Costa v. Desert Palace

• Decision Date: 02 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-15645,PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,99-15645
• Citation: 268 F.3d 882
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2001) CATHARINA F. COSTA,, v. DESERT PALACE, INC., DBA CAESARS PALACE HOTEL & CASINO,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 882

268 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001)

CATHARINA F. COSTA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DESERT PALACE, INC., DBA CAESARS PALACE HOTEL & CASINO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

No. 99-15645

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted September 13, 2000

Filed October 2, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Mark J. Ricciardi, Ricciardi Law Group, a partner in Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada, for the defendant-appellant.

Robert N. Peccole, Peccole & Peccole Ltd., Las Vegas, Nevada, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada; David Warner Hagen, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-00009-DWH/RJJ.

Before: Kozinski and Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges, and Schwarzer,^* Senior District Judge.

Schwarzer, Senior District Judge.

ORDER

The panel has voted unanimously to withdraw the Opinion filed December 29, 2000.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED.

OPINION

The central question before us is whether the district court erred in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury considering plaintiff's claim of discriminatory working conditions and wrongful discharge. We conclude that in the absence of substantial evidence of conduct or statements by the employer directly reflecting discriminatory animus, the giving of a mixed-motive instruction was reversible error.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Catharina Costa was employed by Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino (Caesars) as a warehouse worker from 1987 to 1994. She was the only woman in the bargaining unit covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Caesars and Teamsters Local 995. A long history of disciplinary infractions and suspensions culminated in her termination in 1994, following a verbal and physical altercation with a fellow worker, Herbert Gerber. While Costa was fired, Gerber, a twenty-five year employee with a good disciplinary record and no prior suspensions, received only a five-day suspension. Both employees filed grievances under the CBA. An arbitrator sustained both disciplinary actions and found that Caesars had just cause to terminate Costa.

Costa filed this action alleging gender discrimination in connection with the conditions of her employment and her termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-2000e-17 (1994)[hereinafter Title VII].¹ The jury returned a verdict for Costa, awarding $64,377 for financial loss, $200,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. The court denied Caesars' motion for judgment as a matter of law but granted its motion for new trial or remittitur, conditioned on Costa's acceptance of a reduction of compensatory damages to $100,000. The court also awarded attorney's fees of $56,298 and judgment was entered accordingly. Caesars appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and vacate the judgment on the conditions of employment claim, reverse on the termination claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DISCUSSION

I. THE MIXED-MOTIVE JURY INSTRUCTION

The district court submitted both the termination and the conditions of employment claims to the jury. It first instructed the jury that:

The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Costa suffered adverse work conditions, and

2. Costa's gender was a motivating factor in any such work conditions imposed upon her. Gender refers to the quality of being male or female. If you find that each of these things has been proved against a defendant, your verdict should be for the plaintiff and against the defendant. On the other hand, if any of these things has not been proved against a defendant, your verdict should be for the defendant.

It then went on to give the following instruction, which is the central issue in this appeal:

You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiff's sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you find that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.

However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff's gender had played no role in the employment decision.

Caesars' principal contention on appeal is that the district court erred by giving the jury a Price Waterhouse mixed-motive instruction rather than a McDonnell Douglas pretext instruction. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). It objected to the instruction at trial and offered a McDonnell Douglas pretext instruction, which the court rejected.

"Jury instructions must be formulated so that they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, correctly state the law, and are not misleading." Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996). Generally, we review the formulation of instructions for abuse of discretion. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998). However, "[i]f the instructions are challenged as a misstatement of the law, they are then reviewed de novo." Mockler v. Multnomah County, 140 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the instruction did not misstate the law, Caesars argues that it was legal error to give it on the basis of the evidence presented at trial.

A Title VII employment discrimination claim may proceed on either a single-motive (or pretext) theory or a mixed-motive theory. In a pretext case, an employee must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. If the employee succeeds, the burden of production shifts to the employer to arcticulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer makes that showing, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and the burden of production then shifts to the employee to show that the employer's reason was pretext and the real reason was discriminatory. That burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employee has been the victim of intentional discrimination. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).

In contrast, in a mixed-motive case, proof proceeds in two steps. First, the plaintiff must prove that"an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion). Second, once "a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Id. at 258 (plurality opinion).

We have not heretofore addressed directly what evidentiary burden a plaintiff must satisfy to prove her gender was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action. ² Our sister circuits have dealt with this issue and, though not in identical language, have all reached the conclusion that evidence that merely raises an inference of discrimination from differential treatment is not sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant. See Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990) ("If a plaintiff can provide direct evidence that gender bias infected the decision making process, the Burdine framework becomes irrelevant and the burden shifts to defendant. . . . Direct evidence is evidence which, in and of itself, shows a discriminatory animus."); (Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]hough sufficient proof that the forbidden factor played a `motivating role' to entitle the plaintiff to a burden shifting instruction may be furnished through circumstantial evidence, that circumstantial evidence must be tied directly to the alleged discriminatory animus. . . . If the plaintiff's nonstatistical evidence is directly tied to the forbidden animus, for example, policy documents or statements of a person involved in the decision making process that reflect a discriminatory or retaliatory animus of the type complained of in the suit, that plaintiff is entitled to a burden-shifting instruction."); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1995) ("In a `mixed motives' or Price Waterhouse case, the employee must produce direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., more direct evidence than is required for the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima facie case."); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995) ("To earn a mixed motive instruction .. . requires `direct evidence that decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion,' " quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277, O'Connor, J., concurring); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) ("When a plaintiff presents credible direct evidence that discriminatory animus in part motivated or was a substantial factor in the contested employment action, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made regardless of the forbidden factor. Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption."); Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Under Price Waterhouse, such a burden on the defendant only arises...