Cote v. State

• Decision Date: 31 January 1972
• Citation: 286 A.2d 868
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Parties: Patrick J. COTE v. STATE of Maine and Allan L. Robbins.

Page 868

286 A.2d 868

Patrick J. COTE v. STATE of Maine and Allan L. Robbins.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 31, 1972.

Verrill, Dana, Philbrick, Putnam & Williamson, by Michael T. Healy, Portland, for plaintiff.

Clayton N. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendants.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Chief Justice.

Indicted for escape from the Men's Correctional Center in Windham, Maine, petitioner, Patrick J. Cote, chose to enter a plea of guilty to the charge. The arraignment and acceptance of the plea took place on January 23, 1969. Incarcerated at the Maine State Prison under sentence to a term of not less than 1 1/2 years and not more than 3 years, Cote filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A., §§ 5502-5508. He was then represented by court-appointed counsel other than the attorney who represented him at the trial level. He now makes the commonplace accusations that his plea was not made voluntarily and understandingly. He attributes his judicial confession to inadequate advocacy of incompetent counsel.

The petitioner initially claims that his plea is involuntary and that he is entitled to plead anew because his plea was accepted without full adherence to Rule 11 procedural requirements.

Our Rule 11, Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective since December 1, 1965, in pertinent part provides as follows:

'* * * The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea * * * in any felony proceeding without first

(a) making such inquiry as may satisfy it that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged, and,

(b) addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, at the time of the Court's acceptance of Cote's plea of guilty on January 23, 1969 the Rule was an integral part of the prescribed criminal procedures under which guilty pleas to felony charges could be accepted by trial judges. Rules of court duly authorized by, and not repugnant to, law, which establish the manner of conducting the civil and criminal business in our courts of justice, have the force of law, are binding upon the courts and cannot be dispensed with merely to suit the circumstances of any particular case. See, Cunningham v. Long, 1926, 125 Me. 494, 135 A. 198; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 1939, 136 Me. 513, 4 A.2d 679; Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., Me. 1969, 256 A.2d 629. Criminal rules, as well as criminal statutes, are to be strictly interpreted in favor of a defendant where substantial rights are involved. Tuttle v. State, 1962, 158 Me. 150, 180 A.2d 608, certiorari denied 371 U.S. 879, 83 S.Ct. 151, 9 L.Ed.2d 116.

In the acceptance of guilty pleas to felonious charges, our Rule 11 casts two distinct obligations upon the trial court. As one of the obligations to be performed, the court must satisfy itself that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged and this duty, the Rule says, may be complied with by such inquiry as will produce the result to be obtained. The court may, and perhaps should, discharge this part of its obligations under the rule by personally addressing and interrogating the defendant, but the rule does not, either expressly or impliedly, so require and the accuracy of the plea may be established in some other manner. The second duty which the trial judge must fulfill in order to fully adhere to the requirements of Rule 11 is to determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge. In respect to this second section of the Rule which concerns itself directly with the voluntariness of the plea, the trial court by positive direction is ordered to address the defendant personally and determine that issue.

In the instant case, both directives of the Rule were disobeyed as the following colloquy at the plea-taking proceeding discloses:

'Q Patrick Cote?

A Yes.

Q You have now received a copy of the indictment?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q You have discussed it with your counsel, Mr. * * *?

A Yes.

Q You understand the charge in the indictment made against you?

A Yes.

Q You understand the penalties attached thereto?

A Yes.

The Court: Mr. (Counsel), you have consulted with Mr. Cote?

Mr. (Counsel): Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: And discussed the indictment?

Mr. (Counsel): Yes.

The Court: Does he understand the charges made against him?

Mr. (Counsel): Yes, sir.

The Court: Is he ready to be arraigned?

Mr. (Counsel): Yes, sir.

The Court: He may be arraigned.

Q (By the Court): Mr. Cote, before accepting the plea of guilty, the Court will inquire of you-are you pleading guilty because you are as a matter of fact guilty and for no other reason?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Has anyone threatened you or coerced you into making such a plea?

A No.

Q Has anyone made any promises of leniency to get you to enter such a plea?

A No, sir.

The Court: You recommend the Court accept the plea of guilty, Mr. (Counsel)?

Mr. (Counsel): Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: The plea is accepted.'

Mere acknowledgement by the accused personally, on the Court's inquiry, that he understands the charge and the range of penalties attached thereto, even when supported by the statement of counsel that the defendant is knowledgeable therein, does not satisfy the requirements of our Rule 11. See, Child v. State, Me.1969, 253 A.2d 691. The record further reveals that no inquiry was conducted in any form by the Court below to satisfy itself that the defendant had in fact committed the crime of escape to which he was pleading guilty.

The petitioner contends that the complete failure of the trial Court to satisfy the demands of our Rule 11 precluded it from accepting the guilty plea and fatally tainted the conviction, so that it was error for the post conviction habeas Court to deny the requested relief of setting aside the plea conviction and sentence and remanding the case for another hearing at which he should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew.

Such was the relief granted in McCarthy v. United States, April 2, 1969, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, where the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as requiring an on-the-record demonstration at the time the plea is entered that the defendant's plea was voluntary. This conclusion, the Court said, was reached solely on the basis of its supervisory power over the lower federal courts and not on any constitutional grounds.

The Supreme Court's rationale was expressed in clearly defined objectives:

'We thus conclude that prejudice inheres in a failure to comply with Rule 11, for non-compliance deprives the defendant of the Rule's procedural safeguards that are designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of his plea. Our holding that a defendant whose plea has been accepted in violation of Rule 11 should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew not only will insure that every accused is afforded those procedural safeguards, but also will help reduce the great waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the original record is inadequate.'

On May 5, 1969 the Supreme Court limited the McCarthy relief to those federal defendants whose guilty pleas were accepted after April 2, 1969, the date of the McCarthy decision. Halliday v. United States, May 5, 1969, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16. Even though the Court in McCarthy was not adopting a new constitutional concept, since it expressly stated that its ruling was not based on constitutional grounds, nevertheless, in Halliday, supra, it sanctioned, in determining the issue of retroactivity of McCarthy, the use of the same criteria employed in deciding whether constitutionally grounded decisions that depart from previous practice should be applied retroactively. The Halliday Court concluded that

'* * *, in view of the general application of Rule 11 in a manner inconsistent with our holding in McCarthy, and in view of the large number of constitutionally valid convictions that may have been obtained without full compliance with Rule 11, we decline to apply McCarthy retroactively. We hold that only those defendants whose guilty pleas were accepted after April 2, 1969, are entitled to plead anew if their pleas were accepted without full compliance with Rule 11.'

In McCarthy, supra, and Halliday, supra, the voluntariness section of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was involved. In Child v. State, supra, it was that part of our Rule 11 which concerns itself with the legal accuracy of the plea that was in issue. Our Court recognized the presiding Justice in the Superior Court who accepted Child's guilty plea on April 26, 1967 did not have the benefit of the McCarthy ruling respecting Federal Rule 11 in his evaluation of the requirements of our own Rule 11, nor of the impact a violation of the Rule might have on the plea itself.

Even in the face of Rule 2, M.R.Crim.P., which says

-(t)hese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,-(emphasis added)

our Court did not give relief to Child for the apparent reason that the McCarthy ruling, if controlling, was inapplicable since, as determined by Halliday, it was not to be given retroactive application. We need not in this case decide, nor do we intimate, that the Court was right or wrong in summarily denying relief to Child solely on the ground of non-retroactivity of the McCarthy interpretative ruling of Federal Rule 11. However, in this posture of the case, the Child decision did hold that no relief from violation of our...