Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Mgmt., LLC
| Decision Date | 24 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:11-CV-95-PRC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
| Parties | FELISHA COTTLE, on behalf of herself and others similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. FALCON HOLDINGS MANAGEMENT, LLC and FALCON HOLDINGS MANAGEMENT, LLC d/b/a CHURCH'S CHICKEN, Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Falcon Holdings Management, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 87], filed by Defendants Falcon Holdings Management, LLC and Falcon Holdings, LLC d/b/a Church's Chicken on June 29, 2012. Plaintiff Felicia Cottle filed a response on July 27, 2012. Defendants have not filed a reply, and the time to do so has passed.
Plaintiff Felisha Cottle filed the instant cause of action against Defendant Falcon Holdings Management LLC d/b/a Church's Chicken on March 15, 2011. Falcon Holdings Management LLC d/b/a Church's Chicken filed an Answer on May 13, 2011.
On August 18, 2011, Ms. Cottle file a Motion to Certify as a Collective Action. On November 3, 2011, the Court conditionally certified this matter as a collective action. On November 18, 2011, Ms. Cottle filed a Motion for Approval of Proposed Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs, which the Court granted on December 6, 2011, and which was placed on the docket on January 27, 2012.
On April 11, 2012, Ms. Cottle filed an Amended Complaint, with leave of Court, naming Defendants Falcon Holdings Management, LLC and Falcon Holdings, LLC d/b/a Church's Chicken.Count I alleges a claim of "race and color discrimination" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and Count II alleges Title VII retaliation. Count III alleges failure to provide reasonable accommodations and disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and Count IV alleges ADA retaliation. Count V alleges failure to pay overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 201, et seq., and Count VI alleges FLSA retaliation. Count VII alleges a state law claim of negligent retention and supervision, while Count VIII alleges a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On April 18, 2012, Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint.
On September 20, 2012, the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Decertify the Class Action. However, the Court granted in part Defendants' Motion for Discovery Sanctions, dismissing with prejudice opt-in Plaintiffs Jasmine Smith, Jacqueline Coley, Kendra Jackson, Jasmine Marie Jackson, Lisa Stubbs, Toinette Neal, Alanza McCullum, Kyle Ferguson, Takyla Jones, Latoya Hughes, and William Lockhart. The Court also granted in part and denied in part as moot Defendants' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Claims of Certain FLSA Opt-In Plaintiffs, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants against opt-in Plaintiffs Tommy Conley, Roy Lee Gail, Shalonda Jones, Petrina Burpo, and Parthenia Ford. Thus, the collective action claim for unpaid overtime wages in Count V of the Amended Complaint remains pending as to collective action class members Felicia Cottle, Fred Culbreath, and Deon Thompson.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254,1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial," then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is notto evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
In November 2009, Ms. Cottle was a customer at Defendants' store 532, when she complained to her daughter about the poor service she was receiving. Farid Talukder, a market leader for Church's Chicken, was sitting at a table doing paperwork, and he overheard her and began a conversation with her. Ms. Cottle complained to Mr. Talukder about the poor service, and he responded that he was unable to motivate his employees to work. Ms. Cottle then responded that she had management experience. She testified that Mr. Talukder offered her a job as a shift manager. The paperwork indicates that Ms. Cottle was hired by Falcon Holdings, LLC on November 15, 2009, as a team member at store 532. In his deposition, Mr. Talukder testified that Ms. Cottle was in training to become a shift manager at the time of her termination.
Mr. Talukder hired Ms. Cottle that same day, and she began work the next day. Ms. Cottle testified that she never received a copy of Defendants' employee handbook, and no representative of Defendant ever reviewed its terms with her. Instead, Ms. Cottle testified that Mr. Talukder simply told Ms. Cottle that Defendants were hiring her at $9.00 per hour, gave her paperwork, told her to sign the paperwork, and said she could start working.
Mr. Talukder did not specifically remember reviewing Defendants' employee handbook with Ms. Cottle, nor did he remember reviewing the physical requirements for her job. He also did not remember reviewing any of Defendants' other hiring documents with Ms. Cottle. The application form completed by Ms. Cottle is for all positions, including both team member and shift manager.Ms. Cottle never signed an employee handbook, because Store 532 had none available at the time she was hired.1
Ms. Cottle performed all functions that Defendants listed as job duties belonging to both a team member and a shift manager.2 Ms. Cottle testified that both the store manager Monir Zaman and Mr. Talukder referred to her as a shift manager. When Mr. Talukder explained the job duties to Ms. Cottle, he outlined duties that belonged to the shift managers.
Ms. Cottle's paychecks were paid at the hourly rate of $7.25 or $7.75 per...
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