Cotton v. Missouri

• Decision Date: 21 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 4:15-CV-1414-SPM,4:15-CV-1414-SPM
• Parties: PATRICK COTTON, Petitioner, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

PATRICK COTTON, Petitioner, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent.

No. 4:15-CV-1414-SPM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

September 21, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Missouri state prisoner Patrick Cotton's ("Petitioner's") Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 5). For the following reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following background is taken from the Missouri Court of Appeals' opinion affirming the motion court's denial of Petitioner's motion for post-conviction relief:

[Petitioner] was an inmate in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. While in prison, [Petitioner] was involved in an altercation during which he struck Corrections Officer Anastacia Hirsch in the side and back of her head several times, grabbed her by the throat and threw her to the ground, causing her to hit her head on the ground. Keith Watson, a case manager at the prison, attempted to intervene. Corrections Officer Hirsch was diagnosed with a concussion and suffered scrapes and bruises to her neck, back, head, and arms. Watson allegedly suffered scrapes on his arm and knee as a result of the intervention.

[Petitioner] was charged with two counts of violence to an employee of the department of corrections by an inmate, Section 217.385, R.S. Mo. 2000. A jury convicted [Petitioner] of only the charge related to Corrections Officer Hirsch. [Petitioner] was sentenced, as a persistent offender, to twenty-five years of imprisonment. [Petitioner's] convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Cotton, 398 S.W.92 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).

Resp't Ex. I at 2-3.

In his direct appeal, Petitioner raised two points of trial error: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion to dismiss, which alleged that prison officials had viewed and then destroyed video footage of the incident that formed the basis of his charges, in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and his rights under the Missouri Constitution; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike a particular juror for cause, in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and his rights under the Missouri Constitution. Resp't Ex. B-1 at 13-14. Both claims were denied on the merits, and the conviction was affirmed. Resp't Ex. E at 3-8.

Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, asserting three claims: the two claims he raised on direct appeal, and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based several alleged defects in his attorney's performance. Resp't Ex. F at 8-15.¹ Through counsel, Petitioner subsequently filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief, asserting three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) that Petitioner's trial counsel failed to adduce evidence of an interoffice memorandum dated June 17, 2010, which showed there was reviewable video of the alleged incident that was destroyed only after Petitioner asserted his right to trial; (2) that Petitioner's trial counsel failed to object to the use of the initial aggressor language in the jury instructions; and (3) that Petitioner's trial counsel failed to cross-examine the alleged victim, Anastacia Hirsch, using photographs that showed her injuries were more minor than she portrayed them to be. Resp't Ex. F at 20-24. The motion court found all of Petitioner's claims without merit and denied the motion; it appears that the motion court considered only the claims in Petitioner's pro se motion. Resp't Ex. F at 40-46. Petitioner appealed the motion court's denial of his ineffective assistance claims, arguing the motion court erred in denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing because it entered only findings of fact and conclusions of law as to Petitioner's pro se claims, which were rendered a nullity when the amended motion was filed by counsel. Resp't Ex. I at 1-2. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court's decision. Resp't Ex. I at 5, 10.

On September 14, 2015, Petitioner filed his pro se petition in the instant action. Petitioner raises four claims: (1) that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony of the victim, Anastacia Hirsch, to convict him;² (2) that the trial court erred by overruling Petitioner's motion to dismiss based on the state's alleged bad-faith destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence; (3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike a juror whose answers revealed a pre-existing bias in favor of law enforcement; and (4) that his trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to introduce evidence that visible footage of the incident did exist; and (b) failing to use photographs of the victim's alleged injuries in cross-examining her regarding the extent of her injuries.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard for Reviewing Claims on the Merits

Federal habeas review exists only "as 'a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.'" Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011)). Accordingly, "[i]n the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by AEDPA [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of a claim "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. at 407-08; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "Finally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006) (noting that state court factual findings are presumed correct unless the habeas petitioner rebuts them through clear and convincing evidence) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

B. Procedural Default

To preserve a claim for federal habeas review, a state prisoner must present that claim to the state court and allow that court the opportunity to address the claim. Moore-El v. Luebbers, 446 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991)). See also Beaulieu v. Minnesota, 583 F.3d 570, 573 ("Ordinarily, a federal court reviewing a state conviction in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding may consider only those claims which the petitioner has presented to the state court in accordance with state procedural rules.") (quoting Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 1988)). "Where a petitioner fails to follow applicable state procedural rules, any claims not properly raised before the state court are procedurally defaulted." Moore-El, 446 F.3d at 896 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1992), & Abdullah v. Groose, 75 F.3d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1996)). The federal habeas court will consider a procedurally defaulted claim only "where the petitioner can establish either cause for the default and actual prejudice, or that the default will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that the claimed errors "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Lastly, in order to assert the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, a petitioner must "'present new evidence that affirmatively demonstrates that he is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.'" Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2006)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One: The Prosecution's Use of Perjured Testimony

In Ground One, Petitioner argues the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony to convict him. Petitioner contends that Anastacia Hirsch's testimony at trial concerning the assault was inconsistent with prior recorded or written statements she...