Cost v. Caletri
| Decision Date | 18 November 1978 |
| Citation | 394 A.2d 513,483 Pa. 11 |
| Parties | Christine N. COST v. Suzanne CALETRI, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued Sept. 21, 1978.
John J. Driscoll, Hudock & Driscoll, Greensburg, for appellant.
Nathan F. Abromson, Abromson & Abromson, Mount Pleasant, for appellee.
Before EAGEN C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
The present appeal, which involves a surviving spouse's right to make an election under Section 6111 of the Decedents Estates and Fiduciaries Code ("the Code") [1] is further evidence of the accuracy of the observation of the late Chief Justice Bell that joint bank account cases, despite the existence of settled legal principles, often prove "vexing" and "difficult" when one seeks to apply these principles "to the different factual situations which so frequently arise . . ." Martella Estate, 390 Pa. 255, 258, 135 A.2d 372, 373 (1957). The difficulties notwithstanding, we are obliged to agree with appellant that the court below erred in its disposition of this case. We accordingly will reverse.
Phillip H. Cost died intestate on November 10, 1974. His estate consisted of a house in Mount Pleasant, Pennsylvania, held by the entireties with his wife, appellee herein, and various bank accounts. The property with which the lower court's decree and this appeal are concerned, however, are the proceeds of a certain certificate of deposit in the joint hands of Phillip Cost (the decedent) and Suzanne Caletri (decedent's granddaughter), the appellant herein. This certificate was redeemed and its proceeds obtained by Suzanne in decedent's lifetime. It is these proceeds which are the subject of the present action brought by appellee in the orphans' court division of the court of common pleas. [2] After hearing, the lower court held that these proceeds were subject to an election by appellee under Section 6111 of the Code, and this appeal followed dismissal of exceptions by the court en banc. [3]
The evidence presented at the hearing may be summarized as follows. Phillip Cost and Christine N. Cost were married for some fifty years, but in the last years of Phillip's life their relationship became seriously strained. As a result of litigation with his wife which need not be detailed here, decedent became acquainted with a lawyer, Donald Hacker, whom he saw fairly often during 1974 regarding property and other matters. Hacker testified at the hearing and recounted his conversations with the decedent. We need not review the discussions at length. [4] Suffice it to say that this testimony shows, as the lower court put it, that "there can be little doubt as to the intention of (decedent) in so far as his wife inheriting any amount of money on his death (is concerned) . . . it is apparent that it was his intention to dispose of his estate so that there was not enough left for the purchase of a cup of coffee." Decedent was, however, quite fond of his granddaughter, who also lived in Mount Pleasant and who visited him often.
The certificate was placed in decedent's safe deposit box, to which Suzanne had access as a "deputy." Phillip Cost's conception of his granddaughter's interest in these accounts is clear from the testimony. So far as he was concerned, the money was as much hers as his, and could be used by her as she saw fit. [5]
By November, 1974, decedent, who had been ill from time to time during the past six months, was in a nursing home in Clairton, Pennsylvania. On November 4, 1974, appellant, who according to her testimony "had been advised by Mr. Hacker," took a bank power of attorney form to her grandfather at the nursing home. Cost signed the instrument in the presence of two witnesses. On the next day, Suzanne obtained the unmatured certificate of deposit from the safe deposit box and redeemed it by assignment to Pittsburgh National Bank. The proceeds of the certificate were deposited in a bank account which appellant held jointly with her husband.
Four days later, on November 9, Phillip Cost's brother Anthony, who lived in Clairton, informed Phillip at the nursing home that he was going to Mount Pleasant the next day for a reunion. Anthony testified that decedent then told him to "see Suzanne, I gave all my money to Suzanne." Phillip Cost died the next day, November 10, 1974.
Section 6111 of the Code, pursuant to which the lower court decreed that appellee could elect to take against the proceeds of the certificate, provides in pertinent part as follows:
[6]
This section, which was derived from Section 11 of the Estates Act of 1947, as amended, [7] was intended to preserve "for the surviving spouse the right to share in the decedent's assets where the decedent has retained important rights of ownership at death." [8] If, however, a husband in his lifetime "makes an outright gift which divests himself of any possible interest so that the property can no longer inure to his benefit, nothing in our case law or statutes (prior, at least, to the recent legislation noted above; see note 6, Supra ) would allow his widow to claim any part of his property." Schwartz Estate, 449 Pa. 112, 115, 295 A.2d 600, 602 (1972). See also, E. g., Montague Estate, 403 Pa. 558, 560, 170 A.2d 103, 105 (1961). Appellant contends that this is the situation here, for it is her position that because of a valid and complete inter-vivos gift to her by the decedent of the monies in dispute, no rights of ownership in those assets were held by Phillip Cost when he died. This argument requires a brief review of certain legal principles applicable to joint bank accounts and inter vivos gifts. [9]
What we said in Young Estate,--- Pa. ---, ---, 391 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1978) (Filed October 5, 1978), is applicable here:
See also Lux Estate, 480 Pa. 256, ---, 389 A.2d 1053, 1057-58 (1978). In addition, under our case law the creation of the joint tenancy with right of survivorship in a certificate of deposit, as shown by the signature card, constitutes prima facie evidence of an inter vivos gift of an undivided one-half interest in the proceeds, with a contingent right in the donee to the whole fund. See, E. g., Dzierski Estate, 449 Pa. 285, 288-89, 296 A.2d 716, 718 (1972); Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 414, 115 A.2d 197 (1955). [10] Thus, had nothing more happened in the case at bar than the purchase of the certificate of deposit, Phillip Cost would have held an undivided one-half interest in that certificate at his death, and this interest would have been subject to his widow's election under Section 6111. See Hetrick Estate, 42 Pa.D. & C.2d 582, 586, 17 Fiduc.Rep. 317, 87 Dauph. 339 (O.C.1967); Drejko Estate, 34 Pa.D. & C.2d 233, 14 Fiduc.Rep. 636 (O.C.Phila.1965); Hershey Estate, 10 Fiduc.Rep. 390, 1 Adams 160, 166-68 (O.C.Fulton 1960), and cases cited therein. Appellant's contention, however, as stated above, is that this rule is not applicable because here decedent gave the whole of the interest in the certificate to appellant six days before he died.
A complicating factor in the present case is the use of the power of attorney of November 4 in connection with the gift transaction. The trial court believed that since the power was by its terms revocable, under Section 6111 the decedent as donor of the power of attorney retained "a power of revocation or consumption" over the certificate of deposit. This, however, does not follow. The power of attorney was a standard form prepared by Pittsburgh National Bank and merely established an agency in Suzanne Caletri to deal, by herself, with the bank in all needful respects concerning the identified certificate of deposit. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial