Cortland v. Lewis Cnty.
| Decision Date | 25 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 52066-4-II,52066-4-II |
| Parties | BRIAN CORTLAND, Appellant, v. LEWIS COUNTY, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
CRUSER, J. — Brian Cortland appeals the trial court's order on the merits concluding that Lewis County (the County) did not violate the Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56 RCW. Cortland argues first that the trial court erred when it failed to make a finding of fact regarding which entity responded to his PRA request, and to the extent the trial court credited the County with the response submitted by the superior court, it erred. Cortland next contends that since the Lewis County Superior Court did not have authority to respond to his request under the PRA because it is a judicial entity, he effectively received no response, and thus, the County violated the PRA. Finally, under this same reasoning, he asserts that because the superior court performed the search rather than the County, the search was per se inadequate, and the County failed to meet its burden of proof establishing the adequacy of the search.
The County responds that Cortland has no cause of action under the PRA because he makes no claim that he was denied access to records he was entitled to copy and inspect. In addition, the County maintains it did not violate the PRA when the superior court searched for and produced responsive records on its behalf. Finally, the County argues that the thoroughness of the superior court's search was uncontested and the burden of proof as to the adequacy of the search was met on the evidence submitted to the trial court.
We affirm the trial court. The County had no duty to go beyond its own records to produce records in response to Cortland's request addressed to a nonexistent agency. Accordingly, the County properly denied Cortland's request when it directed Cortland to resubmit his inquiry to the superior court, the sole entity responsible for administering the law library. Furthermore, the County had no duty to go beyond its own records in conducting a search, and Cortland provides no evidence that the County held responsive records that it would have uncovered had it completed a more thorough search. Finally, because Cortland does not challenge the trial court's finding of fact that he received "timely responses and records to each request," he has no cause of action under the PRA. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 317.
Between August 2, 2016 and September 13, 2016, Cortland filed numerous PRA requests addressed exclusively to the Lewis County Law Library Board. But in early 2010, the Lewis County Law Library Board of Trustees ("board") disbanded and the Lewis County Superior Court assumed all of the board's duties. Records pertaining to the law library have been maintained by Susie Parker, the Superior Court Administrator and Public Records Officer for the superior court, ever since.
Cortland had previously submitted requests, also addressed to the Lewis County Law Library Board on December 9, 2015. The lawsuit pertaining to the PRA requests from December 9, 2015 is the subject of a separate appeal, No. 51987-9-II, pending before us.
As it pertains to this appeal, Cortland sent his first PRA request addressed to the "Lewis County Law Library Board" to Lisa Conzatti on August 2, 2016 because he could not find a contact person for the law library board, and Conzatti was listed as a contact for the Lewis County Law and Justice Council. Conzatti responded on August 3, stating that "'[a]lthough the Law Library is located near the Clerk's Office,'" it is not "'the Clerk's responsibility'" and directed him to contact Parker, the superior court administrator, for assistance in his request. Id. at 5 (alteration in original). Cortland followed these instructions, and he forwarded the August 2 PRA request, as well as all subsequent requests, directly to Parker.
Cortland received responses for each of his requests. Glenn Carter, Lewis County Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, responded to every request submitted by Cortland to the nonexistent board, stating that he received the request from the superior court, which administers the law library in lieu of the board. Carter clarified that he responded to Cortland's request on behalf of the court "in its capacity of having assumed the functions of the Law Library Board," and he reaffirmed that requests are governed by GR 31.1. CP at 63, 79, 84, 99, 148, 156, 159, 167.
Parker directed the search for responsive documents and enlisted the assistance of the Information Services Department to procure electronic records. She also reviewed the physical records in the court's possession.
Cortland filed a lawsuit naming the County as the defendant on July 27, 2017 (Thurston County Cause No. 17-2-04278-34). This suit was filed shortly after the same judge ruled in his favor with respect to the December 9, 2015 PRA request.
Cortland's lawsuit pertaining to the August and September PRA requests alleged that the County violated the PRA because it did not respond or produce records. It appears that the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the County prevailed initially. Cortland filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted, and it set a hearing on the merits to determine claims related to adequacy of the County's search for records.
Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court found that Cortland received timely responses and records and that the production of records via the superior court satisfied the County's duties under the PRA. The court, referencing the other PRA case related to the December 9, 2015 request, concluded that because it held that "the Lewis County Superior Court could not escape the PRA obligations of the Lewis County Law Library Board, which the Court rules was a nonjudicial agency subject to the PRA," in the prior suit "[b]y the same token . . . the Superior Court's response to a PRA request here was effective in satisfying those obligations." Id. at 318. The trial court further concluded that because Cortland did not raise an argument regarding the thoroughness of the search, and the search was "reasonably calculated to uncover the relevant documents," that "Lewis County carried its burden to show an adequate search." Id. at 319. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Cortland's claims failed on the merits.
Cortland appeals, challenging the trial court's order on the merits.
"The PRA is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records." Neigh. All. of Spokane County v. Spokane County, 172 Wn.2d 702, 714, 261 P.3d 119 (2011). The PRA "stands for the proposition that, 'full access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society.'" Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS II) (quoting former RCW 42.17.010(11) (1975)). And when evaluating a claim within the framework of the PRA, a court must "take into account the policy of this chapter that free and open examination of public records is in the public interest, even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others." RCW 42.56.550(3).
RCW 42.56.070(1) directs government agencies to disclose public records upon request unless a specific exemption in the PRA applies or some other statute applies that exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen. of Wash., 177 Wn.2d 467, 485-86, 300 P.3d 799 (2013). Consistent with the PRA's purpose, RCW 42.56.030 expressly requires that the PRA be "liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed . . . to assure that the public interest will be fully protected."
Agency actions under the PRA are reviewed de novo. Neigh. All., 172 Wn.2d at 715 (citing RCW 42.56.550(3)). A PRA case may be decided based on affidavits alone. O'Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wn.2d 138, 153-54, 240 P.3d 1149 (2010).
Cortland argues that the trial court erred because it failed to make an explicit finding of fact regarding which entity responded to his PRA request. He contends that the evidence shows that the Lewis County Superior Court was the only entity that responded to his request. And because he received a response from only the superior court, he argues that he received no response at all given that the superior court is not an agency within the scope of the PRA. Thus, he argues that the County violated its duty to respond under RCW 42.56.520.
We disagree with Cortland and hold that the County responded to Cortland's request as required under RCW 42.56.520 by denying the request and directing him to resubmit his request to the superior court, which was the entity that held the records he was requesting. The County had no further duty to provide records beyond its denial of the request because the request was addressed to an entity that no longer existed and whose functions had been entirely subsumed by the superior court.
RCW 42.56.520(1) provides that upon receiving a request, an agency must respond within five days by either providing records, denying the request, or acknowledging the request and providing an estimate for the time it will take to respond. Rufin v. City of Seattle, 199 Wn. App. 348, 359, 398 P.3d 1237 (2017), review denied, 189 Wn.2d 1034 (2018). Failure to so respond within five days of receiving a request violates the PRA. Id.
The county clerk informed Cortland on August 3, one day after he submitted his request, that " " CP at 5. Thus, the County promptly responded under RCW 42.56.520(1)(e) b...
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