Cottingham v. Warden, Ohio Reformatory For Women

• Decision Date: 17 August 2021
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-97
• Parties: JANISHCIA COTTINGHAM, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, OHIO REFORMATORY FOR WOMEN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

JANISHCIA COTTINGHAM, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, OHIO REFORMATORY FOR WOMEN, Respondent.

No. 1:21-cv-97

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division

August 17, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Karen L. Litkovitz, United States Magistrate Judge

Petitioner an inmate in state custody at the Ohio Reformatory for Women in Marysville, Ohio, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging her convictions in the Hamilton County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Case No. B-1305052. This case is before the Court on the petition, respondent's return of writ, and petitioner's reply to the return of writ. (Docs. 1, 5, 6).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

State Convictions and Sentence

On August 22, 2013, the Hamilton County, Ohio, grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging petitioner with Aggravated Murder (Count One), Murder (Count Two), and Felonious Assault (Count Three). (Doc. 4, Ex. 1). On September 9, 2013, petitioner, through counsel, entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. (Doc. 4, Ex. 3).

On October 10, 2013, the trial court found petitioner not competent to stand trial and ordered her to undergo treatment. (Doc. 4, Ex. 6). On January 28, 2014, following treatment, the court found petitioner restored to competency. (Doc. 4, Ex. 7).

On September 2, 2014, through different counsel, petitioner filed a motion to suppress evidence seized incident to her arrest and all statements she made while in police custody. (Doc. 4, Ex. 8). After conducting an evidentiary hearing, which included the testimony of a psychiatrist who had met extensively with petitioner and of one of the officers who had interviewed petitioner; hearing argument from counsel; and watching a DVD of petitioner's interview with police, the trial court found, on May 6, 2015, that petitioner was competent at the time she waived her Miranda^[1] rights and denied the motion to suppress evidence and statements. (Doc. 4, Ex. 12; see also Doc. 4-1, Transcript from Suppression Hearing, at PageID 148-78; Doc. 4-1, Transcript from Suppression Decision, at PageID 198-206).

Thereafter, also on May 6, 2015, petitioner, through counsel, waived her right to a jury trial, withdrew her prior plea of not guilty, and pleaded guilty to amended and reduced charges of involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, and child endangering, with an agreed upon sentence of twenty years. (Doc. 4, Exs. 13, 14; see also Doc. 4-1, Transcript from Change of Plea Hearing, at PageID 208).^[2] In accordance with the plea agreement, petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of twenty years in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. (Doc. 4, Ex. 16). Petitioner did not appeal.

First Delayed Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a pro se motion with the Ohio Court of Appeals on January 3, 2020 for leave to file a delayed appeal of her convictions and sentence. (Doc. 4, Ex. 17). On January 22, 2020, the Ohio Court of Appeals overruled petitioner's motion for delayed appeal. (Doc. 4, Ex. 19). The Ohio Supreme Court denied further review on April 28, 2020. (See Doc. 4, Ex. 23).

State Post-Conviction Motion

In the meantime, on January 14, 2020, petitioner filed a pro se petition to vacate or set aside the judgment of conviction, as well as pro se motions to appoint counsel and for expert assistance. (Doc. 4, Exs. 25-27). On March 6, 2020, the trial court denied the petition to vacate or set aside the judgment, implicitly denying the motions to appoint counsel and for expert assistance. (Doc. 4, Ex. 28). Petitioner filed a letter with the trial court in September 2020, which the trial court construed as a motion for judicial release. (See Doc. 4, Ex. 29). The trial court denied the motion on October 2, 2020. (Doc. 4, Ex. 30).

Federal Habeas Corpus

In February 2021, petitioner filed the instant federal habeas corpus petition, raising the following three grounds for relief:

GROUND ONE: Robin experienced fevers prior to her demise week before her passing.

Supporting Facts: Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center records of 08/09/2013 with Pt. Robin Cottingham 15 mos. w/ her parent Janishcia Cottingham. She experience fever and cold symptoms. Fever up to 101 at daycare yesterday. Also documents on how I am her only active parent her whole life with no support from family or friends.

GROUND TWO: Documents of my child smother with a pillow but, with (sic) evidence of this described pillow ever being tested.

Supporting Facts: Letter from Hamilton County Coroner stating no analytical report with that description in our system. At arrest reports of, Ms Janishcia Cottingham in a “somewhat catatonic state” before being interrogated.

GROUND THREE: I was placed several psychiatric, medicines on 08/16/2013 a day after processed into County Jail up until 05/13/2015.

Supporting Facts: I signed a plea deal of twenty year sentence after receiving two Thorazine injection both 25 mg/ml 4 quantity, three Diphenhydramine injection 50 mg/ml 1 quantity and Lorazepam injection 2 mg/ml 1 quantity which are (Thorazine) anti-psychotic med, (Benadryl) an antihistamine and Lorazepam injection date 4/19/15, 4/17/15, 4/6/2015 before 5/6/2015 plea agreement.

(Doc. 1, at PageID 6-8).

Respondent asserts that petitioner's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, procedurally defaulted, and/or fail on the merits. “[F]ederal courts are not required to address a procedural . . . issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). Because an analysis of the procedural issues raised by respondent would overlap with the merits of petitioner's claims, the Court will proceed to the merits.^[3]

III. THE HABEAS PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED.

In this federal habeas case, the applicable standard of review governing the adjudication of constitutional issues raised by petitioner to the state courts is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under that provision, a writ of habeas corpus may not issue with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state courts unless the adjudication either:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“A decision is ‘contrary to' clearly established federal law when ‘the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Otte v. Houk, 654 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)). “A state court's adjudication only results in an ‘unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law when ‘the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'” Id. at 599-600 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).

The statutory standard, established when the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was enacted, is a difficult one for habeas petitioners to meet. Id. at 600. As the Sixth Circuit explained in Otte:

Indeed, the Supreme Court has been increasingly vigorous in enforcing AEDPA's standards. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (holding that AEDPA limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court). It is not enough for us to determine that the state court's determination is incorrect; to grant the writ under this clause, we must hold that the state court's determination is unreasonable. . . . This is a “substantially higher threshold.”. . . To warrant AEDPA deference, a state court's “decision on the merits” does not have to give any explanation for its results, Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011), nor does it need to cite the relevant Supreme Court cases, as long as “neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam).

Id. (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court extended its ruling in Harrington to hold that when a state court rules against a defendant in an opinion that “addresses some issues but does not expressly address the federal claim in question, ” the federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was “adjudicated on the merits” and thus subject to the “restrictive standard of review” set out in § 2254(d). See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 292 (2013).

Although the standard is difficult to meet, § 2254(d) “stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings” and “preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). In other words, to obtain federal habeas relief under that provision, the state prisoner must show that the state court ruling on the claim presented “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

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