Cosby v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-CV-2040-LRR,18-CV-2040-LRR |
| Parties | ONEIDA COSBY, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................... 2
III. APPLICABLE LAW ..................................... 2
IV. ANALYSIS ............................................ 5
V. CONCLUSION ........................................ 11
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Plaintiff Oneida Cosby's "Motion for Remand" ("Motion") (docket no. 26).
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 15, 2018, Cosby filed a "Petition at Law and Jury Demand" ("Petition") (docket no. 2) in the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Iowa ("Iowa District Court"). In the Petition, Cosby asserts the following claims: (1) a claim for negligence against Defendants Canadian National Railway Company ("Canadian National"), Illinois Central Railroad Company ("Illinois Central") and Chicago, Central & Pacific Railroad Company ("CCP") (collectively, "Railroad Defendants"); (2) a claim for premises liability against Railroad Defendants; (3) a claim for negligence against Defendant David Hill; (4) a claim for intentional disregard for public safety against Railroad Defendants; (5) a claim for punitive damages against Railroad Defendants; and (6) a claim of direct participant liability against Canadian National. See Petition ¶¶ 66-146. On June 28, 2018, Illinois Central filed a Notice of Removal (docket no. 1), bringing the case before the court. On July 20, 2018, Cosby filed the Motion. On August 3, 2018, Illinois Central filed a Resistance to the Motion ("Illinois Central Resistance") (docket no. 32). On the same date, CCP filed a Resistance to the Motion ("CCP Resistance") (docket no. 33). On August 10, 2018, Cosby filed a Reply to the Illinois Central Resistance ("Reply to Illinois Central Resistance") (docket no. 34) and a Reply to the CCP Resistance ("Reply to CCP Resistance") (docket no. 35). Illinois Central requests oral argument. See Illinois Central Resistance. Upon review, the court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
"A defendant . . . desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). "A defendant may remove a state law claim to federal court only if the action originally could have been filedthere." In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 619 (8th Cir. 2010). "Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000 and complete diversity of citizenship among the litigants." Id. at 619-20 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); see also Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (). "Complete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship." E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC, 781 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007)).
"Joinder designed solely to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction is fraudulent and will not prevent removal." Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1983). That is, "the right of an out-of-state defendant to remove a diversity suit to federal court 'cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant.'" Simpson v. Thomure, 484 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921)). "A party has been fraudulently joined when there exists 'no reasonable basis in fact and law' to support a claim against it." Thompson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 760 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., 665 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2011)); see also Anderson, 724 F.2d at 84 (). "Fraudulent joinder does not exist where 'there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts involved.'" Block, 665 F.3d at 948 (quoting Junk v. Terminix Int'l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010)).
The removing party bears the burden to prove fraudulent joinder. See Polito v. Molasky, 123 F.2d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1941) (). "[T]o establish fraudulent joinder, the defendant must 'do more than merely prove that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion' since '[the court] do[es] not focus on the artfulness of the plaintiff's pleadings.'" Block, 665 F.3d at 948 (quoting Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 980 (8th Cir. 2011)); see also Junk, 628 F.3d at 445 (). Rather, "the district court's task is limited to determining whether there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts involved." Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2003). "Where applicable state precedent precludes the existence of a cause of action against a defendant, joinder is fraudulent." Id. at 810. However, the court may not step from the threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits. See id. at 811 ().
"All doubts about federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court." In re Prempro, 591 F.3d at 620. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that "where the sufficiency of the complaint against the non-diverse defendant is questionable, 'the better practice is for the federal court not to decide the doubtful question in connection with a motion to remand but simply to remand the case and leave the question for the state courts to decide.'" Filla, 336 F.3d at 811 (quoting Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Med. Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 406 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977)); see also Morris v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 68 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1934) ().
IV. ANALYSIS
In the Motion, Cosby requests that the court remand the instant action to the Iowa District Court. See Motion at 1. Cosby contends that Illinois Central improperly removed the case because the court "lacks jurisdiction . . . due to the lack of diversity among the parties." Id. Specifically, both Cosby and Hill reside in Iowa. Petition ¶¶ 1, 6. In the Notice of Removal, Illinois Central asserts that Hill "has been fraudulently joined in this action because [Cosby's] claims against him lack a 'reasonable basis in fact and law.'" Notice of Removal ¶ 20 (quoting Welk v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 720 F.3d 736, 737 (8th Cir. 2013)).
The factual allegations in the Petition are as follows. On September 6, 2017, Cosby was a pedestrian whose path was blocked by Railroad Defendants' train. Petition ¶ 15. Cosby "attempted to traverse the crossing while [the] freight train was stopped and still blocking the crossing." Id. ¶ 17. Without warning, the train moved suddenly, causing "the train to roll over [Cosby's] extremities." Id. ¶ 18. As a result, Cosby "sustained serious, permanent, and progressive life-altering injuries and damages, including amputation to her left and right legs." Id. Cosby asserts that "[h]aving to crawl through and under trains parked across the tracks . . . is a safety hazard that is well-known to [Railroad Defendants]" and that Railroad Defendants have "not taken adequate steps to enforce rules, educate or warn members of the public of the danger" nor have they "taken any steps to eliminate the hazard of blocked crossings." Id. ¶ 22.
Since 2003, Hill "has been employed as the Risk Mitigation Officer in Waterloo, Iowa" for the Railroad Defendants. Id. ¶ 32. As part of his responsibilities, "Hill is required to investigate claim[s] and incidents involving" Railroad Defendants in Waterloo. Id. Cosby also contends that Hill is charged with "receiving and responding to citizencomplaints, working with city officials, and ultimately developing solutions to make train operations safer in Waterloo." Brief in Support of Motion (docket no. 26-1) at 3; see also Petition ¶ 6 (). Cosby further asserts that "Hill has made policy decisions for [Railroad Defendants] . . . that are harmful to the safety of the public." Petition ¶ 6.
In Count 3 of the Petition, Cosby alleges a negligence claim against Hill. See id. ¶¶ 116-18. Cosby claims in relevant part that "Hill has a personal duty to exercise reasonable care to [Cosby]" and that he "breached his duty to...
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