Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc.

Decision Date02 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. 99-15645.,99-15645.
Citation299 F.3d 838
PartiesCatharina F. COSTA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DESERT PALACE, INC., dba Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Mark J. Ricciardi, David B. Dornak, Michael J. Shannon, Ricciardi Law Group, Las Vegas, NV, for defendant-appellant.

Robert N. Peccole, Peccole & Peccole, Ltd., Las Vegas, NV, for plaintiff-appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada; David Warner Hagen, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-00009 DWH/RJJ.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, FERNANDEZ, KLEINFELD, SILVERMAN, GRABER, McKEOWN, FISHER, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge

We agreed to hear this case en banc1 primarily to examine the legal standard for proof of a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In this classic instance of what has been termed a "mixed-motive" case, the employer, Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino ("Caesars"), terminated Catharina Costa, the only woman in her bargaining unit, citing disciplinary problems. Costa argued, and the jury agreed, that sex was "a motivating factor" in her termination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Because Caesars failed to establish that she would have been terminated without consideration of her sex, the jury awarded back pay and compensatory damages. Finally, the jury found that the discrimination was "egregious" and warranted punitive damages. Caesars argues that Costa should have been held to a special, higher standard of "direct evidence," a threshold it claims she did not meet. We disagree. Title VII imposes no special or heightened evidentiary burden on a plaintiff in a so-called "mixed-motive" case. Consequently, we affirm the liability finding as well as the judgment for back pay and compensatory damages. In light of intervening Supreme Court authority, we remand with respect to punitive damages. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999).

BACKGROUND

Catharina Costa is a trailblazer. She has worked most of her life in a male-dominated environment, driving trucks and operating heavy equipment. At Caesars, a well known casino in Las Vegas, she worked in a warehouse and, along with members of her bargaining unit, Teamsters Local 995, operated the forklifts and pallet jacks to retrieve food and beverage orders. Costa was the only woman in this job.

Costa's work was characterized as "excellent" and "good." As her supervisor explained: "We knew when she was out there the job would get done." Nonetheless, she experienced a number of problems with management and her co-workers. At first, she responded by simply focusing on doing her job well. Slowly, Costa began to notice that she was being singled out because she was a woman. Her concerns not only fell on deaf ears — "my word meant nothing" — but resulted in her being treated as an "outcast."

In a series of escalating events that included informal rebukes, denial of privileges accorded her male co-workers, suspension, and finally discharge, Costa's efforts to resolve problems were thwarted along the way. The situation deteriorated so significantly that she finally complained to the human resources department, which declined to intervene.

There were "so many" incidents, it was difficult for her to recount them all. Nonetheless, her testimony at trial on this point was detailed and extensive. For example, when men came in late, they were often given overtime to make up the lost time; when Costa came in late — in one case, one minute late — she was issued a written reprimand, known as a record of counseling. When men missed work for medical reasons, they were given overtime to make up the lost time; when Costa missed work for medical reasons, she was disciplined. On one occasion, a warehouse supervisor actually suspended her because she had missed work while undergoing surgery to remove a tumor; only the intervention of the director of human resources voided this action.

In another episode, corroborated at trial by a fellow employee who was an eyewitness, a number of workers were in the office eating soup on a cold day. A supervisor walked in, looked directly at Costa, and said, "Don't you have work to do?" He did not reprimand any of her colleagues — all men. Another supervisor began to follow her around the warehouse. Although several other Teamsters complained about this supervisor's scrutiny, three witnesses, in addition to Costa, testified that she was singled out for particularly intense "stalking."

Costa presented extensive evidence that she received harsher discipline than the men. For instance, she was frequently warned and even suspended for allegedly hazardous use of equipment and for use of profanity, yet other Teamsters engaged in this conduct with impunity. In at least one instance, such a charge against Costa was found to have been fabricated and the suspension voided. Supervisors began to "stack" her disciplinary record. In one case, a supervisor issued multiple warnings on a single day, including docking her for an absence that dated back over eight months and for absences that occurred when Costa was under a doctor's care. Another warehouse manager steered a co-worker who had a dispute with Costa to security instead of handling the matter himself because the manager wanted to bring "this problem with Costa to a `head.'"

Costa was also treated differently than her male colleagues in the assignment of overtime. For example, in an analysis of 95.5 hours of overtime assigned to eight Teamsters, Costa received only two hours. Failure to assign overtime was not for Costa's lack of willingness to work additional hours. Costa was listed as "refusing" overtime when she was on vacation. When she was offered overtime, it was at the last minute, making it impractical for her to accept. The situation became more blatant when Costa asked her supervisors point blank about the differential treatment of another Teamster who was favored with overtime assignments. The response: He "has a family to support."

