation, he inquired into whether Appellant would have committed the same offense had a police officer been present. Appellantanswered that he would not have engaged in the same behavior. According to Dr. Lahiri, this was indicative of knowing the difference between right and wrong.
VALID WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Statement of the Issues
In Issue One, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing self-representation in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Issue Two, he contends that the court also violated Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution provide that a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to assistance of counsel. Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). However, coupled with the right to counsel is the right to waive counsel and to represent one's self. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, ...
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