Cory v. Shierloh

• Decision Date: 11 June 1981
• Docket Number: S.F. 24211
• Citation: 29 Cal.3d 430,174 Cal.Rptr. 500,629 P.2d 8
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 629 P.2d 8 Richard G. CORY, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Michael SHIERLOH, a Minor, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

Page 500

174 Cal.Rptr. 500

29 Cal.3d 430, 629 P.2d 8

Richard G. CORY, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Michael SHIERLOH, a Minor, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

S.F. 24211.

Supreme Court of California.

June 11, 1981.

C. Afton Moore III, Judy R. Campos and Hefner, Stark & Marois, Sacramento, for plaintiff and appellant.

Strauss, Neibauer & Anderson, Modesto, John J. Hollenback, Jr., Robert E. Cartwright, San Diego, Edward I. Pollock, Los Angeles, Harvey R. Levine, Stephen I. Zetterberg, Claremont, Glen T. Bashore, North Fork, William M. Shernoff, Claremont, and Leonard Sacks, North Ridge, as amici curiae for plaintiff and appellant.

Edwin T. Weiberg, Steven A. Block, Fremont, and Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

James O. Abrams, Dunne, Phelps, Mills & Jackson, Mires & Bierce, Lyn C. Bierce, San Francisco, Robert Hale McConnell, Nevada City, Hawkins & Cooper and M. Armon Cooper, San Francisco, as amici curiae for defendant and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

Plaintiff challenges on constitutional grounds recent legislation (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25602, subds. (b), (c); Civ. Code, § 1714, subds. (b), (c)) which is aimed at immunizing certain providers of alcoholic beverages from civil liability for injuries attributable to intoxication. We will sustain the subject legislation and the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Richard Cory, a minor, allegedly was injured in February 1979 after he became intoxicated at a party and lost control of his vehicle while attempting to drive home. In his complaint for damages, plaintiff names as defendants the lessor of the building in which the party was held, the liquor stores which sold the liquor, and various persons including defendant Michael Shierloh, also a minor, who hosted and supervised the party. The complaint contains nine separate causes of action, four of them (the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh) directed at defendant Shierloh.

The several causes of action allege various forms of tortious conduct by Shierloh and other defendants: the fourth, that defendants so negligently operated and controlled the leased premises that plaintiff became intoxicated and thereby sustained injuries; the fifth, that the manner of Shierloh's use and occupancy of the premises constituted a nuisance, in that he permitted thereon the unlicensed and unlawful sale and furnishing of alcoholic beverages to minors and others; the sixth, that Shierloh's unlicensed and unlawful conduct in furnishing alcoholic beverages to plaintiff proximately caused his intoxication and subsequent injuries; and the seventh, that Shierloh negligently sold or furnished alcoholic beverages to plaintiff, knowing that plaintiff was obviously intoxicated and would be driving a car thereafter.

Defendant Shierloh interposed a general demurrer to the complaint, relying primarily upon a series of recent amendments to the Business and Professions Code and the Civil Code (which provisions are hereinafter collectively referred to as the 1978 amendments). He argues that, because of these legislative enactments, the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to plaintiff was not a proximate cause of the latter's injuries. The trial court sustained Shierloh's demurrer without leave to amend, and after a judgment of dismissal was entered this appeal followed.

Before examining the critical statutes, we review several of our recent decisions which apparently prompted the subject legislation. In Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151, we concluded that in an appropriate case the commercial vendor of alcoholic beverages was tortiously liable for injuries to third persons caused by the consumer of the beverage. Observing that "the furnishing of an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person may be a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by that individual upon a third person" (p. 164, 95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151), we overruled Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, in which we had held that "it is the voluntary consumption, not the sale or gift, of intoxicating liquor which is the proximate cause of injury from its use; ..." (Id., at p. 356, 289 P.2d 450.) In Vesely, we relied primarily upon section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code, which proscribed the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to "any obviously intoxicated person." Consistent with long established law, we recognized that a presumption of negligence on the part of the furnisher of the drink would arise whenever section 25602 was violated.

Subsequently, in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313, 128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719, we noted that although Vesely relied upon section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code to support its holding, nevertheless, "the clear import of our decision was that there was no bar to civil liability under modern negligence law." (P. 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719.)

Finally, in Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144, 145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669, we extended the Vesely holding to noncommercial providers such as "social hosts," relying upon both section 25602 and traditional common law negligence principles. Summarizing our rationale, we stated that "We think it evident that the service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to those on the highway .... Simply put, one who serves alcoholic beverages under such circumstances fails to exercise reasonable care." (Pp. 152-153, 144 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669, italics in original.)

In 1978, notwithstanding the clear documentation of the appalling nature of the nationwide drunk driving problem, the Legislature with the Governor's approval enacted legislation which was expressly designed to "abrogate" each of our three foregoing decisions. First, subdivisions (b) and (c) were added to section 1714 of the Civil Code to qualify the general principle (presently expressed in subd. (a) thereof) that everyone is responsible for his own negligent or wilful acts. These amendments recite: "(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager ..., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club ..., and Coulter v. Superior Court ... and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for injuries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person. (P) (c) No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be held legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of such beverages."

In addition, subdivisions (b) and (c) were added to section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code to qualify the prohibition (presently expressed in subd. (a) thereof) against selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages to any obviously intoxicated person. These sections state: "(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage. (P) (c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager ..., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club ... and Coulter v. Superior Court ... be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person."

Expressing a single exception to the foregoing sweeping immunity, the Legislature in section 25602.1 of the Business and Professions Code, added the following qualifying language: "Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 25602, a cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death against any person licensed pursuant to Section 23300 who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or giving of such beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained by such person." (Italics added.) It is agreed that section 25602.1 is inapplicable here, because defendant Shierloh is not licensed to sell or furnish alcoholic beverages.

Plaintiff contends that his complaint survives the 1978 amendments because, first, they do not affect his nonnegligence theories of recovery and, second, the amendments are unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.

I. APPLICABILITY OF THE 1978 AMENDMENTS

The trial court explained that the fourth, sixth and seventh causes of action of plaintiff's complaint "each requires that the defendant's act be the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Neither the negligent management of the premises (fourth cause), the serving of alcohol without a license (sixth cause), or the furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated minor (seventh cause) were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. By legislative mandate the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, not the furnishing of such beverages by itself or in the management of one's property." As for the allegations of nuisance...