Costa also presented evidence that she was penalized for her failure to conform to sexual stereotypes. Although her fellow Teamsters frequently lost their tempers, swore at fellow employees, and sometimes had physical altercations, it was Costa, identified in one report as "the lady Teamster," who was called a "bitch," and told "[y]ou got more balls than the guys." Even at trial, and despite testimony that she "got along with most people" and had "few arguments," Caesars' managers continued to characterize her as "strong willed," "opinionated," and "confrontational," leading counsel to call her "bossy" in closing argument. Supervisor Karen Hallett, who later signed Costa's termination order, expressly declared her intent to "get rid of that bitch," referring to Costa.

Supervisors frequently used or tolerated verbal slurs that were sex-based or tinged with sexual overtones. Most memorably, one co-worker called her a "fucking cunt." When she wrote a letter to management expressing her concern with this epithet, which stood out from the ordinary rough-and-tumble banter, she received a three-day suspension in response. Although the other employee admitted using the epithet, Costa was faulted for "engaging in verbal confrontation with co-worker in the warehouse resulting in use of profane and vulgar language by other employee."

These events culminated in Caesars' termination of Costa. The purported basis for termination was a physical altercation in the warehouse elevator with another Teamster, Herb Gerber. This incident began, as Gerber admitted, when he went looking for Costa, upset about a report that he believed she had made about his unauthorized lunch breaks. Gerber trapped Costa in an elevator and shoved her against the wall, bruising her arm. Costa gave a detailed account of the altercation. Right away she told supervisor Hallett. Reassured that Hallett would investigate, Costa returned to work, only to have Gerber seek her out and "come at" her a second time. Costa's account was also corroborated by her immediate reports to union officials, by photographs of the bruises, and by a witness who had seen Gerber blocking the elevator door. In contrast, Gerber did not immediately report the incident, had no physical corroboration, and provided few details. He first denied that the altercation was physical, but then changed his story to state that Costa had, in fact, hit him.

Nonetheless, Caesars did not believe Costa. Caesars reasoned that the facts were in dispute, so it disciplined both employees—Gerber with a five-day suspension and Costa with termination.

Both Costa and Gerber grieved their respective disciplines pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which did not cover sex discrimination. The arbitrator upheld both actions. After receiving an EEOC right to sue letter, Costa filed this suit. The trial court dismissed her claim of sexual harassment on summary judgment, but allowed the other disparate treatment claim to proceed.

At trial, Caesars maintained that Costa was terminated because of her disciplinary history and her altercation with Gerber. Costa did not suggest that she was a model employee, but rather that her sex was a motivating factor in her termination. After hearing Costa's testimony, Judge Hagen, the trial judge, admonished counsel: "This is a case that should have settled." He denied Caesars' motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Costa's case, which was renewed at the close of the evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Costa for $64,377.74 back pay, $200,000 compensatory damages, and $100,000 punitive damages....

To continue reading

Request your trial
238 cases
  • Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., CASE NO. 3:16-cv-05694-RBL
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
    • March 5, 2020
    ...motivations, they can still be liable if the employee's protected characteristic was also a motivation. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 299 F.3d 838, 848 (9th Cir. 2002). It is also not necessary under Title VII that an employee actually suffer a rejection if a negative outcome is preordaine......
  • Madrigal v. Allstate Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • May 19, 2016
    ......." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A party seeking judgment as a matter of law has a "very high" standard to meet. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). A district court may grant judgment as a matter of law against a party only if "there is no legally sufficient ba......
  • Rutenschroer v. Starr Seigle Communications, Inc, Civ.05-00364 ACK/BMK.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii
    • June 29, 2006
    ...treatment claim, a plaintiff must "prove that the employer acted with conscious intent to discriminate." Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 854 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-06, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 When a defendant moves for s......
  • Kesser v. Cambra
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 16, 2004
    ...Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality).9 Notably, in Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 848 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc), we recognized that in Price Waterhouse"[a]ll nine justices agreed" that a finding of wrongdoing was appropria......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Age discrimination
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Employment Jury Instructions - Volume I
    • April 30, 2014
    ...of “sole cause” and “motivating factor” formulations derived from the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa , 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (emphasis in original), aff’d , 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Despite the fact that both Title VII and the ADEA prohibit......
  • Race and national origin discrimination
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Employment Jury Instructions - Volume I
    • April 30, 2014
    ...Employment Jury Instructions 3-330 plaintiff’s gender had played no role in the employment decision. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002); aff’d Desert Palace v. Costa , 539 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2003). The Ninth Circuit affirmed that the employer is liable under Price ......
  • Deposing & examining the plaintiff
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Deposing & Examining Employment Witnesses
    • March 31, 2022
    ...judgment motions in ADEA cases. The McDonnell Douglas test is used on summary judgment, not at trial. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This legal proof structure is a tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage so that they may reach trial … [I]t......
  • Gross v. Fbl Financial Services, Inc.: a Simple Interpretation of Text and Precedent Results in Simplified Claims Under the Adea - Robert Fuller
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 61-3, March 2010
    • Invalid date
    ...v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 345 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2003), aff'd on reh'g, 377 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2004); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd, 539 U.S. 90; Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 1999); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT