Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
Decision Date | 08 December 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 40880,40880 |
Citation | 257 So.2d 36 |
Parties | Melba I. CORY, as surviving widow of Fay C. Cory, Deceased and as Executrix of the Estate of Fay C. Cory, Deceased, Petitioner, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., a California corporation, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Alan R. Schwartz, of Horton & Schwartz, Miami, and James H. Nance, Melbourne, for petitioner.
J. Compton French and Thorwald J. Husfeld, of Landis, Graham, French, Husfeld, Sherman & Ford, DeLand, for respondent.
By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 243 So.2d 478), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District (Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Turpak, 225 So.2d 340), on the same point of law. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4, F.S.A.
In the early morning hours of July 12, 1966, a greyhound bus, heading north through the fog, struck an East Volusia Mosquito Control District fogging machine, creeping slowly in the same direction. In the resulting crash and gasoline explosion, Fay C. Cory, the operator of the fogging machine was burned to death. His widow, Melba I. Cory, brought two separate actions against Greyhound Lines, Inc., to recover damages arising out of Mr. Cory's injuries and death. One action was brought individually under the wrongful death statute. The other action was brought by Mrs. Cory as Executrix of her deceased husband's estate under the survivor statute.
The cases were consolidated for jury trial and the following verdicts were returned:
The exact amount requested in the survival case ($11,192.00) was assessed in the wrongful death action. The jury assessed $147,000.00 (slightly more than had been requested in the Wrongful death case) in the survival action.
Thereupon, the following occurred:
'THE COURT: Let me see the verdicts again please?
'In other words, the Court is of the opinion that certainly it appears to the Court that the verdict for the widow is approximately the sum that was asked for by the executrix, by the personal representatives of the estate, and it appears that perhaps you have confused the two, and I'm going to ask you to return to the juryroom and deliberate further, based upon the instructions I have just given.
'You may return to the juryroom.'
The jury returned to the courtroom and rendered the following verdicts:
The jury was then polled and a discussion took place out of the presence of the jury. Mr. James H. Nance, the attorney for plaintiff, suggested that the jury had put the Executrix award on the wrongful death verdict and the wrongful death award on the Executrix verdict when they originally returned. Thereupon, the following occurred:
The defendant filed motion for a new trial on the issues of both liability and damages. The plaintiff filed a motion for entry of final judgments in which she sought the entry of final judgments in accordance with the alleged intention of the jury as incorrectly expressed, in the first verdicts, by the entry of a judgment of $147,000.00 for the plaintiff in the wrongful death case, and $11,192.00 for the plaintiff's estate in the survivor case. The trial judge denied plaintiff's motion for entry of final judgments and granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages alone. The order stated:
'That there is no reason to disturb the jury's findings as to the questions of liability, the Court further finds
'That the verdicts may be based upon confusion in the minds of the jurors as to elements of damages. The Court (Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing which was accompanied by the affidavits of five jurors and counsel's affidavit as to what he had been told by the sixth juror concerning the jurors' intentions in returning the verdict. The motion for rehearing was denied. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in a 'per curiam' order affirmed the order granting defendant a new trial on damages only.
For conflict petitioner refers us to Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Turpak, Supra. In that case the jury returned a verdict for the widow as Executrix, and a separate verdict for the widow in her individual capacity. These verdicts were accepted and the jury was discharged. The Court allowed the foreman to be interviewed and plaintiff's attorney gave an affidavit purporting to relate the result of the interview with the foreman. On the basis of this, the trial court undertook to reconstruct the verdict by lumping the total of both verdicts into one for the widow and awarding zero dollars' verdict for the Executrix. The defendant appealed and Mrs. Turpak, the widow, contended the jury made an 'inadvertent clerical error' and that 'there was no dispute concerning the jury's true intent.' In reversing, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, said:
'Mrs. Turpak cites numerous cases in support of her proposition * * *. These cases hold that The Court has power to correct a verdict where the jury has incorrectly apportioned damages, erroneously transposed the amounts in consolidated actions, or has made other clerical errors in rendering the verdict or verdicts. (Emphasis supplied.)
'The affidavit of Mrs. Turpak's counsel reflects that the jury foreman indicated to him that the true intent of the jury was 'to enter the total of both verdicts for the support of the wife and children' and that this was so apportioned because of the jury's erroneous belief that it should enter 'past damages' in the widow's action and 'future damages' in the Executrix's action; and that the amount of $4,102.00 for medical and general expenses and property damage was not included in either verdict because of the jury's erroneous belief that this amount had been 'stipulated upon' by the parties and therefore did not need to be set forth in the jury verdict.
'This, then, was not a mere clerical error, but...
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...jury, the trial court was required to adjust the verdicts actually returned to reflect their lawful intention. See Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 257 So.2d 36 (Fla.1971); Baker Protective Servs. Inc. v. FP, Inc., 643 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Burgess v. Mid-Florida Serv., 609 So.2d 637......
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Phillips v. Ostrer, 83-2686
...indication of the jury's intent to follow appellants' suggestions in determining the amount of compensatory damages. See Cory v. Greyhound Lines, 257 So.2d 36 (Fla.1971). When the intent of the jury is apparent, the verdict will sustain a judgment entered in conformity with that intent. Cor......
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XTec, Inc. v. Hembree Consulting Servs., Inc.
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CG Chase Const. Co. v. Colon, 97-1353.
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